How much of the American boarder with Mexico is out of radar contact?

There was some fuss about the FAA creating TFRs for the UAVs that are flying
with boarder patrol along the Mexico. Why can't the UAV just fly along
under an IFR flight plan and everyone else just avoid the little thing just
like any other plane on an IFR flight plan?

When there is so much talk about securing the boarders, I can't imagine that
there is any strip of the boarder that we can not monitor by radar.

"John Doe" > wrote in
ink.net:

> How much of the American boarder with Mexico is out of radar contact?
>
> There was some fuss about the FAA creating TFRs for the UAVs that are
> flying with boarder patrol along the Mexico. Why can't the UAV just
> fly along under an IFR flight plan and everyone else just avoid the
> little thing just like any other plane on an IFR flight plan?
>
> When there is so much talk about securing the boarders, I can't
> imagine that there is any strip of the boarder that we can not monitor
> by radar.
>
>
>

The UAV is primarily looking at the ground....

--
-- ET >:-)

"A common mistake people make when trying to design something
completely foolproof is to underestimate the ingenuity of complete
fools."---- Douglas Adams

>>>>> "JD" == John Doe > writes:
JD> Why can't the UAV just fly along under an IFR flight plan and
JD> everyone else just avoid the little thing just like any other
JD> plane on an IFR flight plan?

Because that's not the way it works in VMC. In VMC, *everybody*
avoids everybody else visually, as well as with other aids (ATC). So
if the "little thing" is flying, and I'm flying, and it's VMC and I'm
not talking to ATC, and I don't see that "little thing", and of course
nobody is onboard the UAV to see me....midairs happen.

John Doe wrote:
> How much of the American boarder with Mexico is out of radar contact?
>
> There was some fuss about the FAA creating TFRs for the UAVs that are flying
> with boarder patrol along the Mexico. Why can't the UAV just fly along
> under an IFR flight plan and everyone else just avoid the little thing just
> like any other plane on an IFR flight plan?
The "UAVs" are really remotely-piloted vehicles. The pilots are
instrument rated and the planes are on IFR flight plans. That info
comes from a USMC pilot of one of them.

Maybe IFR from their base to the border, but when doing surveillance of
the border, the UAV will often loiter in an area which presents a
challenge to maintaining IFR separation.

"Stubby" > wrote in message
...
> John Doe wrote:
>> How much of the American boarder with Mexico is out of radar contact?
>>
>> There was some fuss about the FAA creating TFRs for the UAVs that are
>> flying with boarder patrol along the Mexico. Why can't the UAV just
>> fly along under an IFR flight plan and everyone else just avoid the
>> little thing just like any other plane on an IFR flight plan?
> The "UAVs" are really remotely-piloted vehicles. The pilots are
> instrument rated and the planes are on IFR flight plans. That info
> comes from a USMC pilot of one of them.

On Fri, 13 Jan 2006 12:38:33 GMT, "John Doe" >
wrote in et>::

>How much of the American boarder with Mexico is out of radar contact?

I would suspect the answer to that question is, very little. But
that's not the question we should be asking.

Why does baby Bush deploy UAVs for the mission of securing the
nation's southern border? Because UAVs cost millions of dollars, and
require a crew of 7 on the ground to operate them, not to mention the
airspace grab through TFRs, the money spent on this non-hostile
mission would be much better spent on live bodies in Cessna C-182s
equipped with IR sensors. UAVs are useful for missions on which the
potential for loss of crew is a factor, and about four times more
costly to operate than conventional manned surveillance aircraft. If
the Bush administration's goal were truly boarder security, they could
field four times as many manned observation/surveillance aircraft.

>There was some fuss about the FAA creating TFRs for the UAVs that are flying
>with boarder patrol along the Mexico.

And well there should be. The current UAVs lack the ability to comply
with FARs requiring aircraft to maintain _visual_ separation in VMC.

>Why can't the UAV just fly along under an IFR flight plan and everyone
>else just avoid the little thing just like any other plane on an IFR flight plan?

Because, in VMC the UAVs are unable to comply with federal
regulations.

>When there is so much talk about securing the boarders, I can't imagine that
>there is any strip of the boarder that we can not monitor by radar.

The borders are unsecured, because the Bush administration doesn't
want to secure them. The UAVs are being deployed to establish a
precedent for remote domestic surveillance, in my opinion, not to
secure the nation's borders. Given the cost involved, what other
reason for UAV deployment makes sense?

> The RFP for the southern border project specified UAV's with 12 hour
> endurance, synthetic aperture radar and a laser illuminator as well as
> a FLIR system, light amplification cameras, comm relay for ground
> agents, a mode S transponder and a pile of other stuff. You have a
> 182 and a crew that can do that?

I guess you're right. I've never heard of a 182 that can carry a mode S
transponder and be within its weight limits. The comm relay is another
impressive bit of gear - it can send signals literally through the air
as the aircraft is flying. Amazing technology, that.

I don't know how much the other equipment weighs, nor how it stacks up
against trained eyeballs. I have no idea why they need 12 hour
endurance - except that a UAV can't refuel as easily as a 182. I've
heard of 182s that can literally land on a grass field, refuel, and take
off again on that =very= =same= grass field!

How much of the UAV's systems are pilot surrogates? (that is, unneeded
if there were a live pilot on board?

Jose
--
Money: what you need when you run out of brains.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

I'm not sure how that relates to anything. ATC does not seperate IFR
pilots from non-partisipating VFR pilots. IFR pilots are required to
see-and-avoid just as much as VFR pilots. This TFR is a way around the
see-and-avoid requirement.

-Robert

There is radar contact along the entire U.S. Mexican boarder. I usually
call ATC about 10 miles south of the boarder when enter the U.S. I've
entered from several areas of California and Arizona. Also, along the
California boarder there are airways that are as close as 5 miles from
the boarder that do not enter Mexico.

-Robert

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> The borders are unsecured, because the Bush administration doesn't
> want to secure them. The UAVs are being deployed to establish a
> precedent for remote domestic surveillance, in my opinion, not to
> secure the nation's borders. Given the cost involved, what other
> reason for UAV deployment makes sense?

Window dressing, same as most of the TSA and Homeland Security nonsense.

"ET" > wrote in message
...
> "John Doe" > wrote in
> ink.net:
>
>> How much of the American boarder with Mexico is out of radar contact?
>>
>> There was some fuss about the FAA creating TFRs for the UAVs that are
>> flying with boarder patrol along the Mexico. Why can't the UAV just
>> fly along under an IFR flight plan and everyone else just avoid the
>> little thing just like any other plane on an IFR flight plan?
>>
>> When there is so much talk about securing the boarders, I can't
>> imagine that there is any strip of the boarder that we can not monitor
>> by radar.
>>
>>
>>
>
> The UAV is primarily looking at the ground....

Really? Gee and here this whole time I thought it was a cheap AWACS.....not
sh*t it's looking at the ground.

Ok, maybe I better explain my question.

The ISSUE seems to be deconfliction between the UAV flying boarder patrol
and VFR aircraft to ensure the two shall not collide.

"Bob Fry" > wrote in message
...
>>>>>> "JD" == John Doe > writes:
> JD> Why can't the UAV just fly along under an IFR flight plan and
> JD> everyone else just avoid the little thing just like any other
> JD> plane on an IFR flight plan?
>
> Because that's not the way it works in VMC. In VMC, *everybody*
> avoids everybody else visually, as well as with other aids (ATC). So
> if the "little thing" is flying, and I'm flying, and it's VMC and I'm
> not talking to ATC, and I don't see that "little thing", and of course
> nobody is onboard the UAV to see me....midairs happen.

Ok, you just contradicted yourself.

If you're flying in VMC and you don't see that "little thing", and have a
midair, it's your fault. Why does it matter if anyone is on board the UAV
or not?

Personally I think a NOTAM saying when/where the UAVs will be should be
enough for VFR pilots to avoid the thing. Why do we need a TFR?

"Stubby" > wrote in message
...
> John Doe wrote:
>> How much of the American boarder with Mexico is out of radar contact?
>>
>> There was some fuss about the FAA creating TFRs for the UAVs that are
>> flying with boarder patrol along the Mexico. Why can't the UAV just fly
>> along under an IFR flight plan and everyone else just avoid the little
>> thing just like any other plane on an IFR flight plan?
> The "UAVs" are really remotely-piloted vehicles. The pilots are
> instrument rated and the planes are on IFR flight plans. That info comes
> from a USMC pilot of one of them.

I understand that and it has nothing to do with my question....but thanks
for playing.

"sfb" > wrote in message news:r6Pxf.9$MG1.6@trnddc05...
> Maybe IFR from their base to the border, but when doing surveillance of
> the border, the UAV will often loiter in an area which presents a
> challenge to maintaining IFR separation.
>

ATC provides IFR seperation to aircraft all over the world. Why is our
boarder with Mexico so difficult?

> If you're flying in VMC and you don't see that "little thing", and have a
> midair, it's your fault.

It's also partly the UAV's fault. Everything is required to see and
avaoid in VMC.

Jose
--
Money: what you need when you run out of brains.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

"Robert M. Gary" > wrote in message
ups.com...
> I'm not sure how that relates to anything. ATC does not seperate IFR
> pilots from non-partisipating VFR pilots. IFR pilots are required to
> see-and-avoid just as much as VFR pilots. This TFR is a way around the
> see-and-avoid requirement.
>
> -Robert
>

I understand that, but if a TFR is the FAA's answer to UAVs, we're in for a
world of hurt for GA in this country.

"John Doe" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>> The UAV is primarily looking at the ground....
>
> Really? Gee and here this whole time I thought it was a cheap
> AWACS.....not sh*t it's looking at the ground.
>
> Ok, maybe I better explain my question.
>
> The ISSUE seems to be deconfliction between the UAV flying boarder patrol
> and VFR aircraft to ensure the two shall not collide.
>
>
>

The whole problem seems to be the conflict between border and boarder.
Introducing two separate and distinct subjects confuses some of our
readers.(LOL)

Tex

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 13 Jan 2006 12:38:33 GMT, "John Doe" >
> wrote in et>::
>
>>How much of the American boarder with Mexico is out of radar contact?
>
> I would suspect the answer to that question is, very little. But
> that's not the question we should be asking.
>
> Why does baby Bush deploy UAVs for the mission of securing the
> nation's southern border? Because UAVs cost millions of dollars, and
> require a crew of 7 on the ground to operate them, not to mention the
> airspace grab through TFRs, the money spent on this non-hostile
> mission would be much better spent on live bodies in Cessna C-182s
> equipped with IR sensors. UAVs are useful for missions on which the
> potential for loss of crew is a factor, and about four times more
> costly to operate than conventional manned surveillance aircraft. If
> the Bush administration's goal were truly boarder security, they could
> field four times as many manned observation/surveillance aircraft.

I completely agree. I think the problem is, there are UAVs that are
available now and it's an immediate bandaid to the problem. What we need is
a call for bids for a long term contract for airborne ISR to work with/for
the boarder patrol. I don't know of any fleet of aircraft/pilots that are
standing by and waiting to do this job.
>
>>There was some fuss about the FAA creating TFRs for the UAVs that are
>>flying
>>with boarder patrol along the Mexico.
>
> And well there should be. The current UAVs lack the ability to comply
> with FARs requiring aircraft to maintain _visual_ separation in VMC.
>
>>Why can't the UAV just fly along under an IFR flight plan and everyone
>>else just avoid the little thing just like any other plane on an IFR
>>flight plan?
>
> Because, in VMC the UAVs are unable to comply with federal
> regulations.
>

Guess it's time to change the FARs to welcome UAVs to US airspace....(like
it or not, they're here)

>>When there is so much talk about securing the boarders, I can't imagine
>>that
>>there is any strip of the boarder that we can not monitor by radar.
>
> The borders are unsecured, because the Bush administration doesn't
> want to secure them. The UAVs are being deployed to establish a
> precedent for remote domestic surveillance, in my opinion, not to
> secure the nation's borders. Given the cost involved, what other
> reason for UAV deployment makes sense?
>
>

Politics to show that the administration is doing something to address the
problem. I call it Bandaid Politics.

"Richard Riley" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 13 Jan 2006 15:46:12 GMT, Larry Dighera >
> wrote:

> :>Why can't the UAV just fly along under an IFR flight plan and everyone
> :>else just avoid the little thing just like any other plane on an IFR
> flight plan?
>
> They will. The problem is the VFR guy with no electrical system and
> no transponder, barreling through and not seeing the UAV.

Then the VFR guy needs to get his eyesight checked. How is that any
different from hitting someone else. Are you telling me that in every
previous case of a mid-air that blame was shared 50/50 between the two
parties?

Next, These UAVs are probably flying >10,000 along the boarder. How many
VFR "guys" with no electrical system, radios, transponder, etc are going to
be a) that close to the boarder and 2) that high?

I'm not really that opposed to ops along the boarder. My concern is when
UAVs spread to other areas around the country, metro areas, police actions,
etc and now we start having TFRs or worse all over the place.

"Jose" > wrote in message
...
>> The RFP for the southern border project specified UAV's with 12 hour
>> endurance, synthetic aperture radar and a laser illuminator as well as
>> a FLIR system, light amplification cameras, comm relay for ground
>> agents, a mode S transponder and a pile of other stuff. You have a
>> 182 and a crew that can do that?
>

Sounds like politics to me. Defense industry at it's best. There's big
bucks in this stuff and no one wants to give that up for a bunch of bush
pilots out in the desert. You're talking about $10 million or more for a
UAV with all that stuff on board. Just think about how many C-182s (or
whatever) you could run for that amount of cash. I wouldn't need 1 C-182 to
fly 12 hours. I could have 6 of them flying 2 hours each. (or whatever).

I'm not fighting China here folks, most of that stuff is fancy overkill.
(what about the tunnel found in California, none of that stuff would have
found that)

A pilot and spotter with a pair of bino's during the day and NVGs at night
would work just fine. A beefed up laser pointer would work just as well
from 1-2000' feet. Comm relay for ground agents? Comm on, they've all got
cell phones. Transponder, gee that's tough.

On Fri, 13 Jan 2006 08:52:21 -0800, Richard Riley
> wrote in
>::

>On Fri, 13 Jan 2006 15:46:12 GMT, Larry Dighera >
>wrote:
>
>:On Fri, 13 Jan 2006 12:38:33 GMT, "John Doe" >
>:wrote in et>::
>:
>:Why does baby Bush deploy UAVs for the mission of securing the
>:nation's southern border? Because UAVs cost millions of dollars, and
>:require a crew of 7 on the ground to operate them, not to mention the
>:airspace grab through TFRs, the money spent on this non-hostile
>:mission would be much better spent on live bodies in Cessna C-182s
>:equipped with IR sensors.
>
>The RFP for the southern border project specified UAV's with 12 hour
>endurance, synthetic aperture radar and a laser illuminator as well as
>a FLIR system, light amplification cameras, comm relay for ground
>agents, a mode S transponder and a pile of other stuff.

Is the equipment specification in that Request For Proposal a result
of necessity to accomplish the mission of securing the nation's
boarders, or was the specification established to conform to
pre-existing UAV equipment? (are you able to provide a URL for the
RFP?) After all, the civilian militia currently patrolling the
southern boarder, that sprang up out of necessity to protect private
property, successfully uses model aircraft equipped with video
cameras. The difference in cost is many orders of magnitude less than
a UAV and a ground crew.

>You have a 182 and a crew that can do that?

You could deploy four C-182s with 2-man crews with capabilities
similar to the UAV specification, and save millions of dollars, and
avoid impacting the safety of the National Airspace System with
Temporary Flight Restrictions. The Bush administration's choice to
employ UAVs is clearly not driven by minimizing cost nor capabilities.

>And - btw - the optical systems can't be in the propeller slipstream,
>the turbulance degrades their resolution too much. That's why so many
>of the UAV's are pushers.

So mount the FLIR head out on the wing out of the prop-wash.

>So you're looking at a twin, minimum 2 people on board and a PILE of
>gear - and 12 hour endurance.

Let me remind you, the mission is currently being successfully
accomplished with model aircraft fitted with video cameras. The use
of UAVs is not justified for this border patrol mission.

>:UAVs are useful for missions on which the
>:potential for loss of crew is a factor, and about four times more
>:costly to operate than conventional manned surveillance aircraft. If
>:the Bush administration's goal were truly boarder security, they could
>:field four times as many manned observation/surveillance aircraft.
>
>It's a lot easier to look at the video and data from a base station on
>the ground with a hot coffee in hand than in the airplane after you've
>been flying for 10 hours straight.

I'll accept your lack of contention as agreement, that UAVs only make
sense for missions that have potential for catastrophe for manned
aircraft.

>:>There was some fuss about the FAA creating TFRs for the UAVs that are flying
>:>with boarder patrol along the Mexico.

As well there should have been. The FAA has the responsibility of
safely operating the NAS. Given the rash of poorly thought out
Executive branch mandated TFRs that have been created since the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, it's a wonder that the NAS
continues to function at all.

>:And well there should be. The current UAVs lack the ability to comply
>:with FARs requiring aircraft to maintain _visual_ separation in VMC.
>
>Look up "HALE ROA"

From this statement on the Access 5 web-site:

http://www.access5.aero/access5_custom/what.html
What is Access 5 ?

Access 5 is a national project sponsored by NASA and Industry with
participation by the FAA and DoD to introduce high altitude long
endurance (HALE) remotely operated aircraft (ROA) for routine
flights in the National Airspace System (NAS). Access 5 commenced
in May 2004 and is slated to run for five years. The project has
received initial funding from NASA and guarantees of support from
the ROA industry. (ROA will be used interchangably [sic] with
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) throughout this website.)

The goal of Access 5 is to enable what government and industry
leaders believe will ultimately be a robust civil and commercial
market for HALE ROA. The current lack of ready access to the NAS
inhibits investment in ROA commercialization and the ability of
users to obtain cost-effective ROA services. Access 5 seeks to
remove the barriers to aviation's most compelling new offering in
decades.

It is patently obvious that Access 5's goal is all about big business
exploiting and compromising the safety of the NAS in which the public
relies for travel.

>:>Why can't the UAV just fly along under an IFR flight plan and everyone
>:>else just avoid the little thing just like any other plane on an IFR flight plan?
>
>They will. The problem is the VFR guy with no electrical system and
>no transponder, barreling through and not seeing the UAV.

If the "VFR guy" fails to see-and-avoid the UAV, he is subject to FAA
administrative action probably resulting in suspension of his pilot
certificate if he survives the MAC. On the other hand, if the UAV
crew's failure to see-and-avoid causes a MAC, the "VFR guy" probably
dies.

Please cite the federal regulations that specify what action will be
taken against the UAV crew in the event of their causing a MAC.

>:The borders are unsecured, because the Bush administration doesn't
>:want to secure them. The UAVs are being deployed to establish a
>:precedent for remote domestic surveillance, in my opinion, not to
>:secure the nation's borders. Given the cost involved, what other
>:reason for UAV deployment makes sense?
>
>You want to see a precident for domestic surveillance? See
>http://news.pajamasmedia.com/science/2006/01/13/6944237_USDA_Using_Satel.shtml
>
WICHITA, Kan., Jan. 13, 2006 (AP Online delivered by Newstex) --
Satellites have monitored crop conditions around the world for
decades, helping traders predict futures prices in commodities
markets and governments anticipate crop shortages.

But those satellite images are now increasingly turning up in
courtrooms across the nation as the Agriculture Department's Risk
Management Agency cracks down on farmers involved in crop
insurance fraud.

The Agriculture Department's Farm Service Agency, which helps
farmers get loans and payments from a number of its programs, also
uses satellite imaging to monitor compliance.

Across government and private industry alike, satellite imaging
technology is being used in water rights litigation and in
prosecution of environmental cases ranging from a hog confinement
facility's violations of waste discharge regulations to injury
damage lawsuits stemming from herbicide applications. The
technology is also used to monitor the forestry and mining
industries.

"A lot of farmers would be shocked at the detail you can tell.
What it does is keep honest folks honest," said G.A. "Art" Barnaby
Jr., an agricultural economist at Kansas State University.

Satellite technology, which takes images at roughly eight-day
intervals, can be used to monitor when farmers plant their
acreage, how they irrigate them and what crops they grow. If
anomalies are found in a farm's insurance claim, investigators can
search satellite photos dating back years to determine cropping
practices on individual fields.

...

While fewer than 100 cases have been prosecuted using satellite
imaging since the RMA started its crackdown in 2001, data mining _
coupled with satellite imaging _ pinpoints about 1,500 farms
annually that are put on a watch list for possible crop fraud,
Hand said. Ground inspections are done on the suspect farms
throughout the growing season.

The agency says its spot checklist generated by the satellite data
has saved taxpayers between $71 million and $110 million a year in
fraudulent crop insurance claims since 2001.

The agency stepped up its enforcement after the Agriculture Risk
Protection Act of 2000 mandated it use data mining to ferret out
false claims, Hand said. Every year, it ships claims data to the
Center for Agriculture Excellence at Tarleton State University in
Stephensville, Texas, where analysts look for anomalies in claims.
They generate a list of claims for further investigation, with
satellite imaging pulled on the most egregious cases.

Just as U.S. satellites kept track of things like the wheat
harvest in the former Soviet Union, other countries have also
launched satellites to monitor American crops. Germany, France and
others have satellites monitoring crop conditions, and many other
private firms sell those images in the U.S.

"Everybody spies on everybody. I was stunned to hear that myself,"
Edwards said. "Someday, I may have to rely on a French satellite
to convict an American citizen."


Just because the federal government spies on its citizens, doesn't
make it right:


http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/16/AR2005121600021.html
Bush Authorized Domestic Spying
Post-9/11 Order Bypassed Special Court

By Dan Eggen
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, December 16, 2005; Page A01

President Bush signed a secret order in 2002 authorizing the
National Security Agency to eavesdrop on U.S. citizens and foreign
nationals in the United States, despite previous legal
prohibitions against such domestic spying, sources with knowledge
of the program said last night.

The super-secretive NSA, which has generally been barred from
domestic spying except in narrow circumstances involving foreign
nationals, has monitored the e-mail, telephone calls and other
communications of hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of people under
the program, the New York Times disclosed last night.

...

Congressional sources familiar with limited aspects of the program
would not discuss any classified details but made it clear there
were serious questions about the legality of the NSA actions. The
sources, who demanded anonymity, said there were conditions under
which it would be possible to gather and retain information on
Americans if the surveillance were part of an investigation into
foreign intelligence.

But those cases are supposed to be minimized. The sources said the
actual work of the NSA is so closely held that it is difficult to
determine whether it is acting within the law.

The revelations come amid a fierce congressional debate over
reauthorization of the USA Patriot Act, an anti-terrorism law
passed after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. The Patriot Act granted
the FBI new powers to conduct secret searches and surveillance in
the United States.

Most of the powers covered under that law are overseen by a secret
court that meets at Justice Department headquarters and must
approve applications for wiretaps, searches and other operations.
The NSA's operation is outside that court's purview, and according
to the Times report, the Justice Department may have sought to
limit how much that court was made aware of NSA activities.

Public disclosure of the NSA program also comes at a time of
mounting concerns about civil liberties over the domestic
intelligence operations of the U.S. military, which have also
expanded dramatically after the Sept. 11 attacks.

For more than four years, the NSA tasked other military
intelligence agencies to assist its broad-based surveillance
effort directed at people inside the country suspected of having
terrorist connections, even before Bush signed the 2002 order that
authorized the NSA program, according to an informed U.S.
official.

The effort, which began within days after the attacks, has
consisted partly of monitoring domestic telephone conversations,
e-mail and even fax communications of individuals identified by
the NSA as having some connection to al Qaeda events or figures,
or to potential terrorism-related activities in the United States,
the official said.

It has also involved teams of Defense Intelligence Agency
personnel stationed in major U.S. cities conducting the type of
surveillance typically performed by the FBI: monitoring the
movements and activities -- through high-tech equipment -- of
individuals and vehicles, the official said.

The involvement of military personnel in such tasks was provoked
by grave anxiety among senior intelligence officials after the
2001 suicide attacks that additional terrorist cells were present
within U.S. borders and could only be discovered with the
military's help, said the official, who had direct knowledge of
the events.

Kate Martin, director of the Center for National Security Studies,
said the secret order may amount to the president authorizing
criminal activity.

The law governing clandestine surveillance in the United States,
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, prohibits conducting
electronic surveillance not authorized by statute. A government
agent can try to avoid prosecution if he can show he was "engaged
in the course of his official duties and the electronic
surveillance was authorized by and conducted pursuant to a search
warrant or court order of a court of competent jurisdiction,"
according to the law.

"This is as shocking a revelation as we have ever seen from the
Bush administration," said Martin, who has been sharply critical
of the administration's surveillance and detention policies. "It
is, I believe, the first time a president has authorized
government agencies to violate a specific criminal prohibition and
eavesdrop on Americans."

Caroline Fredrickson, director of the Washington legislative
office of the American Civil Liberties Union, said she is
"dismayed" by the report.

"It's clear that the administration has been very willing to
sacrifice civil liberties in its effort to exercise its authority
on terrorism, to the extent that it authorizes criminal activity,"
Fredrickson said.
...

On Fri, 13 Jan 2006 18:24:56 GMT, "John Doe" >
wrote in et>::

>
>Guess it's time to change the FARs to welcome UAVs to US airspace....(like
>it or not, they're here)

Perhaps it's time to publicly voice your opposition to UAVs in
domestic airspace before it's too late.

http://www.house.gov/writerep/
http://www.senate.gov/general/contact_information/senators_cfm.cfm

("Jose" wrote)
> It's also partly the UAV's fault. Everything is required to see and
> avaoid in VMC.


That's pretty much what the 'illegals' on the ground are trying to do also -
see and avoid.


Montblack

On Fri, 13 Jan 2006 18:31:22 GMT, "John Doe" >
wrote in et>::

>
>I'm not really that opposed to ops along the boarder. My concern is when
>UAVs spread to other areas around the country, metro areas, police actions,
>etc and now we start having TFRs or worse all over the place.

Right. This is the camel's nose under the tent.

http://camelphotos.com/tales_nose.html

("John Doe" wrote)
> Politics to show that the administration is doing something to address the
> problem. I call it Bandaid Politics.


Two years into his second term and ten years after everyone knew there was a
problem ...it's not time for a bandaid, it's time for a tourniquet!


Montblack

John Doe wrote:

> If you're flying in VMC and you don't see that "little thing", and have a
> midair, it's your fault. Why does it matter if anyone is on board the UAV
> or not?

Who cares whose fault it is? You're much more likely to be blindsided by one of
these things than by an aircraft piloted by someone who isn't suicidal.

> Personally I think a NOTAM saying when/where the UAVs will be should be
> enough for VFR pilots to avoid the thing. Why do we need a TFR?

Put out a NOTAM, and the people smugglers will be able to find out what areas
aren't being patrolled at the moment.

George Patterson
Coffee is only a way of stealing time that should by rights belong to
your slightly older self.

John Doe wrote:

> ATC provides IFR seperation to aircraft all over the world.

ATC does not provide separation between IFR aircraft and VFR aircraft.

George Patterson
Coffee is only a way of stealing time that should by rights belong to
your slightly older self.

> You want to see a precident for domestic surveillance? See
> http://news.pajamasmedia.com/science/2006/01/13/6944237_USDA_Using_Satel.shtml

That, is an interesting article!

"George Patterson" > wrote \

> Put out a NOTAM, and the people smugglers will be able to find out what
> areas aren't being patrolled at the moment.

How about a NOTAM that says the areas involved, and the altitude the thing
will be flying at, and leave the notam in place. Then, all you have to do
is avoid, say 2000 feet and you will not hit/be hit by it.
--
Jim in NC

"john smith" > wrote in message
...
>> You want to see a precident for domestic surveillance? See
>> http://news.pajamasmedia.com/science/2006/01/13/6944237_USDA_Using_Satel.shtml
>
> That, is an interesting article!

AP slacking off. NPR had that story in November or December on Morning
Edition. I think it was a multi-part piece.

On Fri, 13 Jan 2006 17:48:51 -0800, Richard Riley
> wrote in
>::

>That's what the whole Access 5 program is about - being able to fly
>UAV's in the airspace *without* impacting other traffic.

However, that is not what is occurring with regard to the UAV Mexico
border patrol. In fact, to my knowledge, the UAV manufacturers have
not yet demonstrated a synthetic vision system adequate to permit UAVs
to comply with FAA see-and-avoid regulations.

To move forward deploying UAVs in domestic airspace is, as a result of
that failure, is irresponsible at best, if not negligent. And the
federal government's complicity in bilking the American people of
millions of dollars in UAV funding is a travesty and reveals the
current lack of fiscal responsibility.

The money is better spent putting more agents in the field and
implementing effective deportation policies; that's where the problems
are.

"Larry Dighera" > wrote

> In fact, to my knowledge, the UAV manufacturers have
> not yet demonstrated a synthetic vision system adequate to permit UAVs
> to comply with FAA see-and-avoid regulations.

You know, I wonder why they have not developed some means, yet. There are
certainly radar systems that could be tuned to detect planes in the area.
Perhaps they could just swing their existing ground surveillance systems up
and around the surrounding airspace once in a while, to make sure the
airspace is clear?
--
Jim in NC

Start making L19s again? They carried a lot of stuff for FACing.
Walt BJ

"John Doe" > wrote in message
ink.net...
> How much of the American boarder with Mexico is out of radar contact?
>
> There was some fuss about the FAA creating TFRs for the UAVs that are
> flying with boarder patrol along the Mexico. Why can't the UAV just fly
> along under an IFR flight plan and everyone else just avoid the little
> thing just like any other plane on an IFR flight plan?
>
> When there is so much talk about securing the boarders, I can't imagine
> that there is any strip of the boarder that we can not monitor by radar.

The TFR text says 12,000' to 14,000' inclusive.

So if you are lower than 12,000' or higher than 14,000' there's no
restriction, right?

Jay B

I know at one time the US deployed tethered "blimps" carrying radar to
provide radar coverage along the border, and even in the Florida Keys. I've
seen the lighter-than-air vehicles while flying or driving in the area.
It's been a few years since I was near the areas. I'm not sure if they
still operate or not.
Click here for more info http://tinyurl.com/9wjup

--
Scott

Today, the sons and daughters of those earlier appeasers have taken up
where their parents and grandparents left off. - Burt Prelutsky
http://tinyurl.com/coplb

John Doe wrote:
> "Bob Fry" > wrote in message
> ...
> >>>>>> "JD" == John Doe > writes:
> > JD> Why can't the UAV just fly along under an IFR flight plan and
> > JD> everyone else just avoid the little thing just like any other
> > JD> plane on an IFR flight plan?
> >
> > Because that's not the way it works in VMC. In VMC, *everybody*
> > avoids everybody else visually, as well as with other aids (ATC). So
> > if the "little thing" is flying, and I'm flying, and it's VMC and I'm
> > not talking to ATC, and I don't see that "little thing", and of course
> > nobody is onboard the UAV to see me....midairs happen.
>
> Ok, you just contradicted yourself.
>
> If you're flying in VMC and you don't see that "little thing", and have a
> midair, it's your fault. Why does it matter if anyone is on board the UAV
> or not?
>
> Personally I think a NOTAM saying when/where the UAVs will be should be
> enough for VFR pilots to avoid the thing. Why do we need a TFR?

Answer a question for me: is this a little bitty slow UAV that's hard
to see from any kind of distance or one of the larger, faster ones that
can run a light plane down from behind where the pilot couldn't see it
coming?

John Doe wrote:
> "Bob Fry" > wrote in message
> ...
> >>>>>> "JD" == John Doe > writes:
> > JD> Why can't the UAV just fly along under an IFR flight plan and
> > JD> everyone else just avoid the little thing just like any other
> > JD> plane on an IFR flight plan?
> >
> > Because that's not the way it works in VMC. In VMC, *everybody*
> > avoids everybody else visually, as well as with other aids (ATC). So
> > if the "little thing" is flying, and I'm flying, and it's VMC and I'm
> > not talking to ATC, and I don't see that "little thing", and of course
> > nobody is onboard the UAV to see me....midairs happen.
>
> Ok, you just contradicted yourself.
>
> If you're flying in VMC and you don't see that "little thing", and have a
> midair, it's your fault. Why does it matter if anyone is on board the UAV
> or not?
>
> Personally I think a NOTAM saying when/where the UAVs will be should be
> enough for VFR pilots to avoid the thing. Why do we need a TFR?

Answer a question for me: is this a little bitty slow UAV that's hard
to see from any kind of distance or one of the larger, faster ones that
can run a light plane down from behind where the pilot couldn't see it
coming?

Larry Dighera wrote:

> Why...deploy UAVs for the mission of securing the
> nation's southern border? Because UAVs cost millions of dollars, and
> require a crew of 7 on the ground to operate them....

How many people are required to keep a 182 operating on the same mission?



Jack

On Fri, 13 Jan 2006 18:12:46 GMT, "John Doe" >
wrote:
>
>If you're flying in VMC and you don't see that "little thing", and have a
>midair, it's your fault. Why does it matter if anyone is on board the UAV
>or not?
>
>Personally I think a NOTAM saying when/where the UAVs will be should be
>enough for VFR pilots to avoid the thing. Why do we need a TFR?
>


I was down that way a couple of weeks ago (closer to Sierra Vista) and
saw a big white airship hovering at around 2000 feet - if this is the
UAV they're talking about, you don't have to worry about it running
into you - or you not seeing it.

jb

> Answer a question for me: is this a little bitty slow UAV that's hard
> to see from any kind of distance or one of the larger, faster ones that
> can run a light plane down from behind where the pilot couldn't see it
> coming?

Not to be flip, but it is a small camel or a large one?

Jose
--
Money: what you need when you run out of brains.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

"tscottme" <blahblah@blah,net> wrote in message
...
> I know at one time the US deployed tethered "blimps" carrying radar to
> provide radar coverage along the border, and even in the Florida Keys.
I've
> seen the lighter-than-air vehicles while flying or driving in the area.
> It's been a few years since I was near the areas. I'm not sure if they
> still operate or not.

As of about a year or so ago, there was still one down in the Keys... The
one that is south of Houston along the coast, I haven't stumbled across in a
few years, but I suspect it's still there...

On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 10:52:42 GMT, Jack > wrote in
>::

>Larry Dighera wrote:
>
>> Why...deploy UAVs for the mission of securing the
>> nation's southern border? Because UAVs cost millions of dollars, and
>> require a crew of 7 on the ground to operate them....
>
>How many people are required to keep a 182 operating on the same mission?

That's a good question. Perhaps you'll find time to research it.

It's clear that it doesn't take 7 people to fly a C-172 as it does a
UAV.

On Fri, 13 Jan 2006 18:16:13 -0800, Richard Riley
> wrote in
>::

>On Fri, 13 Jan 2006 18:45:58 GMT, Larry Dighera >
>wrote:
>
>:On Fri, 13 Jan 2006 08:52:21 -0800, Richard Riley
> wrote in
>::
>:
>:Is the equipment specification in that Request For Proposal a result
>:of necessity to accomplish the mission of securing the nation's
>:boarders, or was the specification established to conform to
>:pre-existing UAV equipment? (are you able to provide a URL for the
>:RFP?)
>
>Search for hsbp1005r0425
>

These two references were all I found:



http://www.fbodaily.com/archive/2005/06-June/23-Jun-2005/FBO-00833130.htm
FBO DAILY ISSUE OF JUNE 23, 2005 FBO #1305
SOLICITATION NOTICE

15 -- Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
Notice Date
6/21/2005

Notice Type
Solicitation Notice

NAICS
541330 — Engineering Services

Contracting Office
DHS - Border and Transportation Security, Customs and Border
Protection, Office of Procurement, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,
Room 1310 NP, Washington, DC, 20229

ZIP Code
20229

Solicitation Number
HSBP1005R0425

Response Due
7/19/2005

Archive Date
8/3/2005

Description
Please Note that this Announcement is issued in order to upload
Solicitation HSBP1005R0425 into FebBizOpps and is not a notice of
a new requirement. It is the resulting solicitation that was
announced earlier as Reference Number 5-10-2005-UAV-FY05 SUBJECT:
PRESOLICITATION NOTICE - Department of Homeland Security Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV). GENERAL INFORMATION: The Department of
Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of
Border Patrol intends to issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) to
procure an operating UAV system(s) (UAV airframe(s) and sensors,
Ground Control Stations (GCSs), Sensor Control Terminals (SCTs)
and Remote Viewing Terminals (RVTs)). CBP is seeking sources that
can provide a medium altitude long endurance UAV system(s),
support equipment, air vehicle and sensor operators, maintenance
personnel and systems integration support. Initial operations are
intended to be conducted on the Southern Border of the United
States. CBP intends to commence UAV operations 30 days after
contract award. CBP anticipates conducting operations during 4th
Quarter FY 05. Operations and maintenance support shall be
month-to-month for a minimum of 224 hours per month, with the
potential for increased flying hours each month, above the
minimum. For this effort an Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite
Quantity type contract for engineering services, Time and Material
for operations and maintenance support, and Firm Fixed Price (FFP)
pricing arrangements for UAV systems is anticipated. The
Government anticipates a single-award contract pursuant to the
criteria in the RFP. This will be a Full and Open Competition. It
is anticipated that the solicitation will be issued on or about
May 26, 2005. Note: The reference number used to identify this
pre-solicitation notice is not the solicitation number. When the
solicitation for this requirement is posted a DHS solicitation
number with the appropriate nomenclature will be used. POINT OF
CONTACT: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of
Procurement, Suite 1310, ATTN: Sharon Lim, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave.,
NW, Washington, D.C. 20229. All questions and comments should be
in writing and should be directed to the Contracting Officer,
Sharon Lim, via email. The contact information for the contracting
officer is as follows: Telephone (202) 344-1112, Fax (202)
344-1190 or Email: .

Place of Performance
Address: Southern Border of the United States

Record
SN00833130-W 20050623/050621211521 (fbodaily.com)

Source
FedBizOpps.gov Link to This Notice
(may not be valid after Archive Date)




http://www.fbodaily.com/archive/2005/06-June/24-Jun-2005/FBO-00834206.htm

FBO DAILY ISSUE OF JUNE 24, 2005 FBO #1306
MODIFICATION

15 -- Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
Notice Date
6/22/2005

Notice Type
Modification

NAICS
336411 — Aircraft Manufacturing

Contracting Office
DHS - Border and Transportation Security, Customs and Border
Protection, Office of Procurement, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,
Room 1310 NP, Washington, DC, 20229

ZIP Code
20229

Solicitation Number
Reference-Number-5-10-2005-UAV-FY05

Response Due
7/19/2005

Archive Date
8/3/2005

Description
PLEASE NOTE: INFORMATION RELATING TO THIS REQUIREMENT IS NOW
AVAILABLE UNDER SOLICITATION REFERENCE NUMBER: HSBP1005R0425 WHICH
WAS POSTED 6/21/2005 SUBJECT: PRESOLICITATION NOTICE - Department
of Homeland Security Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). GENERAL
INFORMATION: The Department of Homeland Security, Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) Office of Border Patrol intends to issue a
Request for Proposal (RFP) to procure an operating UAV system(s)
(UAV airframe(s) and sensors, Ground Control Stations (GCSs),
Sensor Control Terminals (SCTs) and Remote Viewing Terminals
(RVTs)). CBP is seeking sources that can provide a medium altitude
long endurance UAV system(s), support equipment, air vehicle and
sensor operators, maintenance personnel and systems integration
support. Initial operations are intended to be conducted on the
Southern Border of the United States. CBP intends to commence UAV
operations 30 days after contract award. CBP anticipates
conducting operations during 4th Quarter FY 05. Operations and
maintenance support shall be month-to-month for a minimum of 224
hours per month, with the potential for increased flying hours
each month, above the minimum. For this effort an Indefinite
Delivery, Indefinite Quantity type contract for engineering
services, Time and Material for operations and maintenance
support, and Firm Fixed Price (FFP) pricing arrangements for UAV
systems is anticipated. The Government anticipates a single-award
contract pursuant to the criteria in the RFP. This will be a Full
and Open Competition. It is anticipated that the solicitation will
be issued on or about May 26, 2005. Note: The reference number
used to identify this pre-solicitation notice is not the
solicitation number. When the solicitation for this requirement is
posted a DHS solicitation number with the appropriate nomenclature
will be used. POINT OF CONTACT: U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, Office of Procurement, Suite 1310, ATTN: Sharon Lim,
1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20229. All questions
and comments should be in writing and should be directed to the
Contracting Officer, Sharon Lim, via email. The contact
information for the contracting officer is as follows: Telephone
(202) 344-1112, Fax (202) 344-1190 or Email: .

Record
SN00834206-W 20050624/050622211524 (fbodaily.com)

Source
FedBizOpps.gov Link to This Notice
(may not be valid after Archive Date)


And then there's the irony of this: http://uvscanada.org/blog/?p=13 .
Imagine an American neighboring country looking at US border patrol
equipment.


>None of the manufacturers were able to provide a UAV that met all
>their specs, so the specs were NOT written to match existing hardware.

Unfortunately, I wasn't able to locate those specifications on-line.
Are you able to provide a URL for them?

>Predator B won, they came the closest.


From the General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc web-site:

http://www.uav.com/products/predator_b.html
The Predator B aircraft was developed in 2000 with first flight
commencing in February 2001. Powered by a turboprop engine, the
Predator B series was designed as a long-endurance, high-altitude
unmanned aircraft for use as a multi-mission system by a variety
of customers. From reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and
weapons delivery to scientific research and other civilian
applications, Predator B has the capacity to conduct multiple
missions simultaneously due to its large internal and external
payload capacity.


PREDATOR B
Military Multi-Mission ISR
Wingspan: 66 ft (20.1168m)
Fuselage: 36 ft (10.9728m)
Weight: 10,000 lb (4536 kg)
Altitude: 50,000 ft
Endurance: 30+ hr
Payload: Internal - 800 lb (363 kg)
External - 3,000 lb (1361 kg)
Powerplant: Honeywell TPE 331-10T
Air Speed: Over 220 kn
Customer: U.S. Air Force


ALTAIR
High-Altitude
Scientific Research
Wingspan: 86 ft (26.2128m)
Fuselage: 36 ft (10.9728m)
Weight: 7,000 lb (3175 kg)
Altitude: 52,000 ft
Endurance: 30+ hr
Payload: Internal - 660 lb (300 kg)
External - 3,000 lb (1361 kg)
Powerplant: Honeywell TPE 331-10T
Air Speed: TBA
Customer: NASA


MARINER
Long-Endurance
Border & Maritime Surveillance
Wingspan: 86 ft (26.2128m)
Fuselage: 36 ft (10.9728m)
Weight: 10,500 lb (4763 kg)
Altitude: 52,000 ft
Endurance: 49+ hr
Payload: Internal - 800 lb (363 kg)
External - 3,000 lb (1361 kg)
Powerplant: Honeywell TPE 331-10T
Air Speed: Over 220 kn
Customer: U.S. Navy, Dept of Homeland Security


More information here:
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/predator/


>Other proposals were less
>expensive, and one (at least) took a very creative approach to provide
>the same capabilities using smaller vehicles at lower cost, but it
>didn't quite conform to the requirements.

It sure would be interesting to see those requirements (and the
proposals).

>I don't agree with your basic assumptions, but since I work in the
>field I won't engage you debate.

I respect your decision, but what better debate is there but that
between two people with differing viewpoints? You shouldn't have
anything to fear (from your government nor employer). If the decision
to employ UAVs for border patrol can't stand open public debate,
perhaps there is something suspect about it.

On Fri, 13 Jan 2006 22:20:24 -0500, "Morgans"
> wrote in >::

>
>"Larry Dighera" > wrote
>
>> In fact, to my knowledge, the UAV manufacturers have
>> not yet demonstrated a synthetic vision system adequate to permit UAVs
>> to comply with FAA see-and-avoid regulations.
>
>You know, I wonder why they have not developed some means, yet.

It's probably quite difficult.

Don't forget, these UAVs operate antonymous (without operator input)
on some missions and whenever the command radio link is inoperative.
At those times there is no possibility of human intervention in the
event of a potential MAC.

>There are certainly radar systems that could be tuned to detect planes in the area.

But, could they be shown to be infallible?

>Perhaps they could just swing their existing ground surveillance systems up
>and around the surrounding airspace once in a while, to make sure the
>airspace is clear?

What of the NORDO wooden glider with the right of way over powered
aircraft?

Larry Dighera wrote:

> It's clear that it doesn't take 7 people to fly a C-172 as it does a
> UAV.

And it's also clear you can't give the Cessna the UAV's capabilities.

You appear to have a political axe to grind, since you can't demonstrate
any mission advantage to the Cessna.

Here's a political football for you: the whole damn border ought to be a
TFR and a triple concertina wired no-man's land, with well-armed guards
shooting on sight anything that moves.


Jack

On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 17:58:22 GMT, Jack wrote:

>Here's a political football for you: the whole damn border ought to be a
>TFR and a triple concertina wired no-man's land, with well-armed guards
>shooting on sight anything that moves.

ask the former border patrols from East-Germany. They have some knowledge.
Also the Chinese might help a little.

#m
--
If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh?
If you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?
W. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, Act III, scene I

On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 17:58:22 GMT, Jack > wrote in
>::

>Larry Dighera wrote:
>
>> It's clear that it doesn't take 7 people to fly a C-172 as it does a
>> UAV.
>
>And it's also clear you can't give the Cessna the UAV's capabilities.

Which is it, the Cessna or the UAV's capabilities? (I always love it
when I've got 'em sputterin'.)

If you question any of the information I have provided, it is your
responsibility to find data that supports your argument, not mine.

>You appear to have a political axe to grind,

Yes. I am not happy with Bush's unconstitutional/illegal repeal of
personal liberty and privacy, upon which this UAV patrolled border
policy seems to further encroach.

>since you can't demonstrate any mission advantage to the Cessna.

I find cost to be an advantage. Don't you?

>Here's a political football for you: the whole damn border ought to be a
>TFR and a triple concertina wired no-man's land, with well-armed guards
>shooting on sight anything that moves.

Why?

tscottme wrote:
> I know at one time the US deployed tethered "blimps" carrying radar to
> provide radar coverage along the border, and even in the Florida Keys. I've
> seen the lighter-than-air vehicles while flying or driving in the area.
> It's been a few years since I was near the areas. I'm not sure if they
> still operate or not.
> Click here for more info http://tinyurl.com/9wjup
>

The aerostats are still in place. You can find them on aviation
charts covering the appropriate areas.

Mike

"John Doe" > wrote in message
ink.net...
> How much of the American boarder with Mexico is out of radar contact?
>
> There was some fuss about the FAA creating TFRs for the UAVs that are
> flying with boarder patrol along the Mexico. Why can't the UAV just fly
> along under an IFR flight plan and everyone else just avoid the little
> thing just like any other plane on an IFR flight plan?
>
> When there is so much talk about securing the boarders, I can't imagine
> that there is any strip of the boarder that we can not monitor by radar.
>

What if we made the boarder area a MOA instead of a TFR?

Seems to me the risk of a mid-air is much higher flying through an active
MOA (which is currently allowed) with a manned fighter jet moving at
tactical speeds than it is with a slow moving UAV (even though it's
unmanned).

"Bob Fry" > wrote in message
...
>>>>>> "JD" == John Doe > writes:
> JD> Why can't the UAV just fly along under an IFR flight plan and
> JD> everyone else just avoid the little thing just like any other
> JD> plane on an IFR flight plan?
>
> Because that's not the way it works in VMC. In VMC, *everybody*
> avoids everybody else visually, as well as with other aids (ATC). So
> if the "little thing" is flying, and I'm flying, and it's VMC and I'm
> not talking to ATC, and I don't see that "little thing", and of course
> nobody is onboard the UAV to see me....midairs happen.

So how does it work with the Global Hawk UAV which was granted a national
certificate of authorization by the FAA in 2003 to fly on an IFR flight plan
in unrestricted airspace in the US?

On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 18:46:07 GMT, "Wendy" > wrote in
t>::

>
>
>What if we made the boarder [sic] area a MOA instead of a TFR?

Then VFR traffic would be subject to conflicting UAV traffic that is
incapable of complying with FAA see-and-avoid regulations.

>Seems to me the risk of a mid-air is much higher flying through an active
>MOA (which is currently allowed) with a manned fighter jet moving at
>tactical speeds than it is with a slow moving UAV (even though it's

Be that as it may, the manned fighter jet's pilot is capable of
complying with FAA see-and-avoid regulations.

However, military pilots just disregard federal regulations
occasionally:
http://groups.google.com/group/rec.aviation.ifr/msg/f103a8d3aef07908?dmode=source&hl=en

Here's some background on the subject of UAV operations in the NAS:
http://groups.google.com/group/rec.aviation.piloting/msg/9bfc1a1d0e10f738?dmode=print&hl=en

On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 18:56:08 GMT, "Wendy" > wrote in
et>::

>So how does it work with the Global Hawk UAV which was granted a national
>certificate of authorization by the FAA in 2003 to fly on an IFR flight plan
>in unrestricted airspace in the US?

I presume you are referring to this/:
http://www.apfn.net/Messageboard/8-18-03/discussion.cgi.33.html

San Diego - Aug 18, 2003
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has granted a national
Certificate of Authorization (COA) to the U.S. Air Force to
routinely fly the Northrop Grumman-produced RQ-4 Global Hawk
aerial reconnaissance system in national airspace. The certificate
is the first national COA granted for an unmanned air vehicle
(UAV) system.

The high altitude, long endurance Global Hawk currently flies in
restricted airspace during take-off and landing before quickly
ascending to altitudes high above commercial air traffic. ...

Above 18,000' MSL _all_ aircraft are separated by ATC. As you'll
note, the UAV climbs and descends in Restricted airspace. We wouldn't
want to endanger civil Part 91 flights operating below Positive
Control Airspace with a blind UAV.

Larry Dighera wrote:

>>Here's a political football for you: the whole damn border ought to be a
>>TFR and a triple concertina wired no-man's land, with well-armed guards
>>shooting on sight anything that moves.

> Why?

Why, to increase inflation, of course.

But a small ancillary benefit might be to also decrease terrorist
access, for those who think that's important.


Jack

On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 02:18:31 GMT, Larry Dighera >
wrote in >::

>On Fri, 13 Jan 2006 17:48:51 -0800, Richard Riley
> wrote in
>::
>
>>That's what the whole Access 5 program is about - being able to fly
>>UAV's in the airspace *without* impacting other traffic.
>
>However, that is not what is occurring with regard to the UAV Mexico
>border patrol. In fact, to my knowledge, the UAV manufacturers have
>not yet demonstrated a synthetic vision system adequate to permit UAVs
>to comply with FAA see-and-avoid regulations.
>
>To move forward deploying UAVs in domestic airspace is, as a result of
>that failure, is irresponsible at best, if not negligent. And the
>federal government's complicity in bilking the American people of
>millions of dollars in UAV funding is a travesty and reveals the
>current lack of fiscal responsibility.
>
>The money is better spent putting more agents in the field and
>implementing effective deportation policies; that's where the problems
>are.

Apparently, I'm not the only one with concerns about the new UAV TFRs:

-------------------------------------------------------------
AOPA ePilot Volume 8, Issue 2 January 13, 2006
-------------------------------------------------------------

AOPA QUESTIONS FAA'S UAV TFR ON MEXICAN BORDER
The FAA last Friday suddenly, and somewhat unexpectedly,
established a temporary flight restriction (TFR) area near
Nogales, Arizona, along the Mexican border for unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) flights. "There has been an ongoing discussion
regarding TFRs for U.S. Customs UAV border patrol operations. But
the unexpected, immediate implementation of this TFR raises
concerns that federal officials have not taken into
consideration the impact that this kind of TFR has on general
aviation," said Melissa Rudinger, AOPA vice president of
regulatory affairs. "The association staff is meeting this week
with the FAA, Homeland Security, and other security officials to
take up the issue." This isn't the first time AOPA has raised
concerns about UAV operations in airspace shared with general
aviation. AOPA has insisted consistently that unmanned aerial
vehicles be able to detect and avoid other aircraft at least as
well as "see-and-avoid" tactics for manned aircraft. Currently,
UAVs can't do that. And that's why UAVs need TFRs to cover their
operations. But then that raises the possibility of widespread
TFRs usurping civilian airspace. AOPA will fight that. See AOPA
Online
( http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/2006/060109uav.html ).

"Larry Dighera" > wrote
>
> What of the NORDO wooden glider with the right of way over powered
> aircraft?

It is my understanding that synthetic aperture radar can see every kind of
object, including trees, ground, buildings, ect. That should work OK for
wood or fiberglass planes, also.
--
Jim in NC

On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 20:32:27 GMT, Jack > wrote in
>::

>Larry Dighera wrote:
>
>>>Here's a political football for you: the whole damn border ought to be a
>>>TFR and a triple concertina wired no-man's land, with well-armed guards
>>>shooting on sight anything that moves.
>
>> Why?
>
>Why, to increase inflation, of course.

You mean to imply that the increased federal spending necessary to
implement what you suggest will be so massive as to affect the rate of
inflation? Or are you implying that the higher cost of wages as a
result of drying up the illegal immigrant labor pool will result in
higher prices? Or ...

>But a small ancillary benefit might be to also decrease terrorist
>access, for those who think that's important.

Despite the fact, that the Bush administration finds no difficulty in
using national security as an excuse for war, torture, trampling
citizens' Constitutional liberties and illegal domestic spying, it's
apparent that Bush finds even higher priority in keeping the cost of
labor down, than in actually securing the nation's borders.

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 18:56:08 GMT, "Wendy" > wrote in
> et>::
>
>>So how does it work with the Global Hawk UAV which was granted a national
>>certificate of authorization by the FAA in 2003 to fly on an IFR flight
>>plan
>>in unrestricted airspace in the US?
>
> I presume you are referring to this/:
> http://www.apfn.net/Messageboard/8-18-03/discussion.cgi.33.html
>
> San Diego - Aug 18, 2003
> The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has granted a national
> Certificate of Authorization (COA) to the U.S. Air Force to
> routinely fly the Northrop Grumman-produced RQ-4 Global Hawk
> aerial reconnaissance system in national airspace. The certificate
> is the first national COA granted for an unmanned air vehicle
> (UAV) system.
>
> The high altitude, long endurance Global Hawk currently flies in
> restricted airspace during take-off and landing before quickly
> ascending to altitudes high above commercial air traffic. ...
>
> Above 18,000' MSL _all_ aircraft are separated by ATC. As you'll
> note, the UAV climbs and descends in Restricted airspace. We wouldn't
> want to endanger civil Part 91 flights operating below Positive
> Control Airspace with a blind UAV.
>

So why don't we just put the UAVs on the boarder above 18,000 ft?

"John Doe" > wrote in message
ink.net...
> How much of the American boarder with Mexico is out of radar contact?
>
> There was some fuss about the FAA creating TFRs for the UAVs that are
> flying with boarder patrol along the Mexico. Why can't the UAV just fly
> along under an IFR flight plan and everyone else just avoid the little
> thing just like any other plane on an IFR flight plan?
>
> When there is so much talk about securing the boarders, I can't imagine
> that there is any strip of the boarder that we can not monitor by radar.
>

Found this interesting. It's the Department of Defense's UAV (now called
"UA"s or "UAS"s) Roadmap for 2005-2030.

Appendix F talks about integrating UAVs into the "national airspace system"

http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uav_roadmap2005.pdf

On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 16:06:02 -0500, "Morgans"
> wrote in >::

>
>"Larry Dighera" > wrote
>>
>> What of the NORDO wooden glider with the right of way over powered
>> aircraft?
>
>It is my understanding that synthetic aperture radar can see every kind of
>object, including trees, ground, buildings, ect. That should work OK for
>wood or fiberglass planes, also.

Here's the definitive Synthetic Aperture Radar web-site:
http://www.sandia.gov/radar/sar.html

And here is the Synthetic Aperture Radar Applications web-page:
http://www.sandia.gov/radar/sarapps.html

However, I don't see any mention of SAR being capable of seeing wooden
aircraft in flight, but SAR is able to image an oil slick on the
ocean, perhaps you've got something there.

On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 21:35:23 GMT, "Wendy" > wrote in
et>::

>
>So why don't we just put the UAVs on the boarder above 18,000 ft?
>

You'll have to ask the Department Of Homeland Security that question.

"Jack" > wrote in message
m...
> Larry Dighera wrote:
>
>>>Here's a political football for you: the whole damn border ought to be a
>>>TFR and a triple concertina wired no-man's land, with well-armed guards
>>>shooting on sight anything that moves.
>
>> Why?
>
> Why, to increase inflation, of course.
>
> But a small ancillary benefit might be to also decrease terrorist access,
> for those who think that's important.

I doubt it. Are the UAV's going to swoop down and gather up the illegals?
By the time a UAV spots something and Border Patrol gets there the illegals
are long gone. Or are you saying the UAV's can discern between normal
everyday illegals and terrorist? If so I would like to hear more.

> Jack

"Wendy" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>
> "Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
> ...
>> On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 18:56:08 GMT, "Wendy" > wrote in
>> et>::
>>
>>>So how does it work with the Global Hawk UAV which was granted a national
>>>certificate of authorization by the FAA in 2003 to fly on an IFR flight
>>>plan
>>>in unrestricted airspace in the US?
>>
>> I presume you are referring to this/:
>> http://www.apfn.net/Messageboard/8-18-03/discussion.cgi.33.html
>>
>> San Diego - Aug 18, 2003
>> The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has granted a national
>> Certificate of Authorization (COA) to the U.S. Air Force to
>> routinely fly the Northrop Grumman-produced RQ-4 Global Hawk
>> aerial reconnaissance system in national airspace. The certificate
>> is the first national COA granted for an unmanned air vehicle
>> (UAV) system.
>>
>> The high altitude, long endurance Global Hawk currently flies in
>> restricted airspace during take-off and landing before quickly
>> ascending to altitudes high above commercial air traffic. ...
>>
>> Above 18,000' MSL _all_ aircraft are separated by ATC. As you'll
>> note, the UAV climbs and descends in Restricted airspace. We wouldn't
>> want to endanger civil Part 91 flights operating below Positive
>> Control Airspace with a blind UAV.
>>
>
> So why don't we just put the UAVs on the boarder above 18,000 ft?


Because then they couldn't get press for imposing a window dressing TFR.

>>Here's a political football for you: the whole damn border ought to be a
>>TFR and a triple concertina wired no-man's land, with well-armed guards
>>shooting on sight anything that moves.
>
> ask the former border patrols from East-Germany. They have some knowledge.

Nah, they couldn't keep people *in*. This is a totally different problem.
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 23:29:26 GMT, "Jay Honeck"
> wrote:
>>
>> ask the former border patrols from East-Germany. They have some knowledge.
>
>Nah, they couldn't keep people *in*. This is a totally different problem.

What? The East Germans didn't want freedom, opportunity, health care,
schools? They weren't willing to die for the chance?

Don

The East German government was trying to keep people in the country. The
US government is trying to keep Mexicans out of the US.

"Don Tuite" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 23:29:26 GMT, "Jay Honeck"
> > wrote:
>>>
>>> ask the former border patrols from East-Germany. They have some
>>> knowledge.
>>
>>Nah, they couldn't keep people *in*. This is a totally different
>>problem.
>
> What? The East Germans didn't want freedom, opportunity, health care,
> schools? They weren't willing to die for the chance?
>
> Don

Jay Honeck wrote:
>>ask the former border patrols from East-Germany. They have some knowledge.
>
> Nah, they couldn't keep people *in*. This is a totally different problem.

oh, I see, so the Great Wall of China or the Ligne Maginot -- both
built with the best technology available at the time, both to keep
some folks *out*, both just as successful -- would be better
examples then?

--Sylvain

"sfb" > wrote:

>The East German government was trying to keep people in the country. The
>US government is trying to keep Mexicans out of the US.
>
No, we are trying to keep illegal people out of the US, to likely
include Muslim terrorists who want to kill us. Big difference.

Ron Lee

Larry, you must be a liberal. Facts should never get in the way of
reality.

Ron Lee


Larry Dighera > wrote:

>On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 20:32:27 GMT, Jack > wrote in
>::
>
>>Larry Dighera wrote:
>>
>>>>Here's a political football for you: the whole damn border ought to be a
>>>>TFR and a triple concertina wired no-man's land, with well-armed guards
>>>>shooting on sight anything that moves.
>>
>>> Why?
>>
>>Why, to increase inflation, of course.
>
>You mean to imply that the increased federal spending necessary to
>implement what you suggest will be so massive as to affect the rate of
>inflation? Or are you implying that the higher cost of wages as a
>result of drying up the illegal immigrant labor pool will result in
>higher prices? Or ...
>
>>But a small ancillary benefit might be to also decrease terrorist
>>access, for those who think that's important.
>
>Despite the fact, that the Bush administration finds no difficulty in
>using national security as an excuse for war, torture, trampling
>citizens' Constitutional liberties and illegal domestic spying, it's
>apparent that Bush finds even higher priority in keeping the cost of
>labor down, than in actually securing the nation's borders.

Dave Stadt wrote:

"...the whole damn border ought to be a
TFR and a triple concertina wired no-man's
land, with well-armed guards shooting on
sight anything that moves.

"...to increase inflation, of course.

"But a small ancillary benefit might be to
also decrease terrorist access,
for those who think that's important.


> I doubt it. Are the UAV's going to swoop down and gather up the illegals?
> By the time a UAV spots something and Border Patrol gets there the illegals
> are long gone. Or are you saying the UAV's can discern between normal
> everyday illegals and terrorist? If so I would like to hear more.


Ok, Dave, I've removed all the really confusing parts. Read and THEN
respond, please.


Jack

John Keeney wrote:

> Answer a question for me: is this a little bitty slow UAV that's hard
> to see from any kind of distance or one of the larger, faster ones that
> can run a light plane down from behind where the pilot couldn't see it
> coming?

Someone claimed that a 182 wouldn't be able to carry all the gear that this
thing does. That would argue for the larger aircraft.

George Patterson
Coffee is only a way of stealing time that should by rights belong to
your slightly older self.

John Doe wrote:

>
> Personally I think a NOTAM saying when/where the UAVs will be should be
> enough for VFR pilots to avoid the thing. Why do we need a TFR?
>
>

To ensure when a VFR guy crashes into the UAV inside the TFR, the
guvmint can say "it was the VFR guys fault.. it was restricted airspace".

This TFR was inevitable given the circumstances

AOPA and others screamed that UAV's cant visually separate themselves
from traffic. The guvmint isnt going to man an escort plane to fly along
side of it 24/7.. which defeats the purpose.

The guvmint simply agreed with AOPA in that you cant guarantee visual
separation with UAV's. The only realistic alternative was that you
sanitize the airspace so that your UAV is the only player.

Unfortunately the AOPA and others disagree with the establishment of the
TFR as well.

Yanno.. you cant have your cake and eat it too. While this TFR issue was
"sudden", you have to admit that its a 2000 ft wedge, above 10000 feet,
in a very "small" wedge along an obtuse angled section of the border. I
suspect existing GA VFR traffic was light to nonexistent in the area,
and impact was minimal to existing actual VFR operations.

THe only practical gripe that I could agree with is that this is a
"slippery slope" regarding airspace grabs via the TFR/"PFR" process...
otherwise, the existing structure, design and location of this
particular TFR doesnt create much of a problem (when compared to the
ADIZ, MickeyMouse TFR's, 60 mile Presidential no-fly zones, and such.

Dave

"George Patterson" > wrote
>
> Someone claimed that a 182 wouldn't be able to carry all the gear that
> this thing does. That would argue for the larger aircraft.

It seems to me that a couple of factors figure in, on why they choose the
UAV over the 182. (or bigger)

1. A computer geek can fly the 182, with nowhere near the training of the
182 pilot.
2. The time on station is hard to beat, with a UAV. 12 hours would be near
impossible for a 182 pilot, if not impossible, very uncomfortable. The UAV
dood can get his backup to take turns, go pee, eat, whatever.
3. If you were using 182's, it would just be a matter of time, before you
lost your first crew. News break: small planes do crash.
4. UAV's can do their mission in nearly all weather. Ice would be about
the only thing that would keep them on the ground. They even flew these
things in hurricane recon missions. You can't say the same about spam cans.
They would be frequently grounded, due to weather.
5. You can have a whole crew of specialists, monitoring a large number of
instruments. You could only take the pilot, and one or two, in the 182.
Go large enough to accommodate a large crew, and watch operating costs go
up, with the larger plane.

I am not in favor of sharing airspace, without a better workaround than what
is being proposed, but I do see why UAV's are attractive to the gubermint.
--
Jim in NC

> oh, I see, so the Great Wall of China or the Ligne Maginot -- both
> built with the best technology available at the time, both to keep
> some folks *out*, both just as successful -- would be better
> examples then?

Poor examples. Both were designed to stop a military assault.

What is happening on the southern border of the U.S. is far more insidious
than that.
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

Wendy wrote:

> So why don't we just put the UAVs on the boarder above 18,000 ft?

Because he can't make the rent with all those UAV's on him all the time.

Give the guy a little privacy.


Jack

>>And it's also clear you can't give the Cessna the UAV's capabilities.
>
>
> Which is it, the Cessna or the UAV's capabilities? (I always love it
> when I've got 'em sputterin'.)

It was clear to me. The poster is claiming that you cannot give the
capabilities that the UAV has... to the Cessna. This may or may not be
true or relevant, depending on how you define the capabilities. But
what the OP said was quite clear.

Jose
--
Money: what you need when you run out of brains.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

> So why don't we just put the UAVs on the boarder above 18,000 ft?

It's "border". AAAAaaaaaagh!

A border is a boundary. A boarder is one who rents a flat.

Jose
--
Money: what you need when you run out of brains.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

In article >,
Jose > wrote:

> > So why don't we just put the UAVs on the boarder above 18,000 ft?
>
> It's "border". AAAAaaaaaagh!
>
> A border is a boundary. A boarder is one who rents a flat.

don't loose it.

;-)

--
Bob Noel
New NHL? what a joke

On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 03:01:29 GMT, Dave S >
wrote in et>::

>THe only practical gripe that I could agree with is that this is a
>"slippery slope" regarding airspace grabs via the TFR/"PFR" process...
>otherwise, the existing structure, design and location of this
>particular TFR doesnt create much of a problem (when compared to the
>ADIZ, MickeyMouse TFR's, 60 mile Presidential no-fly zones, and such.

So you feel that operating a UAV on this border patrol mission at a
cost that exceeds that of operating a C-182 by several orders of
magnitude is not worth griping about? Why is a UAV the platform of
choice in this mission? It's technology is unnecessary ill suited to
the mission; the money is better spent on ground agents and
deportation funding. There is no rational justification for using
UAVs, in my opinion. It's just a way for the Bush administration to
get headlines and pander to General Atomics's business interest
without materially affecting the influx of illegals which might dry up
the cheap labor pool.

On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 07:26:09 GMT, Jose >
wrote in >::

>>>And it's also clear you can't give the Cessna the UAV's capabilities.
>>
>>
>> Which is it, the Cessna or the UAV's capabilities? (I always love it
>> when I've got 'em sputterin'.)
>
>It was clear to me. The poster is claiming that you cannot give the
>capabilities that the UAV has... to the Cessna.

I thought it was a poorly constructed sentence, but if it meant what
you inferred, I doubt it is true.

>This may or may not be true or relevant, depending on how you define
>the capabilities. But what the OP said was quite clear.

Regardless, the expensive high-tech equipment installed on the UAV is
not necessary to locate people illegally entering the US as is born
out by the current successful use of video camera equipped model
aircraft.



http://tinyurl.com/7hmqb
A Sierra Vista, Ariz.-based private group calling itself the American
Border Patrol is using a video-equipped R/C model airplane to spot
illegal aliens entering the U.S. via the Arizona-Mexico border.
The "Border Hawk" is an off-the-shelf model made of balsa wood covered
with heat-shrink plastic. The high-wing, tri-gear craft has a six-foot
wingspan and is painted all white, except for yellow wingtips and the
initials "ABP" in blue on the wing.

According to ABP Director Glenn Spencer, the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
has a top speed of 40 mph and is usually flown at an altitude of
200-400 feet agl. External fuel tanks mounted on the three-foot-long
fuselage give it a 90 minute endurance.

Spencer said he plans to eventually deploy a squadron of UAVs to scout
the border. Each would cost around $12,000, up to $21,000 if equipped
with night-vision equipment, he said.

According to Spencer, the UAVs are the final stage of a project ABP
has been developing for three years. It began with ground sensors
planted at border crossing points commonly used by illegal aliens.

When a sensor alarms, an ABP team launches the UAV to fly over the
area of the incursion and spot the people who set off the alarm. ABP
then notifies the U.S. Border Patrol of the location and number of
illegals.

During a demonstration in Palominas, Ariz. on May 15th, the Border
Hawk sent live video of the border over the MSNBC cable network to
millions of viewers. ABP is now using a portable satellite uplink to
broadcast live UAV footage of illegal aliens crossing into the U.S. on
its website: www.americanborderpatrol.com.

ABP plans to add GPS to future Border Hawk UAVs so that they can
provide the Border Patrol with the precise coordinates of anyone they
spot.

Though vilified by some as a racist vigilante group, ABP has kept its
activities, including the UAV flights, legal. According to the ABP
website, local Border Patrol agents appreciate the helping hand from
ABP's "eye in the sky."

Addressing ABP's efforts, Bureau of Customs & Border Protection
spokesman Mario Villarreal said, "We appreciate the community's
efforts in notifying us of suspicious activities. We encourage them to
call the Border Patrol or law enforcement but those efforts should be
within the law."

Residents and authorities on both sides of the border are well aware
of ABP and its video-equipped UAVs. Some complain that the drones
invade their privacy and foster poor cross-border relations.

"The Mexican population along the border is indignant," said Mexican
Foreign Ministry spokesman Miguel Escobar.
Spencer's reply to complaints about his group's high-tech policing
efforts is that if the government can't or won't protect the U.S.
border, ABP will. He contends that the Border Patrol could operate its
own UAVs for as little as $15,000-$20,000 apiece.

During a May 17th interview, MSNBC news anchor Michael Savage asked
Spencer, "If you can come up with this, why can't the government?'

"We hope that is a question people will ask their representatives,"
Spencer replied.

Larry -- instead of arguing vague costs and such, can you put numbers on any of this?

You claim that a fleet of Cessnas is cheaper than the UAVs, by an
order of magnitude. What are you basing this on? I am curious how
you arrived at your conclusion. (I am acutally interested in how much
these UAVs really cost -- your "several million dollars" figure sounds
quite high to me. Is that just the cost of manufacturing for the
UAVs, or does it include millions of dollars in research amortized
over a small number of planes?)


Larry Dighera > writes:
> Regardless, the expensive high-tech equipment installed on the UAV is
> not necessary to locate people illegally entering the US as is born
> out by the current successful use of video camera equipped model
> aircraft.

Why use model aircraft, when we have seen the successful use of
cowboys on horses? This argument holds no weight unless you can state:

a) what is the goal of the border patrol? How many people do they
wish to catch crossing to achieve this goal? (Note: if the answer is
100%, then they should build a wall.)

b) how effective are the model airplanes at achieving this goal?
Compared to the UAVs? Compared to border agents driving pickup
trucks?

> According to ABP Director Glenn Spencer, the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
> has a top speed of 40 mph and is usually flown at an altitude of
> 200-400 feet agl. External fuel tanks mounted on the three-foot-long
> fuselage give it a 90 minute endurance.

Okay. So if these model planes were autonomous, they could fly up to
30 miles from the launch point, and then fly straight back. Along
that path they could view, twice (on the trip out and back), a swath
of land roughly 400-800 feet wide.

To cover the entire border, you would have to station a launch point
every 60 miles along the border. Presumably these planes are not
autonomous, and so you need an R/C pilot every 60 miles. (Does there
exist a radio technology that can reliably transmit control signals to
an R/C plane over 30 miles in the presence of terrain? How is the
pilot going to control the plane when it is over the horizon? Is it
possible to get a good enough and fast enough video signal back to the
pilot for them to do that reliably from 30 miles away? Three foot
long planes are pretty twitchy, especially if you have any wind at
all.)

They are probably pretty light, so you can only fly them on not very
windy days. They are probably pretty noisy (based on my R/C
experience), so you will only catch the folks who don't hear them
coming and hide. Once they find someone, they can't follow them or
track their position for more then a few minutes before running out of
fuel and having to go home.

To be that small and still be able to carry a payload, they are
probably constructed using model airplane techniques: out of wood,
fiberglass, and monokote. How many cycles of use can they go through
before they have to be reconditioned or replaced? I suspect that the
answer is significantly less than 500 cycles.

Now, let's say you want 24x7 coverage on the border. Every 60 miles
you need to set up an R/C landing strip. You need 9 R/C pilots every
60 miles. Assuming the border is 889 miles long (a google search told
me this), that means you need 133 pilots, operating at least 15
planes. (2 pilots for each 8 hour shift -- one flying, the other
watching the camera. Assume they work a 5 day 40 hour work week.)
How much does that cost?

My math:
133 pilots, at $60k/year: $7,980,000/year
Planes -- assume 12 flights/day, 500 flight plane lifetime, $21,000/plane:
(8.75 new planes/year) * (15 aiports along border) * $21k = $2,756,250

So this program costs you just over $10million/year, ignoring the cost
of setting it up, buying land and housing for the airports and pilots,
administrative costs, or fuel costs.

How much did those UAVs cost? How much more (or less) capable are
they than the ten-million-dollar per year fleet of R/C planes?

(Or, do you think my math or the assumptions behind it are wrong? In
what way?)

And what do you get in the end? Every portion of the border has a
video camera passing over it 24 times a day, at known intervals, with
a lot of noise preceeding the camera's arrival, on clear and calm
days. Do you think this would be money well spent?

Chris
--
Chris Colohan Email: PGP: finger
Web: www.colohan.com Phone: (412)268-4751

> So you feel that operating a UAV on this border patrol mission at a
> cost that exceeds that of operating a C-182 by several orders of
> magnitude is not worth griping about? Why is a UAV the platform of
> choice in this mission? It's technology is unnecessary ill suited to
> the mission; the money is better spent on ground agents and
> deportation funding. There is no rational justification for using
> UAVs, in my opinion. It's just a way for the Bush administration to
> get headlines and pander to General Atomics's business interest
> without materially affecting the influx of illegals which might dry up
> the cheap labor pool.
>

I agree, BUT, show we ONE company that has put in a contract bid to do this
mission?

Anyone out there willing to do this job (covering the same loiter times as
the UAV) needs to come forward and put in a bid for it.

We can bitch all we want but if no one out there wants to do it, what is the
government supposed to do?

"Jose" > wrote in message
. ..
>> So why don't we just put the UAVs on the boarder above 18,000 ft?
>
> It's "border". AAAAaaaaaagh!
>
> A border is a boundary. A boarder is one who rents a flat.

You honestly expect people here to know how to spell?

On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 23:29:26 GMT, Jay Honeck wrote:

>> ask the former border patrols from East-Germany. They have some knowledge.
>
>Nah, they couldn't keep people *in*. This is a totally different problem.

hmm, and I always thought that it is important to keep you well protected
in LALA-land.

#m
--
If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh?
If you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?
W. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, Act III, scene I

On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 03:55:40 GMT, Jay Honeck wrote:

>> oh, I see, so the Great Wall of China or the Ligne Maginot -- both
>> built with the best technology available at the time, both to keep
>> some folks *out*, both just as successful -- would be better
>> examples then?
>
>Poor examples. Both were designed to stop a military assault.

you're absolutely right! Mexicans not seeing a future in their country are
'invading' the country bordering to their north because they see a prosper
future there.

>What is happening on the southern border of the U.S. is far more insidious
>than that.

yeah. exhausted people, hungry and desperate.

#m
--
If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh?
If you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?
W. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, Act III, scene I

> I doubt it. Are the UAV's going to swoop down and gather up the illegals?
> By the time a UAV spots something and Border Patrol gets there the
> illegals are long gone. Or are you saying the UAV's can discern between
> normal everyday illegals and terrorist? If so I would like to hear more.

How you figure? illegals crossing the border are going to outrun a UAV
circling overhead? This I gotta see.

> A border is a boundary. A boarder is one who rents a flat.

Actually, "room & board" means "a room and meals".

Thus, a "boarder" is actually someone who gets food along with their flat --
a relative rarity nowadays. A person who rents a flat, therefore, is
either a "roomer" or a "tenant"...

;-)
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

>>What is happening on the southern border of the U.S. is far more insidious
>>than that.
>
> yeah. exhausted people, hungry and desperate.

This from an AUSTRIAN?

Now THAT is funny. (Like a crutch.)

Immigration is what makes (and made) America. However, there are legal ways
to enter this country -- all we ask is that Mexican immigrants follow the
rules, as our ancestors did.

Or do you think North Africans should be allowed to enter Austria at any
pace, in any quantity, whenever they want?
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 14:03:34 GMT, Jay Honeck wrote:

>>>What is happening on the southern border of the U.S. is far more insidious
>>>than that.
>>
>> yeah. exhausted people, hungry and desperate.
>
>This from an AUSTRIAN?

why are you stressing my nationality in this context?

>Now THAT is funny. (Like a crutch.)
>
>Immigration is what makes (and made) America. However, there are legal ways

it made America.

>to enter this country -- all we ask is that Mexican immigrants follow the
>rules, as our ancestors did.
>
>Or do you think North Africans should be allowed to enter Austria at any
>pace, in any quantity, whenever they want?

you are right about the rules. But you brought up the military stuff. It is
a social problem.

Here, esp. on the Spanish border (better: the base in North Africa), Europe
has a similar problem with illegal immigrants. I don't see a long term
solution coming up. We can't hide behind our fences forever.

#m
--
If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh?
If you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?
W. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, Act III, scene I

"Jay Honeck" > wrote in message
news:Ozsyf.731161$xm3.594257@attbi_s21...
> Actually, "room & board" means "a room and meals".
>
> Thus, a "boarder" is actually someone who gets food along with their
flat --
> a relative rarity nowadays. A person who rents a flat, therefore, is
> either a "roomer" or a "tenant"...
>
> ;-)
> --
> Jay Honeck
> Iowa City, IA
> Pathfinder N56993
> www.AlexisParkInn.com
> "Your Aviation Destination"

The new theme for Jay's hotel "Boarders, Language and Culture" haha, just
kidding!

One assumes the UAVs are another set of eyes for the Border Patrol on
the ground.

"John Doe" > wrote in message news:swsyf.9693$M%
>
> How you figure? illegals crossing the border are going to outrun a
> UAV
> circling overhead? This I gotta see.
>
>
>

On 15 Jan 2006 04:57:18 -0500, Chris Colohan >
wrote in >::

>Larry -- instead of arguing vague costs and such, can you put numbers on any of this?
>
>You claim that a fleet of Cessnas is cheaper than the UAVs, by an
>order of magnitude.

Actually, several orders of magnitude.

>What are you basing this on? I am curious how
>you arrived at your conclusion.

It's a matter of common sense. It takes only one or two people to
operate a Cessna C-182, not SEVEN like it does to operate a UAV.

>(I am acutally interested in how much
>these UAVs really cost -- your "several million dollars" figure sounds
>quite high to me.

Then, perhaps you should do some research:

http://www.uavforum.com/library/librarian.htm
Q: What does a UAV cost to buy? to operate?

A: UAVs flying today range in price from $1000 to $14 million. [For
comparison, manned aircraft range in price from $20,000 to $500
million.] Examples: The developmental version of the Air
Force/Teledyne Ryan RQ-4/Global Hawk costs nearly $14 million with
payload, the Air Force/General Atomics RQ-1/Predator $3.3 million with
payload, the Navy/PUI RQ-2/Pioneer just over $900,000 with payload.
Tactical size UAVs are commercially available in the $250,000 range
with payload, the Aerosonde Robotic Aircraft's Atlantic-crossing
Aerosonde runs $35,000, and MLB offers mini (not micro) UAVs for
around $1000 per aircraft. It is a common mistake to focus on the
price of the individual aircraft and confuse it for the price of the
UAV system, which includes its ground control station and shelter,
launching mechanism, and typically three or more additional aircraft.
These can make the price of an UAV system two to ten times the price
of its individual aircraft. Once bought and deployed, operating costs
are reportedly (Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22 Jun 98, p.23) in
the hundreds of dollars an hour for Predator and tactical size UAVs.
[For comparison, commercial helicopters cost $600-800 an hour and a
Boeing 747 airliner some $7400 an hour.]


$10 million unit flyaway price:
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1474/MR1474.chap3.pdf
http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2000/Navy/0305204N.pdf
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1473/MR1473.chap2.pdf
....

>
>Larry Dighera > writes:
>> Regardless, the expensive high-tech equipment installed on the UAV is
>> not necessary to locate people illegally entering the US as is born
>> out by the current successful use of video camera equipped model
>> aircraft.
>
>Why use model aircraft, when we have seen the successful use of
>cowboys on horses?

First, I'm not suggesting actually using model aircraft for border
surveillance. Rather, I am pointing out that cheap, low-tech
solutions are currently working, and contrasting that with the
obviously dangerous and costly overkill of employing UAVs domestically
for this mission.

>This argument holds no weight unless you can state:

That is not the argument I am making.

In article >,
Larry Dighera > wrote:

> Where is the up-side of domestic UAV operations?

do you equate UAV operations with only military use?

--
Bob Noel
New NHL? what a joke

On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 13:19:34 GMT, "John Doe" >
wrote in t>::

>> So you feel that operating a UAV on this border patrol mission at a
>> cost that exceeds that of operating a C-182 by several orders of
>> magnitude is not worth griping about? Why is a UAV the platform of
>> choice in this mission? It's technology is unnecessary and ill suited to
>> the mission; the money is better spent on ground agents and
>> deportation funding. There is no rational justification for using
>> UAVs, in my opinion. It's just a way for the Bush administration to
>> get headlines and pander to General Atomics's business interest
>> without materially affecting the influx of illegals which might dry up
>> the cheap labor pool.
>>
>
>I agree, BUT, show we ONE company that has put in a contract bid to do this
>mission?

I can't even find the text of the Request For Proposal, let alone a
list of bidders and their proposals. Have you tried to research that?

>Anyone out there willing to do this job (covering the same loiter times as
>the UAV) needs to come forward and put in a bid for it.

It is my understanding that the RFP was written is such a way that
sensible and cost effective solutions would not meet the request.

>We can bitch all we want but if no one out there wants to do it, what is the
>government supposed to do?

What makes you think no one want's to do it?

If the Bush administration were truly interested in stemming the tide
of illegal border crossings, it would request proposals that would
accomplish that task, not set up restrictive proposal criteria for
which the only solution is domestic UAV operations.

On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 11:57:08 -0500, Bob Noel
> wrote in
>::

>In article >,
> Larry Dighera > wrote:
>
>> Where is the up-side of domestic UAV operations?
>
>do you equate UAV operations with only military use?

In my opinion, the only justification for removing the pilot from the
aircraft is if the mission is too dangerous to risk human life.

Larry Dighera wrote:
> On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 17:58:22 GMT, Jack > wrote in
> >::
>
>
>>Larry Dighera wrote:
>>
>>
>>>It's clear that it doesn't take 7 people to fly a C-172 as it does a
>>>UAV.
>>
>>And it's also clear you can't give the Cessna the UAV's capabilities.
>
>
> Which is it, the Cessna or the UAV's capabilities? (I always love it
> when I've got 'em sputterin'.)
>

I didn't detect any sputtering, nor is there any lack of clarity
in Jack's post. The Cessna can't match the capabilities of the
UAV, nor is there a reasonable chance that it can be modified to do so.
At the very least, I've never heard of a C-172 with 12 hours edurance,
nor capable of employing the sensors and equipment callled for in
this instance.

>>You appear to have a political axe to grind,
>
>
> Yes. I am not happy with Bush's unconstitutional/illegal repeal of
> personal liberty and privacy, upon which this UAV patrolled border
> policy seems to further encroach.
>

So surveilling the border to enforce existing border control laws
are a violation of PRIVACY now?

>
>>since you can't demonstrate any mission advantage to the Cessna.
>
>
> I find cost to be an advantage. Don't you?
>

Cost is only an advantage if the lower priced alternative can
actually meet the requirement. If not, then it isn't a viable
alternative and the cost isn't a factor at all.

On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 10:06:41 -0700, mike Williamson
<williamsonONETHIRTY@earthlinkdotnet> wrote in
>::

>Larry Dighera wrote:
>> On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 17:58:22 GMT, Jack > wrote in
>> >::
>>
>
>The Cessna can't match the capabilities of the
>UAV, nor is there a reasonable chance that it can be modified to do so.

The vast capabilities of a UAV (including Hellfire missiles) are
unnecessary for the domestic border patrol mission.

>At the very least, I've never heard of a C-172 with 12 hours edurance,

Why is 12 hours endurance necessary?

Here's the pertinent Cessna C-182 performance specification:

http://skyhawk.cessna.com/spec_perf.chtml
Cruise * 60% power at 10,000 ft
time: 6.6 hr
range: 687nm

Of course, long range fuel tanks could increase that, but I doubt that
would be necessary to accomplish the mission.

>nor capable of employing the sensors and equipment callled for in
>this instance.

In your opinion, what equipment capability IS "called for" in this
instance?

>>>You appear to have a political axe to grind,
>>
>> Yes. I am not happy with Bush's unconstitutional/illegal repeal of
>> personal liberty and privacy, upon which this UAV patrolled border
>> policy seems to further encroach.
>>
>
> So surveilling the border to enforce existing border control laws
>are a violation of PRIVACY now?
>

Employing UAVs, when conventional aircraft would suffice, betrays the
Bush administration's agenda for further domestic spying. Domestic
UAV operation sets a dangerous precedent. Surely, you are not naive
enough to believe, that if the Bush administration is successful in
deploying UAVs domestically, border patrol will be their sole mission.
Domestically deploying UAVs will open the skies for hoards of unmanned
aircraft operated by people located SAFELY ON THE GROUND. These UAVs
will likely be operated by military personnel. The military has time
and again demonstrated its complete lack of accountability in
military/civil mishaps.*

You aren't going to like it if people die at the hands of UAV
operators. What incentive do the ground-based personnel operating
UAVs have to act as prudent and responsibly as a pilot actually aboard
his aircraft? Where are the UAV operators' accountability? How can
the estates of those who fall victim to domestic UAV operations know
who is responsible for the deaths caused by unmanned aircraft?

>>
>>>since you can't demonstrate any mission advantage to the Cessna.
>>
>>
>> I find cost to be an advantage. Don't you?
>>
>
> Cost is only an advantage if the lower priced alternative can
>actually meet the requirement. If not, then it isn't a viable
>alternative and the cost isn't a factor at all.

Of course.

What do you guess/know the requirements you mention to be?

Because video camera equipped model aircraft have successfully
demonstrated, that high-tech solutions are unnecessary in border
patrol missions, I find UAVs inappropriate for this mission. They are
much too costly and dangerous to be deployed domestically.


*
http://groups.google.com/group/rec.aviation.ifr/msg/f103a8d3aef07908?dmode=source&hl=en

Larry Dighera > wrote:
>
>>All you really have to do is make a rule that if you're going to fly
>>in the areas where UAV's are operating, you have to have a working
>>mode C or S transponder that's been checked in the last year, no
>>exceptions. My personal, non-business, non proprietary guess is that
>>will be included when the rules finally get through the system. Once
>>you have that data, collision avoidance is much simpler.
>
>So you're suggesting that the FAA should reconfigure the NAS to
>accommodate domestic UAV operations below 18,000' and pass the cost
>and consequences of doing that on to aircraft owners? How about if
>the UAV industry _FUNDS_ the changes they desire; wouldn't that be
>more equitable?

You need a transponder operating above 10,000' MSL anyway and there
are already accuracy checks required (Biannually). No additional
costs to me as a pilot.

>Where is the up-side of domestic UAV operations? Why should the
>American public be so eager to change an already overburdened NAS to
>accommodate domestic UAV operations? How do domestic UAV operations
>provide a benefit to the American public? Of is it about increasing
>economic prosperity for the UAV industry?

What is burdened about the areas we are talking about? What real
impact does it have to any pilot?
>
>I see UAVs as combat/spy aircraft with NO ACCOUNTABILITY to those over
>whom they fly nor those with whom they share airspace. Is a sky full
>of UAVs armed with Hellfire missiles and surveillance technology the
>future we want for our children? What am I missing?

As with most liberals, you are missing reality. There are peple who
want to kill those precious children you speak of. Anf you. And me.
Our borders need to be defended and if UAVs provide a vital place in
that process then so be it. I have yet to see where there is a real
and significant impact to pilots as we see with the DC area ADIZ.

Ron Lee
>

Larry Dighera > wrote:
>
>It's a matter of common sense. It takes only one or two people to
>operate a Cessna C-182, not SEVEN like it does to operate a UAV.
>
No Larry, you have to consider the sensor operators plus things like
needing multiple crews and associated support personnel for the same
loiter time if using a manned aircraft.

Ron Lee

> Actually, "room & board" means "a room and meals".
>
> Thus, a "boarder" is actually someone who gets food along with their flat --
> a relative rarity nowadays. A person who rents a flat, therefore, is
> either a "roomer" or a "tenant"...

Yup, you're right. And "board" in this sense actually comes from the
word meaning "table" (a board on which food is served or eaten), so it's
quite literal.

Jose
--
Money: what you need when you run out of brains.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

> I see UAVs as combat/spy aircraft with NO ACCOUNTABILITY to those over
> whom they fly nor those with whom they share airspace. Is a sky full
> of UAVs armed with Hellfire missiles and surveillance technology the
> future we want for our children? What am I missing?

Maybe it's a training ground for DC intercepts.

:) Jose
--
Money: what you need when you run out of brains.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

> At the very least, I've never heard of a C-172 with 12 hours edurance,
> nor capable of employing the sensors and equipment callled for in
> this instance.

This may be true, but a C-172 would not need 12 hours endurance to
accomplish the same =objective= (although it would, by definition, need
it to accomplish the same =mission=. Subtle but important difference,
which also bears on the equipment. I don't know the details of the
sensors, but some of them may be unnecessary in a C-172.

> So surveilling the border to enforce existing border control laws
> are a violation of PRIVACY now?

It could be, depending on how it's done.

> Cost is only an advantage if the lower priced alternative can
> actually meet the requirement.

.... and the "requirement" can be tailored to meet the cost.

Don't confuse motion with action.
Don't confuse action with results.
Don't confuse "results" with what you wanted in the first place.

Jose
--
Money: what you need when you run out of brains.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 17:54:49 GMT, (Ron Lee)
wrote in >::

>Larry Dighera > wrote:
>>
>>>All you really have to do is make a rule that if you're going to fly
>>>in the areas where UAV's are operating, you have to have a working
>>>mode C or S transponder that's been checked in the last year, no
>>>exceptions. My personal, non-business, non proprietary guess is that
>>>will be included when the rules finally get through the system. Once
>>>you have that data, collision avoidance is much simpler.
>>
>>So you're suggesting that the FAA should reconfigure the NAS to
>>accommodate domestic UAV operations below 18,000' and pass the cost
>>and consequences of doing that on to aircraft owners? How about if
>>the UAV industry _FUNDS_ the changes they desire; wouldn't that be
>>more equitable?
>
>You need a transponder operating above 10,000' MSL anyway

I don't believe that altitude is where the Bush administration wants
to operate the border patrol UAVs.


>and there are already accuracy checks required (Biannually). No additional
>costs to me as a pilot.

So you're suggesting, that what's good for you is good for the nation?

>>Where is the up-side of domestic UAV operations? Why should the
>>American public be so eager to change an already overburdened NAS to
>>accommodate domestic UAV operations? How do domestic UAV operations
>>provide a benefit to the American public? Of is it about increasing
>>economic prosperity for the UAV industry?
>
>What is burdened about the areas we are talking about? What real
>impact does it have to any pilot?
>>
>>I see UAVs as combat/spy aircraft with NO ACCOUNTABILITY to those over
>>whom they fly nor those with whom they share airspace. Is a sky full
>>of UAVs armed with Hellfire missiles and surveillance technology the
>>future we want for our children? What am I missing?
>
>As with most liberals, you are missing reality. There are peple who
>want to kill those precious children you speak of.

You may characterize me as a liberal (whatever that means), but I
prefer to be seen as one who is willing to speak out in defense of the
principles the founding fathers of our noble nation saw fit to include
when they drafted its Constitution. After decades of oppression,
freedom from government intrusion was foremost in their minds. And
because of their foresight, we have largely been spared (with the
notable exception of J. Edger Hoover and Nixon) governmental invasion
of privacy to the point where we almost beg for it. It's a sad day
indeed when the President of the United States illegally spies on the
people of this nation (among other transgressions), and we are so
unaware of the danger, that we emulate the blithe indifference of a
chicken being gently stroked by the cook as he slits its throat.

>Anf you.

Is that a sentence?

>And me.
>Our borders need to be defended and if UAVs provide a vital place in
>that process then so be it.

I agree, that our borders should be secure from undocumented
immigration. I not aware of any need to DEFEND the nation's borders.
I fail to see how UAVs can be construed as the sole and most cost
effective method of border patrol.

>I have yet to see where there is a real
>and significant impact to pilots as we see with the DC area ADIZ.

Thankfully, your lack of vision is not shared by all who fly. The
time to act is before the precedent is established, not after the fact
when onerous occurrences are proliferating.

In article >,
Larry Dighera > wrote:

> >> Where is the up-side of domestic UAV operations?
> >
> >do you equate UAV operations with only military use?
>
> In my opinion, the only justification for removing the pilot from the
> aircraft is if the mission is too dangerous to risk human life.

so you don't see any mission that would involve a platform airborne
for more than 24 hours?

--
Bob Noel
New NHL? what a joke

In article >,
Larry Dighera > wrote:

> It is my understanding that the RFP was written is such a way that
> sensible and cost effective solutions would not meet the request.

you came to this conclusion without even seeing the RFP?

--
Bob Noel
New NHL? what a joke

On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 14:39:29 -0500, Bob Noel
> wrote in
>::

>In article >,
> Larry Dighera > wrote:
>
>> >> Where is the up-side of domestic UAV operations?
>> >
>> >do you equate UAV operations with only military use?
>>
>> In my opinion, the only justification for removing the pilot from the
>> aircraft is if the mission is too dangerous to risk human life.
>
>so you don't see any mission that would involve a platform airborne
>for more than 24 hours?

I see no reason for 12-hour endurance for border patrol.

With the limited number of federal agents patrolling the nation's
southern border, who would use all the data gathered by these UAVs
anyway. The money would be better spent on personnel; they're out
numbered.

On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 17:51:48 GMT, Larry Dighera >
wrote:

>On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 10:06:41 -0700, mike Williamson
><williamsonONETHIRTY@earthlinkdotnet> wrote in
>::
>
>>Larry Dighera wrote:
>>> On Sat, 14 Jan 2006 17:58:22 GMT, Jack > wrote in
>>> >::
>>>
>>
>>The Cessna can't match the capabilities of the
>>UAV, nor is there a reasonable chance that it can be modified to do so.
>
>The vast capabilities of a UAV (including Hellfire missiles) are
>unnecessary for the domestic border patrol mission.

And is Hellfire part of the RFP, or are you just trying to make it
sound foolish?

>>nor capable of employing the sensors and equipment callled for in
>>this instance.
>
>In your opinion, what equipment capability IS "called for" in this
>instance?

Comms relay for agents on the ground, IR and TV sensors. Capability to
realtime the data to units in the field (i.e. send the picture to a
ground unit so they can see exactly where the border runners are
hiding. Night operational capability.

>> So surveilling the border to enforce existing border control laws
>>are a violation of PRIVACY now?
>
>Employing UAVs, when conventional aircraft would suffice, betrays the
>Bush administration's agenda for further domestic spying.

Border patrol is domestic spying?

>Domestic
>UAV operation sets a dangerous precedent. Surely, you are not naive
>enough to believe, that if the Bush administration is successful in
>deploying UAVs domestically, border patrol will be their sole mission.
>Domestically deploying UAVs will open the skies for hoards of unmanned
>aircraft operated by people located SAFELY ON THE GROUND. These UAVs
>will likely be operated by military personnel. The military has time
>and again demonstrated its complete lack of accountability in
>military/civil mishaps.*
>
>You aren't going to like it if people die at the hands of UAV
>operators. What incentive do the ground-based personnel operating
>UAVs have to act as prudent and responsibly as a pilot actually aboard
>his aircraft? Where are the UAV operators' accountability? How can
>the estates of those who fall victim to domestic UAV operations know
>who is responsible for the deaths caused by unmanned aircraft?

What has any of this to do with domestic spying? Whether military
pilots (on the ground or otherwise) are responsible is a rather
different issue then whether Bush's Eveel sekrit agents are watching
you.

>> Cost is only an advantage if the lower priced alternative can
>>actually meet the requirement. If not, then it isn't a viable
>>alternative and the cost isn't a factor at all.
>
>Of course.
>
>What do you guess/know the requirements you mention to be?
>
>Because video camera equipped model aircraft have successfully
>demonstrated, that high-tech solutions are unnecessary in border
>patrol missions, I find UAVs inappropriate for this mission. They are
>much too costly and dangerous to be deployed domestically.
>*
>http://groups.google.com/group/rec.aviation.ifr/msg/f103a8d3aef07908?dmode=source&hl=en

A model aircraft may indeed work for very localised situations (i.e. a
mile or so of border) in excellent visibility. It's not going to work
along the whole border, nor at night.

And adding an accident report from a manned in flight collision to an
argument about how unsafe UAVs are is pure sophistry.


--
Peter Kemp

"Life is short...drink faster"

In article >,
Larry Dighera > wrote:

> >> >> Where is the up-side of domestic UAV operations?
> >> >
> >> >do you equate UAV operations with only military use?
> >>
> >> In my opinion, the only justification for removing the pilot from the
> >> aircraft is if the mission is too dangerous to risk human life.
> >
> >so you don't see any mission that would involve a platform airborne
> >for more than 24 hours?
>
> I see no reason for 12-hour endurance for border patrol.

You need to think a little out-of-the-box. Consider a platform
operating at an optimum altitude (say for sensor coverage and
comm range) that takes a considerable of time climbing to that
altitude. It could be useful to minimum the number of climbs
through lower altitudes in order to not interfere with small aircraft
operations.

--
Bob Noel
New NHL? what a joke

Dave Stadt wrote:


>
> I doubt it. Are the UAV's going to swoop down and gather up the illegals?
> By the time a UAV spots something and Border Patrol gets there the illegals
> are long gone.

You can't be this dumb. The UAV will spot the activity miles before
they get to the border.

"John Doe" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>
>> I doubt it. Are the UAV's going to swoop down and gather up the
>> illegals?
>> By the time a UAV spots something and Border Patrol gets there the
>> illegals are long gone. Or are you saying the UAV's can discern between
>> normal everyday illegals and terrorist? If so I would like to hear more.
>
> How you figure? illegals crossing the border are going to outrun a UAV
> circling overhead? This I gotta see.

So the UAV sees them, now what? The Border Patrol stationed 25 miles away
dashes out and catches them. I doubt it. Isn't it true the Border Patrol
or whomever doesn't have the resources to detain and return illegals and in
fact leaves most of them go inside this country (US of A)? Soooooo what are
the UAVs going to accomplish other than taking pictures of millions
illegally crossing the border. At best it is a multi-million dollar AN3
bolt in a 12 inch hole.

"Peter Kemp" > wrote in message
...
> >
>
> Comms relay for agents on the ground, IR and TV sensors. Capability to
> realtime the data to units in the field (i.e. send the picture to a
> ground unit so they can see exactly where the border runners are
> hiding. Night operational capability.

Is this actually going to take place or is it just wishful thinking on your
part? If enough ground personnel are not available, which they are not, it
makes no sense.

"Newps" > wrote in message
...
>
>
> Dave Stadt wrote:
>
>
>>
>> I doubt it. Are the UAV's going to swoop down and gather up the
>> illegals? By the time a UAV spots something and Border Patrol gets there
>> the illegals are long gone.
>
> You can't be this dumb. The UAV will spot the activity miles before they
> get to the border.

Yea sure, keep believing. There are so many holes and problems with
securing the border it wouldn't matter if the UAVs could swoop down and pick
them up. The process is so screwed up most of them would be let go anyway
just as they are now. High-tech isn't going to solve this problem.

On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 14:40:17 -0500, Bob Noel
> wrote in
>::

>In article >,
> Larry Dighera > wrote:
>
>> It is my understanding that the RFP was written is such a way that
>> sensible and cost effective solutions would not meet the request.
>
>you came to this conclusion without even seeing the RFP?

I reached that conclusion on the basis of a message earlier in this
thread:

On Fri, 13 Jan 2006 08:52:21 -0800, Richard Riley
> wrote in
>::

>The RFP for the southern border project specified UAV's with 12 hour
>endurance, synthetic aperture radar and a laser illuminator as well as
>a FLIR system, light amplification cameras, comm relay for ground
>agents, a mode S transponder and a pile of other stuff. You have a
>182 and a crew that can do that?
>
>And - btw - the optical systems can't be in the propeller slipstream,
>the turbulance degrades their resolution too much. That's why so many
>of the UAV's are pushers. So you're looking at a twin, minimum 2
>people on board and a PILE of gear - and 12 hour endurance.

On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 15:53:43 -0500, Bob Noel
> wrote in
>::

>In article >,
> Larry Dighera > wrote:
>
>> >> >> Where is the up-side of domestic UAV operations?
>> >> >
>> >> >do you equate UAV operations with only military use?
>> >>
>> >> In my opinion, the only justification for removing the pilot from the
>> >> aircraft is if the mission is too dangerous to risk human life.
>> >
>> >so you don't see any mission that would involve a platform airborne
>> >for more than 24 hours?
>>
>> I see no reason for 12-hour endurance for border patrol.
>
>You need to think a little out-of-the-box.

I'm usually pretty good at that. :-)

>Consider a platform operating at an optimum altitude (say for sensor coverage and
>comm range) that takes a considerable [amount] of time climbing to that
>altitude.

Given:

http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/notams.html#6/0199
6/0199 ZAB PART 1 OF 2 AZ. FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS, SOUTHERN U.S.
BORDER, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS), NOGALES, AZ.
PURSUANT TO TITLE 14 CFR SECTION 99.7, SPECIAL SECURITY
INSTRUCTIONS, AIRCRAFT FLIGHT OPERATIONS PROHIBITED WITHIN AN AREA
BOUNDED BY THE FOLLOWING COORDINATES: 313655N/1110600W TO
313655N/1104502W TO 312000N/1104502W TO 312000N/1110430W TO
312205N/1111100W TO POINT OF BEGINNING FROM 12000 FT MSL TO 14000
FT MSL, INCLUSIVE, EFFECTIVE 2359-1400 UTC DAILY FROM 0601082359
UTC (1659 LOCAL 01/08/06) UNTIL 0612311400 UTC (0700 LOCAL
12/31/06). EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED BELOW AND/OR UNLESS AUTHORIZED BY
ATC: 1. DOD AIRCRAFT OPERATING: A. IN ACCORDANCE WITH A SEPERATION
AGREEMENT WITH D.H.S., AND; B. WITHIN PORTIONS OF AN ACTIVE
MILITARY OPERATING AREA (MOA) THAT ARE WITHIN THE SPECIAL SECURITY
AREA DESCRIPTIVE IN THIS NOTAM. 2. ALL AIRCRAFT ENTERING OR
EXITING THE TFR MUST BE ON A DISCRETE CODE ASSIGNED BY AN AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROL (ATC) FACILITY. AIRCRAFT MUST BE SQUAWKING THE
DISCRETE CODE AT ALL TIMES WHILE IN THE TFR. 3. ALL AIRCRAFT
ENTERING OR EXITING THE TFR MUST REMAIN IN TWO-WAY RADIO
COMMUNICATIONS WITH ATC. 4. ATC MAY PROVIDE FLIGHT ADVISORIES TO
AIRCRAFT IN THE TFR CONCERNING NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS. END
PART 1 OF 2

PART 2 OF 2 AZ. FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS, SOUTHERN U.S.
BORDER,DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS), NOGALES, AZ. 5.
TUSCON APROACH, PHONE 520-670-5087, IS THE FAA COORDINATION
FACILITY. END PART 2 OF 2 [See graphic:
http://www.aopa.org/images/whatsnew/newsitems/2006/notams/6-0199.jpg]

AOPA has compiled plain-language guidance and a list of airports
affected by notam 6/0199:

Size and location:
313655N/1110600W TO 313655N/1104502W TO 312000N/1104502W TO
312000N/1110430W TO 312205N/1111100W TO POINT OF BEGINNING:
12,000-14,000 feet MSL inclusive
Effective time:
1659 through 0700 local daily January 8 until December 31, 2006
Requirements for flight in TFR:
Must remain on a discrete transponder code while in the TFR
Must maintain two-way communication with ATC while in the TFR
Impacted airports:
None

In this case, it's an altitude of 12,000-14,000 feet MSL inclusive.

>It could be useful to minimum the number of climbs
>through lower altitudes in order to not interfere with small aircraft
>operations.

Hopefully the UAVs won't be climbing outside of restricted airspace.

Here's a question for you: Why can't two pilots in an appropriately
equipped C-182 accomplish this mission (without a TFR)?

On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 13:07:53 -0800, Richard Riley
> wrote in
>::

>The SAR is useful becase it has a larger field of view. If a TV or IR
>sensor is zoomed in far enough to see a person on the ground, it's
>field of view is tiny - you'll miss the group that's walking 100 yards
>away from him. It's kind of like looking through a soda straw.
>That's why SAR was in the spec.

Of course, if the altitude is lower, that's a non issue.

>You need a dash speed. There's a LOT of border to cover.

In the case of this TFR, it's abut 120 miles.

>You need to be able to get 50 miles away in a pretty short period.

Why is that a necessity?

>The loiter time is important. The southern border is long, and the
>area they're working with this is uninhabited.

In the case of this TFR, it's abut 120 miles.

>So you want the vehicle to be able to go there from your base, loiter
>all night, and then come home. If you have to refuel at midnight
>you're going to loose half your patrol time.

You could use two C-182s, so that there would always be one over the
boarder, with considerably less expense than one UAV, and it would
require no TFR.

>The laser illuminator is important, so you can point at runners and
>agents on the ground can see it with their NVG's.

Is there something that precludes a C-182 from being quipped with a
laser illuminator?

On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 22:29:58 GMT, "Dave Stadt" >
wrote in >::

>If enough ground personnel are not available, which they are not, it
>makes no sense.

Thank you.

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 22:29:58 GMT, "Dave Stadt" >
> wrote in >::
>
>>If enough ground personnel are not available, which they are not, it
>>makes no sense.
>
> Thank you.

I'm with you on this one Larry.

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 13:19:34 GMT, "John Doe" >
> wrote in t>::
>
>>> So you feel that operating a UAV on this border patrol mission at a
>>> cost that exceeds that of operating a C-182 by several orders of
>>> magnitude is not worth griping about? Why is a UAV the platform of
>>> choice in this mission? It's technology is unnecessary and ill suited
>>> to
>>> the mission; the money is better spent on ground agents and
>>> deportation funding. There is no rational justification for using
>>> UAVs, in my opinion. It's just a way for the Bush administration to
>>> get headlines and pander to General Atomics's business interest
>>> without materially affecting the influx of illegals which might dry up
>>> the cheap labor pool.
>>>
>>
>>I agree, BUT, show we ONE company that has put in a contract bid to do
>>this
>>mission?
>
> I can't even find the text of the Request For Proposal, let alone a
> list of bidders and their proposals. Have you tried to research that?
>
>>Anyone out there willing to do this job (covering the same loiter times as
>>the UAV) needs to come forward and put in a bid for it.
>
> It is my understanding that the RFP was written is such a way that
> sensible and cost effective solutions would not meet the request.
>

Of course it was. That's politics for ya.

>>We can bitch all we want but if no one out there wants to do it, what is
>>the
>>government supposed to do?
>
> What makes you think no one want's to do it?
>

I didn't say that. (hence the "if")

> If the Bush administration were truly interested in stemming the tide
> of illegal border crossings, it would request proposals that would
> accomplish that task, not set up restrictive proposal criteria for
> which the only solution is domestic UAV operations.
>

I just read an article that said the Tuscon sector of the border patrol now
has a Predator-B UAV. The B model is the new and improved (and much more
expensive) UAV. I don't think even the military has taken delivery of one
of these yet. Total politics. This is so overkill for border patrol it
makes me sick. Talk about fraud, waste and abuse of taxpayer money.

"Dave Stadt" > wrote in message
. ..
>
> "John Doe" > wrote in message
> ink.net...
>>
>>> I doubt it. Are the UAV's going to swoop down and gather up the
>>> illegals?
>>> By the time a UAV spots something and Border Patrol gets there the
>>> illegals are long gone. Or are you saying the UAV's can discern between
>>> normal everyday illegals and terrorist? If so I would like to hear
>>> more.
>>
>> How you figure? illegals crossing the border are going to outrun a UAV
>> circling overhead? This I gotta see.
>
> So the UAV sees them, now what? The Border Patrol stationed 25 miles away
> dashes out and catches them. I doubt it. Isn't it true the Border
> Patrol or whomever doesn't have the resources to detain and return
> illegals and in fact leaves most of them go inside this country (US of A)?
> Soooooo what are the UAVs going to accomplish other than taking pictures
> of millions illegally crossing the border. At best it is a multi-million
> dollar AN3 bolt in a 12 inch hole.
>

What do you think the Border Patrol does? Just stroll down the road and if
they happen to see an illegal, they arrest them? They've been dashing out
to locations tripped by sensors for years to catch illegals. The UAV can
track them non-stop for up to 30 hours or until it runs out of gas. Last
time I checked the border patrol had helicopters as well. It wouldn't take
that long to send a patrol out to the UAVs location to see what it's
tracking.

"John Doe" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>
> ">>
>
> I just read an article that said the Tuscon sector of the border patrol
> now has a Predator-B UAV. The B model is the new and improved (and much
> more expensive) UAV. I don't think even the military has taken delivery
> of one of these yet. Total politics. This is so overkill for border
> patrol it makes me sick. Talk about fraud, waste and abuse of taxpayer
> money.

And it isn't even close to being a solution. Typical government
solution....throw good money after bad at the problem and punish the
innocent.

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 10:06:41 -0700, mike Williamson
> Employing UAVs, when conventional aircraft would suffice, betrays the
> Bush administration's agenda for further domestic spying. Domestic
> UAV operation sets a dangerous precedent. Surely, you are not naive
> enough to believe, that if the Bush administration is successful in
> deploying UAVs domestically, border patrol will be their sole mission.
> Domestically deploying UAVs will open the skies for hoards of unmanned
> aircraft operated by people located SAFELY ON THE GROUND. These UAVs
> will likely be operated by military personnel. The military has time
> and again demonstrated its complete lack of accountability in
> military/civil mishaps.*

You're smoking crack on this one. Is an LAPD helicopter with the same
camera on board as the UAV now doing domestic spying? Please. Don't be
surprised if in 5-10 years every metro police department has transitioned
from helicopters to UAVs.

"John Doe" > wrote in message
nk.net...
>
> "Dave Stadt" > wrote in message
> . ..
>>
>> "John Doe" > wrote in message
>> ink.net...
>>>
>>>> I doubt it. Are the UAV's going to swoop down and gather up the
>>>> illegals?
>>>> By the time a UAV spots something and Border Patrol gets there the
>>>> illegals are long gone. Or are you saying the UAV's can discern
>>>> between
>>>> normal everyday illegals and terrorist? If so I would like to hear
>>>> more.
>>>
>>> How you figure? illegals crossing the border are going to outrun a UAV
>>> circling overhead? This I gotta see.
>>
>> So the UAV sees them, now what? The Border Patrol stationed 25 miles
>> away dashes out and catches them. I doubt it. Isn't it true the Border
>> Patrol or whomever doesn't have the resources to detain and return
>> illegals and in fact leaves most of them go inside this country (US of
>> A)? Soooooo what are the UAVs going to accomplish other than taking
>> pictures of millions illegally crossing the border. At best it is a
>> multi-million dollar AN3 bolt in a 12 inch hole.
>>
>
> What do you think the Border Patrol does? Just stroll down the road and
> if they happen to see an illegal, they arrest them? They've been dashing
> out to locations tripped by sensors for years to catch illegals.

And they catch what? Maybe a couple of percent? Many of those are turned
lose on US soil. So what if the UAV can spot them for 30 hours, enough
people are simply not available to dash out as you say and apprehend. UAVs
are not a solution.

> Here, esp. on the Spanish border (better: the base in North Africa),
> Europe
> has a similar problem with illegal immigrants. I don't see a long term
> solution coming up. We can't hide behind our fences forever.

It's not "hiding behind a fence" to expect immigrants to follow proper
procedures. No country can long survive an invasion -- peaceful or
otherwise -- and that's what has happened to America.

We're not talking thousands, or even hundreds of thousands -- we're talking
MILLIONS of people.
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 11:57:08 -0500, Bob Noel
> > wrote in
> >::
>
>>In article >,
>> Larry Dighera > wrote:
>>
>>> Where is the up-side of domestic UAV operations?
>>
>>do you equate UAV operations with only military use?
>
> In my opinion, the only justification for removing the pilot from the
> aircraft is if the mission is too dangerous to risk human life.
>

Or too boring...

Jay B

On Mon, 16 Jan 2006 00:29:07 GMT, "John Doe" >
wrote in et>::

>Total politics. This is so overkill for border patrol it
>makes me sick. Talk about fraud, waste and abuse of taxpayer money.
>


Well, that's kind of the way I see it also. :-)

On Mon, 16 Jan 2006 00:43:46 GMT, "John Doe" >
wrote in t>::

> Is an LAPD helicopter with the same
>camera on board as the UAV now doing domestic spying?

It's possible for that helo to be used for rescue and other
constructive purposes, unlike a UAV whose mission profile is solely
surveillance and weapons delivery.

>Please. Don't be
>surprised if in 5-10 years every metro police department has transitioned
>from helicopters to UAVs.

The world is rapidly becoming a rather disappointing environment. :-(

In article >, Martin Hotze >
wrote:

> this has nothing to do with it. most of those illegals don't have the
> financial means to follow the rules.

?????

--
Bob Noel
goodness - the NFL officials are making
the NHL officials look like geniuses

"John Keeney" > wrote in message
oups.com...

>
> Answer a question for me: is this a little bitty slow UAV that's hard
> to see from any kind of distance or one of the larger, faster ones that
> can run a light plane down from behind where the pilot couldn't see it
> coming?
>

We're talking about these or something very close.

http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/predator/

Martin Hotze > wrote:
>
>this has nothing to do with it. most of those illegals don't have the
>financial means to follow the rules.

Not our problem.
>
>
>still: you/we can't hide behind a fence forever and just go on building an
>even higher fence. You can only try to minimize the social problems on both
>sides (esp on the other side) of the fence.

Exactly!

Ron Lee

George Patterson > wrote:
>John Keeney wrote:
>
>> Answer a question for me: is this a little bitty slow UAV that's hard
>> to see from any kind of distance or one of the larger, faster ones that
>> can run a light plane down from behind where the pilot couldn't see it
>> coming?
>
>Someone claimed that a 182 wouldn't be able to carry all the gear that this
>thing does. That would argue for the larger aircraft.

Well, one of the more favored UAVs is the size of the 737...

Larry Dighera > wrote:
>On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 03:01:29 GMT, Dave S >
>
>>THe only practical gripe that I could agree with is that this is a
>>"slippery slope" regarding airspace grabs via the TFR/"PFR" process...
>>otherwise, the existing structure, design and location of this
>>particular TFR doesnt create much of a problem (when compared to the
>>ADIZ, MickeyMouse TFR's, 60 mile Presidential no-fly zones, and such.
>
>So you feel that operating a UAV on this border patrol mission at a
>cost that exceeds that of operating a C-182 by several orders of
>magnitude is not worth griping about? Why is a UAV the platform of
>choice in this mission? It's technology is unnecessary ill suited to
>the mission; the money is better spent on ground agents and
>deportation funding. There is no rational justification for using
>UAVs, in my opinion. It's just a way for the Bush administration to
>get headlines and pander to General Atomics's business interest
>without materially affecting the influx of illegals which might dry up
>the cheap labor pool.

Larry -- do we know what the mission really is? I think we're all
assuming it's border patrol for drugs and/or illegal immigrants. If
you take a look at the MOA/R/A areas down there, the TFR closes a small
gap between the Fuzzy MOA and the Restricted areas around
sierra Vista. This now creates a complete "wall" along the entire
AZ and NM border. I think the TFR was the quickest and simplest
approach to the border, whereas creating a new MOA or R area
would require public comment and lots of time.

>boarder security

helmet, knee pads and elbow pads worn out on the half-pipe

Larry Dighera > wrote:
>To move forward deploying UAVs in domestic airspace is, as a result of
>that failure, is irresponsible at best, if not negligent. And the
>federal government's complicity in bilking the American people of
>millions of dollars in UAV funding is a travesty and reveals the
>current lack of fiscal responsibility.

And this is different how from 50 years of history of DOD/US Govt.
activity?

>The money is better spent putting more agents in the field and
>implementing effective deportation policies; that's where the problems
>are.

No, deportation is not the problem. INS is the problem. I don't have
any statistics on illegal immigration, but looking at all immigration,
what percentage is from Mexico? Anyone who overstays a visitor,
student or business visa becomes an illegal immigrant. I remember
a few years ago the brouha about "illegal immigrants from Canada".
And yes, I agree with you about more field agents...casual friend
of mine is a border officer, assigned to Arizona. What we hear
on the news is only a small part of what's happening.

From the NOTAM:
> A. IN ACCORDANCE WITH A SEPERATION

Well, they can't spell either.

On 16 Jan 2006 17:51:53 GMT, Blanche > wrote
in >::

>Larry Dighera > wrote:
>>On Sun, 15 Jan 2006 03:01:29 GMT, Dave S >
>>
>>>THe only practical gripe that I could agree with is that this is a
>>>"slippery slope" regarding airspace grabs via the TFR/"PFR" process...
>>>otherwise, the existing structure, design and location of this
>>>particular TFR doesnt create much of a problem (when compared to the
>>>ADIZ, MickeyMouse TFR's, 60 mile Presidential no-fly zones, and such.
>>
>>So you feel that operating a UAV on this border patrol mission at a
>>cost that exceeds that of operating a C-182 by several orders of
>>magnitude is not worth griping about? Why is a UAV the platform of
>>choice in this mission? It's technology is unnecessary ill suited to
>>the mission; the money is better spent on ground agents and
>>deportation funding. There is no rational justification for using
>>UAVs, in my opinion. It's just a way for the Bush administration to
>>get headlines and pander to General Atomics's business interest
>>without materially affecting the influx of illegals which might dry up
>>the cheap labor pool.
>
>Larry -- do we know what the mission really is?

I haven't been able to find much factual data about the RFP nor the
proposals submitted, or much of anything else. It must be
confidential or something. There is some information here:
http://www.fbo.gov/spg/DHS-BT/USCS/PDDC20229/HSBP1005R0425/Attachments.html

This document may be the RFP:
http://fs1.fbo.gov/EPSData/DHS-BT/Synopses/35419/HSBP1005R0425/HSBP1005R0425_ATTACHMENTS.pdf
I've copied the (unformatted) text at the end of this article.

The NOTAM is here: http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/notams.html#6/0199

>I think we're all assuming it's border patrol for drugs and/or illegal immigrants.

Yes.

>If you take a look at the MOA/R/A areas down there, the TFR closes a small
>gap between the Fuzzy MOA and the Restricted areas around
>sierra Vista. This now creates a complete "wall" along the entire
>AZ and NM border. I think the TFR was the quickest and simplest
>approach to the border, whereas creating a new MOA or R area
>would require public comment and lots of time.
>

Because UAVs are currently unable to comply with federal see-and-avoid
regulations, they are not permitted to fly unescorted outside of
Restricted airspace.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bush's address on the subject is here (audio and text):
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051022.html

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051018-3.html
October 2005
Since 2001, the Federal government has increased funding for
border security by 60 percent and hired more than 1,900 new Border
Patrol agents. New technologies like unmanned aircraft, ground
sensors, and infrared cameras have been deployed.


*
http://fs1.fbo.gov/EPSData/DHS-BT/Synopses/35419/HSBP1005R0425/HSBP1005R0425_ATTACHMENTS.pdf
PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION FOR THE
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE
(CBP UAV) SYSTEM

HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Office of Information and Technology
Applied Technology Division (ATD)
PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION
FOR THE
DHS/CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE SYSTEM
Version 1.0
May 26, 2005
OSI CM ID: CBP UAV_Perf Spec_00_U_r01-0
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for DHS/CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 ii
Performance Specification
for the
DHS/Customs and Border Protection
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System
Change History
Version Number Date Description
Draft 1.0 15 February 2005 Initial draft version
Draft 1.1
24 March 2005 Incorporates review
comments
Draft 1.2
12 April 2005 Incorporates user
review comments
Draft 1.3
13 May 2005 Incorporated
Procurement Team
review comments
Version 1.0
26 May 2005 Official RFP version
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 iii
Performance Specification
for the
Customs and Border Protection
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System
Table of Contents
CHANGE
HISTORY........................................... .................................................. ...........
II
ACRONYM LIST
.................................................. .................................................. ........VII
1.0
SCOPE............................................. .................................................. ................
11
1.1 Identification
.................................................. .................................................. .
11
1.2 Entity Description
.................................................. ...........................................
11
1.3 Document Overview
.................................................. .......................................
11
2.0 APPLICABLE
DOCUMENTS......................................... .....................................
12
2.1 Government Documents
.................................................. ................................
12
2.1.1 Specifications, Standards, and Handbooks
............................................... 12
2.2 Order of Precedence
.................................................. ......................................
12
3.0
REQUIREMENTS...................................... .................................................. .......
13
3.1 System Definition
.................................................. ...........................................
13
3.1.1 CBP UAV System Overview
.................................................. ....................
13
3.1.1.1 Mission Objective
.................................................. ................................
13
3.1.1.2 Operational
Strategy.......................................... ...................................
13
3.1.1.3 Design Strategy
.................................................. ...................................
15
3.2
Characteristics................................... .................................................. ............
15
3.2.1 System Component
Descriptions...................................... ........................
16
3.2.1.1 Aircraft
.................................................. .................................................
16
3.2.1.2
Payloads.......................................... .................................................. ...
16
3.2.1.3 Ground Control Station
(GCS)............................................. ................. 16
3.2.1.4 Link
Segment........................................... .............................................
16
3.2.1.5 Sensor Control Terminals (SCT)
.................................................. ......... 17
3.2.1.6 Remote Video Terminals
(RVT)............................................. ............... 17
3.2.2 Functional Configuration
.................................................. ..........................
17
3.2.2.1 Baseline
Configuration..................................... .....................................
17
3.2.3 External Interfaces
.................................................. ...................................
18
3.2.4 Internal Interfaces
.................................................. ....................................
18
3.2.5 Performance
Characteristics................................... ..................................
18
3.2.5.1 System Operations
.................................................. ..............................
18
3.2.5.2 System Compatibility
.................................................. ...........................
20
3.2.5.3 Environmental
Conditions........................................ .............................
21
3.2.5.4 System Reliability, Availability, Maintainability
(RAM)........................... 23
3.2.5.5 Transportability
.................................................. ....................................
25
3.3 Material
Definition........................................ .................................................. ..
25
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 iv
3.3.1 Materials
.................................................. ..................................................
25
3.3.1.1 Hazardous, Toxic and Ozone Depleting Chemicals Prevention
............ 25
3.3.1.2 Recycled, Recovered, or Environmentally Preferable Materials
............ 26
3.3.2 Computer Hardware and
Software.......................................... ..................
26
3.3.2.1 Computer Hardware Requirements
.................................................. ..... 26
3.3.2.2 Computer
Software.......................................... .....................................
27
3.3.3 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects
(E3)............................................. 28
3.3.3.1 Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)
.................................................. .. 28
3.3.3.2 Electromagnetic Vulnerability (EMV)
.................................................. ... 28
3.3.3.3 Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)
.................................................. ..... 29
3.3.3.4 Electromagnetic Radiation Hazards (HERP, HERF, HERO)
................. 29
3.3.3.5 Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)
.................................................. ............. 29
3.3.4
Safety............................................ .................................................. ..........
29
3.3.4.1 System Safety
.................................................. .....................................
29
3.3.4.2 Safety
Provisions........................................ ..........................................
29
3.3.5
Security.......................................... .................................................. .........
30
3.4 Logistics
.................................................. .................................................. .......
30
3.4.1 Support Equipment
.................................................. ..................................
30
3.5 Characteristics of System
Elements.......................................... ......................
30
3.5.1 Aircraft
.................................................. .................................................. ...
30
3.5.1.1 Design
Life.............................................. ..............................................
30
3.5.1.2 Aircraft
Performance....................................... ......................................
31
3.5.1.3 Operating
Altitude.......................................... .......................................
31
3.5.1.4 Signatures
.................................................. ...........................................
31
3.5.1.5
Other............................................. .................................................. ......
32
3.5.1.6 Aircraft Functional Requirements
.................................................. ........ 34
3.5.2
Payload........................................... .................................................. ........
37
3.5.2.1 Types of Initial
Payloads.......................................... .............................
37
3.5.2.2 Flight Operation
.................................................. ...................................
37
3.5.2.3 Payload Tracking and
Pointing.......................................... ...................
37
3.5.2.4 Payload Control
.................................................. ...................................
38
3.5.2.5 Data Display
.................................................. ........................................
38
3.5.2.6 Payload Cooling
System............................................ ...........................
38
3.5.2.7 Sensor Metadata
.................................................. .................................
38
3.5.2.8 Payload
Interfaces........................................ ........................................
38
3.5.3 Electro-optical/Infra-red/Laser Illuminator
.................................................. 38
3.5.3.1 EO/IR/Laser Illuminator Airborne
Suite............................................. .... 38
3.5.4 Synthetic Aperture Radar
(SAR)............................................. ..................
39
3.5.4.1 SAR Airborne Suite
.................................................. .............................
40
3.5.5 Signals Interception
.................................................. .................................
40
3.5.5.1 Signals Interception Airborne Suite
.................................................. ..... 40
3.5.6 Communication
Relay............................................. ..................................
41
3.5.6.1 Communications Relay Airborne Suite
.................................................. 41
3.5.7 Hyper-spectral Imaging Sensor (HIS) System
........................................... 41
3.5.8 Ground Control Station (GCS)
.................................................. ................. 41
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
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3.5.8.1 GCS
Architecture...................................... ............................................
42
3.5.8.2 Ground System Communications
.................................................. ........ 42
3.5.8.3 GCS Data
Recording......................................... ...................................
43
3.5.8.4 Mission Planning
.................................................. .................................
44
3.5.8.5 Mission
Control........................................... ..........................................
44
3.5.8.6 General Physical Characteristics for the GCS and Takeoff and
Landing
System............................................ .....................................
45
3.5.9 Link
Segment........................................... .................................................
45
3.5.9.1 General
Description....................................... .......................................
45
3.5.9.2 Command Link Suite
Performance....................................... ................ 46
3.5.9.3 Data Link Suite
Performance....................................... .........................
47
3.5.10 Sensor Control Terminal (SCT)
.................................................. ............... 47
3.5.10.1 Mission
.................................................. ................................................
48
3.5.10.2 SCT Configuration
.................................................. ...............................
48
3.5.10.3 Environment
.................................................. ........................................
48
3.5.10.4 SCT
BIT............................................... .................................................
48
3.5.10.5 Information
Interface......................................... ....................................
48
3.5.10.6 Electrical Power
Interface......................................... ............................
48
3.5.10.7 Physical
Characteristics................................... .....................................
49
3.5.11 Remote Video Terminal
(RVT)............................................. .....................
49
3.5.11.1 Mission
.................................................. ................................................
49
3.5.11.2 RVT Configuration
.................................................. ...............................
49
3.5.11.3 Environment
.................................................. ........................................
49
3.5.11.4 RVT
BIT............................................... .................................................
49
3.5.11.5 Information
Interface......................................... ....................................
49
3.5.11.6 Electrical Power
Interface......................................... ............................
49
3.5.11.7 Physical
Characteristics................................... .....................................
50
4.0 VERIFICATION
.................................................. .................................................
50
4.1 Methods of
Verification...................................... ..............................................
50
4.1.1 (N/A) Not Applicable
.................................................. ................................
50
4.1.2 (1) Analysis
.................................................. ..............................................
50
4.1.3 (2) Demonstration
.................................................. ....................................
50
4.1.4 (3)
Examination....................................... ..................................................
51
4.1.5 (4) Test
.................................................. .................................................. ..
51
4.2 Classification of Verification
.................................................. ...........................
51
4.2.1 (A)
Design............................................ .................................................. ...
51
4.2.2 (B) First Article
Inspection........................................ .................................
51
4.2.3 (C) Acceptance
Inspection........................................ ................................
51
4.2.4 (D) Special
Inspection........................................ .......................................
51
4.3 Inspection Facilities and
Equipment......................................... .......................
51
4.4 Test Plans, Methods, and Procedures
.................................................. ........... 52
4.5 Detailed Verification Requirements
.................................................. ................ 52
4.5.1 Environmental Verification
.................................................. .......................
52
4.5.1.1 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3)
Requirements.................. 52
5.0
PACKAGING......................................... .................................................. ...........
66
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 vi
6.0
NOTES............................................. .................................................. ................
66
6.1 Intended
Use............................................... .................................................. ..
66
6.2 Objectives
.................................................. .................................................. ....
66
List of Tables and Figures
Table 2-1-1: Specifications, Standards and Handbooks
Referenced........................ 12
Figure 1: Relationship of CBP UAV Controlling
Entities.......................................... .. 14
Figure 2: Restricted Operating Zones
(Notional)........................................ ............... 15
Table 3-2-2-1: NATO STANAG 4586 Levels of Control
............................................. 17
Table 3-2-2-2: CBP UAV System Element and level of Control
................................. 18
Table 3-3-3: External EME for Fixed Wing Aircraft, Excluding Shipboard
Operations
.................................................. ..................................................
28
Table 4-5: Requirement/Verification Matrix
.................................................. .............. 53
Table 6-2: Objective Requirement
.................................................. ...........................
66
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Performance Specification
for the
Customs and Border Protection
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System
Acronym List
AC........................ Alternating Current
ADDS ................... Aviation Digital Data Services
AES......................Advanced Encryption Standard
AST ...................... Airborne SATCOM Terminal
Ai .......................... Inherent Availability
AMOC .................. Air and Marine Operations Center
ANSI.....................American National Standards Institute
Ao ......................... Operational Availability
ATC...................... Air Traffic Control
BEAM...................Bandwidth Efficient Advanced Modulation
BIT........................ Built-In-Test
BLOS....................Beyond-Line-Of-Sight
C2 .........................Command and Control
C3 .........................Command, Control and Communication
CADRG ................Compressed Arc Digitized Raster Graphic
CBP......................Customs and Border Protection
CBP UAV .............Customs and Border Protection Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle
CEP...................... Circular Error Probable
CFR......................Code of Federal Regulation
CLS ...................... Contractor Logistics Support
COA ..................... Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (FAA)
COTS ...................Commercial Off The Shelf
DC........................ Direct Current
DES......................Data Encryption Standard
DF ........................ Direction Finding
DFAD ................... Digital Feature Analysis Data
DHS......................Department Of Homeland Security
DoD......................Department of Defense
DTED ................... Digital Terrain Elevation Data
E3 .........................Electromagnetic Environmental Effect
EA ........................Environmental Assessment
EMC..................... Electromagnetic Compatibility
EME ..................... Electromagnetic Environment
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EMI....................... Electromagnetic Interference
EMV ..................... Electromagnetic Vulnerability
EO/IR ................... Electro-optical / Infrared
EPA...................... Environmental Protection Agency
ESD...................... Electrostatic Discharge
FAA ...................... Federal Aviation Administration
FCC......................Federal Communications Commission
FDet ..................... Fault Detection Rate
FI .......................... Fault Isolation Rate
FMC ..................... Full Mission Capable
FOR...................... Field of Regard
FOV...................... Field Of View
GCS .....................Ground Control Station
GST......................Ground SATCOM Terminal
GIC....................... Gabarit International de-Chargement
GMTI ....................Ground Moving Target Indicator
GPS...................... Global Positioning System
HERF ...................Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Fuel
HERO...................Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to
Ordnance
HERP ................... Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to
Personnel
HOL...................... High Order Languages
HQ........................Headquarters
HIS .......................Hyper-Spectral Imaging
I/O ........................ Input/Output
IAW ...................... In Accordance With
ICD....................... Interface Control Documents
ICE ....................... Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IEEE..................... Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers
IFF........................ Identification, Friend or Foe
INFOSEC ............. Information Systems Security
INS ....................... Inertial Navigation System
IPR .......................Impulse Resolution
IR.......................... Infra-red
IRAC..................... Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee
ISA ....................... International Standard Atmosphere
KM........................Kilometer
KPP......................Key Performance Parameter
KT......................... Knot; Nautical Miles per Hour
KTAS....................Knot, Airspeed
LOS...................... Line Of Sight
LRU...................... Line Replaceable Unit
M.......................... Meter
MA........................ Mission Availability
MC........................ Mission Capable
MDV..................... Mission Detectable Velocity
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
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MIL-STD...............Military Standard
MM....................... Millimeter
MOB.....................Main Operating Base
MPH..................... Statute Miles Per Hour
MSL......................Mean Sea Level
MTBF ...................Mean Time Between Failure
MTBMA ................Mean Time Between Mission Abort
MTBSA.................Mean Time Between System Abort
MTI.......................Moving Target Indicator
MTTR ...................Mean Time To Repair
NATO ................... North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI.......................Non-Developmental Items
NEPA ................... National Environmental Protection Act
NFOV ...................Narrow Field of View
NGA ..................... National Geospacial-Intelligence Agency
NIIRS.................... National Imagery Interpretability Rating
Scale
NM........................ Nautical Mile
NRIIS.................... National Radar Imagery Interpretation Scale
NSA...................... National Security Agency
NTSC ................... National Television Standards Committee
NVD...................... Night Vision Device
NVLAP ................. National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation
Program
(O)........................ Organizational; Objective
ODC.....................Ozone Depleting Chemicals
OFP......................Operational Flight Control Program
OTAR ................... Over-the-Air-Rekey
PLI........................ Precision Location Information
PMC..................... Partially Mission Capable
PROM ..................Programmable Read Only Memory
RAM..................... Reliability, Availability, Maintainability
RF ........................Radio Frequency
RMS..................... Root Mean Square
ROM.....................Read Only Memory
RVT......................Remote Video Terminal
S&A......................See and Avoid
SAR......................Synthetic Aperture Radar
SATCOM..............Satellite Communication
SCT......................Sensor Control Terminal
SE ........................ Support Equipment
SRA......................Systems Replaceable Assembly
STANAG .............. Standardization Agreement (NATO)
(T).........................Threshold
TLE....................... Target Location Error
TOC......................Total Ownership Costs
TOS......................Time On Station
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
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UAV......................Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCS......................Unmanned Control System
UHF...................... Ultra-High Frequency
USCG...................United States Coast Guard
VHF...................... Very High Frequency
WFOV .................. Wide Field of View
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
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PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION FOR THE
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE
(CBP UAV) SYSTEM
1.0 SCOPE
1.1 IDENTIFICATION
This Performance Specification supports the acquisition of an unmanned
aircraft system
by the Department of Homeland Security/Customs and Border Protection
(DHS/CBP).
Its purpose is to specify performance, test, and verification
requirements for the
Customs and Border Protection Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (CBP UAV)
system.
1.2 ENTITY DESCRIPTION
The CBP UAV is an aircraft system with multiple payloads, which may be
employed by
various DHS agencies in a variety of environments. Components of the
CBP UAV
system can be deployed to multiple locations and operated
simultaneously. Control of
the CBP UAV will be from the Ground Control Station (GCS) at the
airfield for
operations in Line-Of-Sight (LOS). For operations Beyond-Line-Of-Sight
(BLOS), air
vehicle control will be transferred to a GCS located at the Border
Patrol Sector
Headquarters (HQ) or other designated location. Control of the CBP UAV
sensors will
be decentralized to the lowest tactical level necessary in the field.
CBP UAV support
will extend beyond the tactical units operating the system’s sensors.
Imagery receipt
and retransmission will be conducted from the airfield GCS in LOS and
from the HQ
GCS via the network in BLOS situations. Through its Link Segment and
control
consoles, the CBP UAV sensor data will be linked through the existing
network to an
extended group of users designated by CBP.
The CBP UAV System is intended to provide persistent, airborne
surveillance in support
of border operations. A system consists of these basic elements:
Aircraft, Payloads
(Sensors), Ground Control Station (GCS), takeoff and landing system,
Link Segment,
Sensor Control Terminals (SCT), and Remote Video Terminals (RVT).
1.3 DOCUMENT OVERVIEW
The word “equipment”, as used in this document, includes all
components or units
necessary (as determined by the equipment manufacturer or installer)
to properly
perform its intended function.
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In this document, the terms “shall” and “must” are used to indicate
requirements. An
approved design would comply with every requirement, which can be
assured by
inspection, test, analysis or demonstration.
The term “must” is used to identify items which are important but are
either duplicated
somewhere else in the document as a “shall”, or are specified in other
documents.
The term “should” is used to denote a recommendation but does not
constitute a
minimum requirement.
2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
2.1 GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
2.1.1 Specifications, Standards, and Handbooks
The following specifications, standards, and handbooks are referred to
in this
specification.
Table 2-1-1: Specifications, Standards and Handbooks Referenced
Title Number
Environmental Engineering Considerations and Laboratory
Tests
MIL-STD-810
Interface Standard, Electromagnetic Environmental Effects MIL-STD-464
Electromagnetic Emission and Susceptibility
Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic
Interference
MIL-STD-461
System Safety Program Requirements MIL-STD-882
Standard Interfaces of the Unmanned Control System
(UCS) for NATO UAV Interoperability
NATO STANAG 4586
Standard Specification for Design and Performance of an
Airborne Sense-and-Avoid System
ASTM F 2411-04
ATC Transponder and altitude reporting equipment and
use
14 Code of Federal
Regulation (CFR)
section 91.215
2.2 ORDER OF PRECEDENCE
In the event of a conflict between the text of this specification and
the references cited
herein, the text of this specification takes precedence. Nothing in
this specification,
however, supersedes applicable laws and regulations unless a specific
exemption has
been obtained.
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
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3.0 REQUIREMENTS
3.1 SYSTEM DEFINITION
The CBP UAV System is defined as all hardware, software, training, and
procedures
necessary to meet the requirements of the CBP UAV System Performance
Specification. A system consists of these basic elements: Aircraft,
Payloads (Sensors),
Ground Control Station (GCS), takeoff and landing subsystem, Data Link
Subsystems
(Link Segment), Sensor Control Terminals (SCT), and Remote Video
Terminals (RVT).
The exact configuration, quantity, and functional capability of these
basic elements will
depend on deployment scenario and on contractor design concepts used
to meet the
mission objectives.
3.1.1 CBP UAV System Overview
DHS/Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has determined by analysis of
alternatives
and multiple field demonstrations that a medium altitude, long
endurance, unmanned
aircraft provides significant and unique force enhancements to the
intelligence
gathering, situational awareness, and law enforcement tasks performed
by CBP.
Further tasks, such as communication relay and interception, although
not yet evaluated
in the field, are assessed to also be best performed by such a
platform. Alternatives
considered were sensors mounted in airships, aerostats, towers, and
manned aircraft.
The purpose of the CBP UAV System is to collect and pass information
using an
airborne sensor platform that will provide CBP and other DHS agents in
the field an
extended and enhanced situational awareness. The payloads that support
these
missions will evolve and mature over time. The CBP UAV System shall be
interoperable with a wide variety of mission payloads. It is
anticipated that this
requirement will be met through a versatile set of physical,
electrical, and data
interfaces. The data interfaces shall include internal interfaces
within the CBP UAV
System and external interfaces into the networks that provide
secondary distribution of
the data to end users.
The CBP UAV system’s main ground control station (GCS) and the rest of
the CBP
UAV system will initially be based at an airfield (Main Operating
Base, MOB) within the
Border Patrol Sector. Priorities for its use will be established and
managed by the
Border Patrol Sector Chief or his designated representative. The GCS
or takeoff and
landing system at the airfield will control the UAV while in
Line-Of-Sight (LOS). When
going Beyond-Line-Of-Sight (BLOS), control of the aircraft will be
passed from the
launch and recovery team at the airfield to another GCS located at a
designated Border
Patrol location (Sector Headquarters or other designated location)
once the aircraft is
established in level flight and reliable narrowband SATCOM up and down
links have
3.1.1.1 Mission Objective
3.1.1.2 Operational Strategy
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 14
been established between the aircraft and the GCS (Figure 1). Once on
station, CBP
agents will control the aircraft's imaging sensor(s) via a Sensor
Control Terminal (SCT).
The sensor(s) will broadcast its images/video to those CBP agents in
its line of sight
who are equipped with a Remote Video Terminal (RVT). Imagery will also
be received
by towers located in various parts of the sector and transmitted to
the controlling GCS
for recording and further dissemination. Control of the sensor will
transfer between
adjacent agents, as the aircraft approaches subsequent areas. Requests
to change the
aircraft's mission shall be made to the controlling GCS, who will be
responsible for flight
safety. Initially, airspace separation and altitude deconfliction will
be employed to
ensure safe separation among manned helicopters, the CBP UAV, and
manned aircraft
operating near each other (see Figure 2).
Figure 1: Relationship of CBP UAV Controlling Entities.
BLOS NB Wireless
(SATCOM)
Land Line (JWN)
LOS WB Wireless
* All Locations are Notional
Sector
(Tucson)*
LVL 1
Towers
(Various)*
SCT LVL 3
Sector
(Tucson)*
GCS LVL 4
OL
(Sierra Vista)*
TALS LVL 5
Field Ops
Supervisor
(Mobile)
SCT LVL 3
Field Ops
Supervisor
(Mobile)
SCT LVL 3
Agent
(Mobile)
RVT LVL 2
Agent
(Mobile)
RVT LVL 2
Agent
(Mobile)
RVT LVL 2
Agent
(Mobile)
RVT LVL 2
Agent
(Mobile)
RVT LVL 2
Agent
(Mobile)
RVT LVL 2
Agent
(Mobile)
RVT LVL 2
Agent
(Mobile)
RVT LVL 2
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
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Figure 2: Restricted Operating Zones (Notional)
The CBP UAV System design should (O) be of a modular nature that will
facilitate
reconfigurations to include or remove subsystem components, depending
on the
resources available to the parent unit and the operating environment.
For example, CBP
UAV ground components will require all the CBP UAV System resources
necessary to
perform the mission and shall be transportable by DHS organizational
transportation
assets.
In order to support the anticipated operational tempo, the CBP UAV
System shall
provide autonomous operation with automatic features that allow for
manual
intervention on critical functions such as rapid re-tasking of the
sensors and flight
rerouting. In order to interact or operate in concert with DHS agents
in the field, the
CBP UAV System shall provide the system operators with tactical
communications. For
example, the operators in the ground control station need
communications with such
functional centers as Border Patrol Stations and Sectors, Air Traffic
Control (ATC)
Agencies, the Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC), and Coast Guard
Stations.
The Government anticipates the CBP UAV System will maximize the use of
existing
commercial and government systems and/or components.
3.2 CHARACTERISTICS
The CBP UAV System performance characteristics delineated in Section 3
represent
the threshold (i.e., minimum) performance characteristics of the
system and are
identified as (T). It is the intent of the Government to develop a CBP
UAV System that
exceeds these characteristics wherever practical while keeping within
the program’s
Total Ownership Cost (TOC) goals in order to maximize the system’s
capabilities.
Section 6.2 delineates the objective performance characteristics that
are desired by the
Government; they are identified as (O). Where practical, the CBP UAV
System should
3.1.1.3 Design Strategy
5
nm
4,000 ft AGL
9,000 ft AGL
UA
Zone
Fixed-Wing Zone
Border
Helicopter Zone
Nogales
Sierra Vista
Naco
Bisbee
Douglas
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 16
satisfy the objective characteristics delineated in Section 6.2. The
Government intends
to initiate a system improvement program to meet the objective
characteristics not
obtainable under this effort. Key Performance Parameters (KPP) are
numbered and
identified in bold print.
3.2.1 System Component Descriptions
The CBP UAV System consists of the following major elements.
The aircraft is the airborne element of the CBP UAV System and carries
the payloads
and embedded airborne communication relay capability. The system will
include
multiple aircraft.
The payloads are self-contained elements that are designed to
accomplish specific
missions. Payloads will be operated on the aircraft element depending
upon specific
mission needs of the CBP UAV System sortie. The system shall (T) be
able to
simultaneously carry electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors, laser
illuminators,
synthetic aperture radars (SAR) with a ground moving target indicator
mode (GMTI),
signals interception receivers, communication relay transceivers, and
the option for (O)
a hyper-spectral (imaging spectrometer) sensor.
The CBP UAV GCS facility contains the hardware and software for
mission planning,
aircraft and payload command and control, and receipt and
dissemination of
imagery/data. The GCS serves as a command post for mission planning,
flight
coordination and scheduling, and ensuring flight safety. The GCS shall
(T) initially be
capable of controlling one single UAV with the ultimate (O) objective
of controlling
multiple UAVs at one time at both LOS and beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS)
ranges. The
system shall initially include (T) one transportable GCS with a
potential addition (O) of
additional transportable GCSs in the future.
The CBP UAV Link Segment consists of redundant command and control
(C2) control
links and a non-redundant sensor data link. The command and control
link suite
provides command, control, and communication (C3) among system
operators (pilots in
the GCS and takeoff and landing system), and the aircraft. The sensor
data link suite
provides data collected by the payloads to payload operators in the
GCS and
supervisors in the field and CBP agents in the field. LOS and BLOS
command and
control links shall (T) contain a primary and a secondary link.
3.2.1.1 Aircraft
3.2.1.2 Payloads
3.2.1.3 Ground Control Station (GCS)
3.2.1.4 Link Segment
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
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The SCT provides supervisory agents in the field with direct control
of all functions of
the EO/IR sensor and access in real time to its video imagery and data
independent of
the GCS. The system will include multiple SCTs. Only one SCT shall
communicate
with the air vehicle at a time.
The RVT provides the CBP agents in the field with direct access in
real time to EO/IR
sensor video imagery and data independent of the GCS. The system will
include
multiple RVTs.
3.2.2 Functional Configuration
The baseline functions and equipment configurations of CBP UAV System
elements
should (O) be modular and can be interchanged and intermixed to meet
specific
missions.
The CBP UAV system will be deployed in one configuration. In this
configuration, the
CBP UAV System’s command and control functions are incorporated and
integrated
into the GCS and takeoff and landing system. These command and control
systems
shall (T) provide the data link and the ground control functionality
for command and
control of the aircraft and payload. The initial classes of CBP UAV
systems and their
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Agreement
(STANAG) 4586
level of connectivity are:
Table 3-2-2-1: NATO STANAG 4586 Levels of Control
LEVEL TYPE OF CONTROL
Level 1 Indirect receipt of secondary imagery and/or data
Level 2 Direct receipt of payload data by a UCS
Level 3 Level 2 interoperability plus control of the UAV
payload by a UCS
Level 4 Level 3 interoperability plus UAV flight control by a
UCS
Level 5 Level 4 interoperability plus the ability of the UCS to
launch and recover the UAV
3.2.1.5 Sensor Control Terminals (SCT)
3.2.1.6 Remote Video Terminals (RVT)
3.2.2.1 Baseline Configuration
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
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Table 3-2-2-2: CBP UAV System Element and level of Control
CBP UAV System Element Level of Control
GCS 5
Takeoff and Landing System 5
SCT 3
RVT 2
3.2.3 External Interfaces
The CBP UAV System shall (T) support existing DHS system interfaces
and should (O)
implement an open systems architecture. The CBP UAV System should
possess
standard communication interfaces; including standard peripheral
ports, and be
interoperable with:
a. CBP, ICE, USCG, and AMOC local area networks
b. Standard meteorological information from the National Weather
Service’s
Aviation Digital Data Services (ADDS) and Department of defense (DoD)
weather services assets
3.2.4 Internal Interfaces
The CBP UAV System shall (T) be defined through a set of Interface
Control
Documents (ICDs). These interfaces shall use commercial and
non-commercial
interface standards and support an open systems architecture. The ICDs
represent the
functional and physical interfaces between system elements and
sub-elements. These
ICDs define the functional, hardware, and software boundaries between
major
functional sub-elements. The ICDs are expected to evolve during
detailed design of the
CBP UAV System with the purpose of facilitating the replacement of
obsolete parts,
upgrading components, and incorporation of additional system elements.
3.2.5 Performance Characteristics
This section defines the performance characteristics of the CBP UAV
System. Specific
system component performance characteristics are defined herein.
3.2.5.1.1 Mission Capability Requirements – KPP1: The CBP UAV System
shall
provide 12 continuous hours of Time On Station (TOS) within a 24-
hour period at a 100-NM operational radius (T) or 20 hours TOS at
100 NM operational radius (O) while carrying the sensor package.
3.2.5.1.2 System Computations – The CBP UAV System shall (T) be
capable of
supporting computations for operations at altitudes ranging from Mean
Sea level (MSL) to greater than 15,000 ft MSL (T) 20,000ft MSL (O).
3.2.5.1 System Operations
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3.2.5.1.3 Target Location Accuracy – The CBP UAV System shall (T)
provide a
target location to the users with a Target Location Error (TLE) of
less than
or equal to (=) 25 (T) 10 (O) meters (m) Circular Error Probable (CEP)
at
3-5 km slant range.
3.2.5.1.4 Mission Planning
a. Pre-Flight Programming. The CBP UAV System shall (T) be capable of
programming the aircraft and payload elements with mission planning
data,
including operational and lost link mission planning, prior to launch.
b. In-Flight Programming. The CBP UAV System shall (T) be capable of
replanning
the aircraft and/or payload mission, including operational and lost
link
mission planning, from the controlling GCS while the air vehicle is in
flight.
3.2.5.1.5 System Control
a. Launch and Recovery – An Automatic Launch and Recovery Capability
shall
(T) be the primary means of launching and recovering the air vehicle.
The
CBP UAV System shall (T) be able to override the Automatic Launch and
Recovery capability and revert to manual control for launch and
recovery. The
CBP UAV System shall (T) be able to command the aircraft to abort the
automatic takeoff or landing sequence with execution of a
pre-programmed,
single action flight command.
b. Command and Control Hand-off – The CBP UAV System shall (T) be able
to
hand-off control of an aircraft and/or payload from one CBP UAV GCS to
another CBP UAV GCS.
c. Simultaneous Operations – The CBP UAV System shall (O) be capable
of
simultaneously operating multiple aircraft, one or more
payloads/sensors, and
the embedded communication relay during a single mission sortie. The
GCS
shall (T) have the capability to simultaneously control the aircraft
and sensors
while also performing mission planning.
3.2.5.1.6 CBP UAV System Communications – The CBP UAV System shall (T)
have communication controls which permit each operator to select
twoway
voice communications using any of the system’s external wire lines,
radio sets, or intercoms, and then to communicate with other operators
and with Air Traffic Control (ATC) authority. Operators shall (T) be
able to
change frequencies in flight.
3.2.5.1.7 Embedded Operational Training Functions – The CBP UAV System
will
possess an embedded training capability to provide operational
training
via the GCS. The operator and maintainer training functions should (O)
be embedded and have add-on interactive training, with self-paced
instruction, duplicating CBP UAV system flight performance
characteristics, capabilities, and limitations.
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3.2.5.2.1 Regulatory Requirements
3.2.5.2.2 FAA Conformance – The CBP UAV system shall meet all Federal
Aircraft
Administration (FAA) requirements for conducting day and night flights
in
unrestricted U.S. airspace (excluding Class B and C terminal airspace)
with (T) without (O) a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) by
providing an equivalent level of safety to that of FAA-certified
manned
aircraft.
3.2.5.2.3 FCC/IRAC Conformance – The CBP UAV system shall meet all
Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and Interdepartmental Radio
Advisory Committee (IRAC) requirements for transmitting commands,
telemetry, and data (T).
3.2.5.2.4 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Conformance – The CBP
UAV
system shall comply with National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA)
provisions for an Environmental Assessment (EA) performed in the
applicable Border Patrol sector (T).
3.2.5.2.5 CBP UAV System Preparation Time
a. Set-Up Times – A CBP UAV System shall (T) be capable of being
off-loaded
from its transport vehicles and achieving, at a minimum, Full Mission
Capable
(FMC) status, which is: one GCS, one aircraft, one Link Segment, and
one
payload, within 8 (T) 4 (O) hours.
b. Fueling – The CBP UAV System shall (T) be compatible with gravity
fueling
systems and (O) pressure fueling systems.
c. Preparation for Transportation Times – The CBP UAV System shall (T)
be
capable of being disassembled, made ready for transport, and reloaded
aboard its ground transport vehicles within 8 hours.
d. Launch and Recovery Time – A CBP UAV System shall (T) be capable of
launching a single aircraft within 30 minutes of receipt of tasking,
assuming
prior airspace coordination and mission planning have been completed.
The
CBP UAV system shall (T) be capable of launching a single aircraft
within 2
hours following a change of tasking that necessitates equipment
change,
assuming prior airspace coordination and mission planning have been
completed.
e. Automatic Launch and Recovery – The Automatic Launch and Recovery
Capability shall (T) be able to launch and recover the aircraft.
3.2.5.2.6 Aircraft to Aircraft System Interoperability – The CBP UAV
System shall
(T) be capable of operating and/or interfacing with other fielded DHS
systems without causing mutual interference or operational
degradation.
3.2.5.2 System Compatibility
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3.2.5.2.7 Environmental Impact – The CBP UAV System should (O)
minimize any
adverse impact on the environment.
3.2.5.2.8 CBP UAV System Power
a. Electrical Power – Electrical power for the CBP UAV System shall
(T) be
compatible with current domestic (US) electrical systems and with
standard
commercially available mobile electrical generations systems.
b. Emergency Power – The CBP UAV System shall (T) have sufficient
backup
electrical power to continue to operate the system to complete its
mission and
recover the air vehicles in the event of an electrical generation
system failure.
In the event of primary power being lost inflight, aircraft power
shall (T)
automatically transition without interruption to a second,
independent, onboard
power source, capable of supporting full functionality of all aircraft
systems
except the payload sensors for a minimum of 30 minutes.
3.2.5.2.9 Human Engineering – The CBP UAV System shall (T) not cause
any
adverse effects on the operators or maintainers.
3.2.5.3.1 Ambient Temperature
a. Operational Temperature Extremes. Components of the CBP UAV System
shall (T) be capable of meeting the CBP UAV System’s mission
objectives in
ambient air temperatures between -40° F (-40° C) to 122° F (+50° C)
for daily
cycle (air temperature outside shelters with solar load of 355 BTU/sq.
ft/hr).
b. Non-Operating, Storage, and Transit. The non-operating CBP UAV
System
and equipment should (O) withstand temperature extremes of -40° F
(-40° C)
to 160° F (+71° C).
c. Operational Temperature Shock. The CBP UAV System equipment shall
(T)
not suffer damage or subsequently fail to meet the CBP UAV System’s
mission objectives when subjected to abrupt temperature changes (more
than
20° C within 1 hour) between -40° F (-40° C) to 122° F (+50° C).
3.2.5.3.2 Humidity – The CBP UAV System and maintenance equipment
shall (T)
be capable of meeting the CBP UAV System’s mission objectives and
sustain no physical damage during and after prolonged exposure to
extreme high humidity levels for hot and basic categories as
encountered
in tropical areas. Provisions should (O) be made to prevent the
excessive
accumulation of moisture during ascent and descent in humid climates.
3.2.5.3.3 Rain – The CBP UAV System, during non-operating, storage and
transit,
shall (T) not sustain any physical damage or be rendered inoperable
following steady rainfall 2 inches per hour for a period of one hour.
3.2.5.3.4 Snow
3.2.5.3 Environmental Conditions
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a. Non-Operating, Storage, and Transit. The CBP UAV System shall
withstand a
snow load of 10 (T), 20 (O) pounds per square-foot when in storage or
transit
status.
b. Operating. The CBP UAV System shall (T) permit removal of snow
prior to
operation in 1.5 hours, after the system encounters a snow load of 10
pounds
per square foot.
3.2.5.3.5 Icing
a. Non-Operating, Storage, and Transit. The CBP UAV System shall (T)
withstand an ice load of 20 pounds per square-foot when in a storage
or transit
status.
b. Operating. The CBP UAV System shall (T) permit removal of ice prior
to
operation. The CBP UAV System should (O) be operational within 1.5
hours
after this equipment encounters an ice load of 3 pounds per square
foot.
3.2.5.3.6 Wind – The CBP UAV System, when in a non-operating, storage,
or
transit status, shall (T) not sustain any physical damage during
steady
winds up to 45 knots, with gusts up to 65 knots, for a period of 30
minutes.
Hold-down or other facilities will (O) be provided to withstand winds
above
45 knots for a period of 5 minutes, with gusts to 85 knots and with 2
inches of radial glazed ice.
3.2.5.3.7 Fungus – The CBP UAV System shall (T) not show evidence of
deterioration and remain operable and storable within environments
containing fungi to include: Chaetomium Globsum, Aspergillus Niger,
Aspergillus Flavus, Aspergillus Versicolor, and Penicillium
Funiculosum.
3.2.5.3.8 Salt Fog – The CBP UAV System shall (T) be capable of
meeting its
mission objectives and not sustain any physical or functional damage
during and after exposure to the salt fog of marine environments.
3.2.5.3.9 Blowing Sand and Dust – The CBP UAV System shall (T) be
capable of
meeting its mission objectives and be protected and resistant to the
degrading effects from and after exposure to sand and dust particles
of all
expected operating and storage environments.
3.2.5.3.10 Altitudes
a. Non-Operating, Storage, and Transit. The CBP UAV System equipment
shall
(T) not sustain physical or functional damage at pressure altitudes up
to
35,000 feet MSL.
b. Operating. The CBP UAV System equipment shall (T) be capable of
meeting
the CBP UAV System’s mission objectives and not sustain physical
damage at
absolute ceiling and pressure altitudes up to the maximum operating
altitude
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
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for the aircraft as specified herein, and at 10,000 feet MSL for
ground
equipment.
3.2.5.3.11 Solar Radiation – The CBP UAV System should (O) not
experience
physical damage and be capable of meeting its mission objectives when
exposed to the diurnal solar radiation.
3.2.5.3.12 Induced Environment – The CBP UAV System equipment shall
(T) not
suffer damage and be capable of meeting its mission objectives when
subjected to the heat, vibration, acceleration, and shock caused by
equipment and subsystems and environmental control units.
3.2.5.3.13 Vibration – The CBP UAV System equipment shall (T)
withstand vibrations
induced during transport, as part of a mobile assemblage over roads
and
off-road terrain.
3.2.5.3.14 Mechanical Shock – The CBP UAV System equipment shall (T)
not suffer
damage and be capable of meeting the CBP UAV System’s mission
objectives when subject to self-induced mechanical shock during
operations, transport, and loading/unloading operations.
3.2.5.3.15 Acceleration – The CBP UAV System equipment shall (T)
withstand
positive and negative accelerations induced during vehicular
transport, as
part of a mobile assemblage over all types of roads and off-road
terrain.
The CBP UAV System equipment should (O) withstand acceleration
induced during rail, air and sea transport.
3.2.5.4.1 Reliability
a. The Mean Time Between Mission Abort (MTBMA) of the CBP UAV System
shall be at least 120 hours (T). A Mission Abort is defined as an
aborted
mission due to a critical LRU failure in flight.
b. The Mean Time Between System Abort (MTBSA, in flight) of the CBP
UAV
System shall be at least 170 hours (T).
3.2.5.4.2 Availability
a. Mission Availability. KPP 2: The CBP UAV system shall support
14-hour
flights to include night for 4 days per week , i.e., 208 days and
2,912
flight hours (T), 5 days per week, i.e., 260 days and 3,640 flight
hours (O),
throughout the year by providing a combination of a high mission
availability rate and ready spare aircraft.
b. The CBP UAV System shall provide an operational availability (Ao)
of 90
percent (T), 95 percent (O). Ao is defined and calculated as Ao = [
(Total Time
- Down Time) / Total Time ] * 100%. Where Total Time = 2,912 yearly
flight
3.2.5.4 System Reliability, Availability, Maintainability (RAM)
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
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hours based on 14-hour flights, 4 days per week, 208 days per year.
Down
Time = The sum of the expected mission time lost due to UAV and GCS
mission aborts. The downtime is dependent on aircraft configuration,
and
does not include any impact due to logistic or spare parts delays. In
addition,
the Ao assumes a 4 aircraft system, and a 0.5 hour relief time per
aircraft. The
relief aircraft are assumed to be preflighted and ready to relieve any
aborted
UAV during the mission timeframe.
c. The CBP UAV System shall have an Inherent Availability (Ai) of 0.90
(T) and
0.95 (O). Ai is based on reliability and maintainability, and is
defined and
calculated as Ai = [MTBF/ (MTBF + MTTR)] * 100%. Where: MTBF = Mean
Time Between Failure, and MTTR = Mean Time To Repair.
3.2.5.4.3 Maintainability – Maintenance to be performed on the
aircraft at
operational level shall be capable of being performed at the airfield
by
contractor support personnel in accordance with the following:
a. Mean Time Between Failure. The CBP UAV System shall have a Mean
Time
Between Failure (MTBF) of 36 hours (T) and 50 hours (O). MTBF is
defined
as: MTBF = (UAV Fleet Flight Hours) / (Total Failures) Where: Total
Failures =
Number of failures due to unscheduled maintenance resulting from a
direct
failure of an LRU.
b. Mean-Time-To-Repair. The CBP UAV System Mean-Time-to-Repair (MTTR)
shall (T) be in a range from 1.0 to 2.5 hours, depending on aircraft
configuration. The MTTR assumes a two level maintenance concept, with
the
repair actions being LRU removal and replacement at the organizational
level.
The MTTR shall be defined as the time required to diagnose and isolate
faults
using BIT and troubleshooting technical manuals, perform the LRU
removal
and replacement, and to perform the system check out.
c. Independence of Failures. Failure, damage, or removal of one item
shall (T)
not cause failure or damage in any other item and not cause a critical
failure if
there is a properly functioning item which is redundant to the failed
item.
3.2.5.4.4 System Diagnostics
a. As part of the system diagnostics, the system shall (T) be capable
of being
commanded from the GCS to move each flight control surface (ailerons,
flaps,
tails, and cowl flap servo-actuator), and verify proper position
versus
command and slew rate.
b. The system diagnostics shall (T) also be capable of monitoring,
displaying,
and recording health status and warnings, to include variables such as
temperature, voltage, and current for selected systems. The health
status
shall (T) include BIT, and provide Flight Critical warnings and Red
limit
warnings to alert the operator of a failed or degraded condition.
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
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3.2.5.4.5 System Diagnostics and Support – The CBP UAV system shall
initially be
operated and maintained under a Contractor Logistics Support (CLS)
contract (T).
3.2.5.5.1 The CBP UAV System shall (T) be capable of being configured
for (or deconfigured
from) sea, ground, or air transport in 8 (T) 4 (O) hours or less,
and not: Overload a designated transport medium and, Require special
handling or specialized loading procedures (temperature limits,
pressure
limits, power source required, protective service or
sensitive/classified)
3.2.5.5.2 Ground Transportability – The DHS CBP UAV System shall (T)
be ground
transportable using standard commercial vehicles available to DHS
which
do not exceed the ordinary and customary restrictions imposed by
individual states and/or the federal government.
3.2.5.5.3 Rail Transportability – The CBP UAV System shall (T) be
capable of rail
transport and be capable of meeting the Gabarit International de-
Chargement (GIC) rail clearance diagram requirements. The CBP UAV
System should (O) be capable of withstanding rail impacts without
damage at speeds of up to 8 mph.
3.2.5.5.4 Air Transportability - Each component of the CBP UAV system
shall (T) be
transportable within the cube and weight constraints of a U.S. Coast
Guard C-130H aircraft.
3.2.5.5.5 Marine Transportability – The CBP UAV System shall (T) be
capable of
transport by marine vessels of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG).
3.3 MATERIAL DEFINITION
3.3.1 Materials
The materials used in the CBP UAV System shall (T) be suitable for
operation in marine
environments, and for extended periods of storage. Materials should
(O) resist
degradation when exposed to the service life environments. This
includes utilization of
corrosion resistant protective finishes and corrosive resistive
materials.
The use of toxic chemicals, hazardous substances, or ozone-depleting
chemicals
(ODC) shall (T) be avoided. When unavoidable, the hazardous
substances, toxic
chemicals, or ODCs shall (T) be safety compliant, and regulation
compliant in
accordance with local, state, and federal regulations. DHS’s objective
is to prevent
hazardous and toxic materials and ozone depleting materials at the
source.
3.2.5.5 Transportability
3.3.1.1 Hazardous, Toxic and Ozone Depleting Chemicals Prevention
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Recycled, recovered, or environmentally preferable materials should
(O) be used to the
maximum extent possible provided that the material meets or exceeds
the operational
and maintenance requirements, and promotes economically advantageous
life cycle
costs.
3.3.2 Computer Hardware and Software
The CBP UAV System should (O) contain non-proprietary software and
follow an Open
Systems Architecture, including open specifications for interfaces,
services, and
formats.
The CBP UAV System shall (T) use computer hardware capable of
integrating into the
existing CBP network architecture.
3.3.2.1.1 Data Storage and Main Memory Reserve Capacity – The CBP UAV
System shall (T) possess 50% or more reserve capacity for program
instruction memory for each system processor, and 50% or more reserve
capacity for data storage devices, evaluated under worst-case loading
conditions.
3.3.2.1.2 Processing Speed/Throughput Reserve Capacity – The CBP UAV
System
shall (T) provide 50% or more reserve capacity in throughput for each
system processor, evaluated under worst-case loading conditions.
Techniques, such as bank switching, used to address memory
requirements should (O) not degrade the computer system performance
during operational missions.
3.3.2.1.3 Input / Output (I/O) Channel Requirements – The I/O channel
throughput
for each system processor shall (T) have 50% or more reserve capacity,
with serial channels possessing a 50% or more reserve baud capacity,
evaluated under worst-case loading conditions.
3.3.2.1.4 Processor and Firmware Enhancements – Processors shall (T)
be
upwardly-scaleable to yield faster execution, reduce life cycle costs,
and
mitigate obsolescence. The processors may be replaced by, or
augmented by, another processor having an identical instruction set or
instruction superset and memory architecture (word length and
addressing
scheme). Firmware should (O) be compatible with existing and planned
hardware configurations and allow for system enhancements.
3.3.1.2 Recycled, Recovered, or Environmentally Preferable Materials
3.3.2.1 Computer Hardware Requirements
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The CBP UAV software shall (T) be modular and scaleable and be
classified as either
operational software or support software. Operational software
includes programs
executed to fulfill the CBP UAV System’s mission and BIT software. BIT
software
includes programs for readiness test, fault detection, performance
monitoring,
maintenance data retrieval, and special test capabilities integral to
the system. Support
software includes capabilities required for the production,
verification, and maintenance
of all software and for the test and maintenance of system equipment.
3.3.2.2.1 Firmware – Contractor developed / controlled computer
programs that are
stored in Read-Only-Memory (ROM), Programmable ROM (PROM), or
other similar memory should (O) be considered firmware. Included are
computer programs and data loaded into memory that cannot be
dynamically modified by the computer during processing.
3.3.2.2.2 Programming Languages – The CBP UAV System software shall
(T) be
Higher Order Languages (HOL) which follow ANSI, IEEE, or equivalent
standards. The use of assembly language or low level code is
restricted
to processing-time-constrained and memory-constrained functions.
3.3.2.2.3 Commenting Standards – Standards shall (T) be established
and utilized
for embedding comments in source code. The comment standards for
banners, headers, and special comments shall be as described in
contractor-approved standards or an equivalent methodology.
3.3.2.2.4 Error and Diagnostic Messages – The CBP UAV System software
shall
(T) possess on-line error and diagnostic messages and require no
additional interpretation by the user. The messages should (O) include
a
textual description of the condition, time of occurrence, required
operator
actions, and data processor and software execution status when
applicable. Error and diagnostic messages are uniquely identifiable
and
shall be recorded or trapped. Errors detected in the processing of a
command or function should (O) result in an alert to the operator and
the
erroneous command or function ignored. Alerts shall (T) be immediately
displayed to the operator upon error detection.
3.3.2.2.5 Character Set Standards – Character sets shall conform to
commercial
standards (T).
3.3.2.2.6 Software Security – The CBP UAV System software shall (T)
possess the
capability to be protected from unauthorized, intentional or
unintentional,
modification.
3.3.2.2.7 Fault Tolerance – The CBP UAV System software shall (T)
prevent single
point failures from disabling the entire system.
3.3.2.2 Computer Software
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3.3.2.2.8 Computer Program Regeneration – CBP UAV System software
shall (T)
be capable of being regenerated via the source code as stored in the
central repository. Patches to CBP UAV software are not considered
source code.
3.3.3 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3)
The individual communication and electronic equipment/subsystems
utilized on the CBP
UAV System shall (T) be inter- and intra-system/platform
electro-magnetically
compatible to ensure that system/platform operational performance
requirements are
met. The performance of the CBP UAV System shall (T) not be degraded
when
exposed to its operational electromagnetic environment (natural or
man-made).
All new or modified CBP UAV System SRAs or modified portions of
interface
subsystems shall (T) not interfere with, or be interfered by the
operation of any other
aircraft equipment or ground control station subsystem. The
electromagnetic
compatibility (EMC) of the CBP UAV System shall allow full use of its
SIGINT payload.
The CBP UAV System shall (T) be electro-magnetically compatible with
the external
electromagnetic environment (EME) as referenced in Table 1E of
MIL-STD-464. All
CBP UAV System equipment shall (T) be compatible with the EME on and
around
airfields, DHS facilities and equipment, and the EME generated onboard
the aircraft
under mission conditions.
Table 3-3-3: External EME for Fixed Wing Aircraft, Excluding Shipboard
Operations
Frequency Range Electric Field (V/m -rms)
(MHz) Peak Average
0.01 – 0.1 50 50
0.1 – 0.5 60 60
0.5 - 2 70 70
2 - 30 200 200
30 - 100 30 30
100 - 200 90 30
200 - 400 70 70
400 - 700 730 80
700 - 1000 1400 240
1000 - 2000 3300 160
2000 - 4000 4500 490
3.3.3.1 Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)
3.3.3.2 Electromagnetic Vulnerability (EMV)
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Frequency Range Electric Field (V/m -rms)
(MHz) Peak Average
4000 - 6000 7200 300
6000 - 8000 1100 170
8000 - 12000 2600 1050
12000 - 18000 2000 330
18000 - 40000 1000 420
40000 - 45000 - -
The generation of an electromagnetic environment by new or modified
LRUs and the
susceptibility of new or modified LRUs to an electromagnetic
environment shall (T) be
controlled within the limits of MIL-STD 461E. The following emissions
and susceptibility
requirements shall apply: CE102, CE106, CS101, CS103, CS104, CS105,
CS114,
CS115, CS116, RE102, RE103, and RS103. Bonding resistance between the
aircraft
grounding surface and any Systems Replaceable Assembly (SRA) is to be
2 milli-ohms
or less.
The CBP UAV System shall (T) protect personnel, ordnance and fuel from
the
hazardous effects of electromagnetic and electrostatic energy. Hazards
of
Electromagnetic Radiation to Personnel (HERP), Hazards of
Electromagnetic Radiation
to Fuel (HERF), and Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance
(HERO)
concerns shall be addressed. The electromagnetic radiation hazard
criteria of MIL-STD
464 are applicable.
The CBP UAV System shall (T) control and dissipate the build-up of
electrostatic
charges caused by precipitation static (p-static), fluid flow, air
flow, and other charge
generating mechanisms to aircraft fuel ignition and ordnance hazards,
to protect
personnel from shock hazards, and to prevent performance degradation
or damage to
electronics.
3.3.4 Safety
The CBP UAV System shall (T) function / operate in a safe manner in
accordance with
MIL-STD-882 or its equivalent.
3.3.3.3 Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)
3.3.3.4 Electromagnetic Radiation Hazards (HERP, HERF, HERO)
3.3.3.5 Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)
3.3.4.1 System Safety
3.3.4.2 Safety Provisions
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
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The CBP UAV System shall (T) ensure against degradation or negation of
safety
features during operations, maintenance, storage, and shipping. The
CBP UAV System
should (O) have fail-safe features with adequate redundancy, and be
capable of being
rendered safe during emergency or abnormal situations.
The CBP UAV System should (O) minimize the probability and severity of
injury to
personnel during all activities including set-up, operation,
maintenance, and tear-down
throughout the life cycle of the equipment. The system shall (T) not
induce electrical
shock or thermal shock type injuries, and the operator’s stations
designed to minimize
inadvertent operator encounters with edges, shelves, and other station
protuberances.
If laser illuminator operations are expected, laser safety goggles
shall be available on
site so if the laser illuminator would not shut off, and the payload
could not be retracted,
at least it can land while still radiating and not injure anyone on
the ground at the GCS
site.
3.3.5 Security
The UAV system shall (T) comply with current security requirements as
imposed by
national policy to be capable of evolving to meet state-of-the-art
technological advances
designed to protect information from unwanted exploitation. The UAV
system shall (T)
be protected from an Information Systems Security (INFOSEC)
perspective, which
would include, but not be limited to, such services as
confidentiality, availability, and
integrity of information that is processed, stored, or transmitted.
3.4 LOGISTICS
The CBP UAV system shall initially be operated and maintained under a
Contractor
Logistics Support (CLS) contract (T). The CBP UAV System emphasizes
maintainability, commonality, reliability, and accessibility of
components to reduce
maintenance, supply, support equipment, and manpower requirements.
3.4.1 Support Equipment
The CBP UAV System should (O) use Support Equipment (SE) that is
common to
DHS/CBP aviation. New/peculiar CBP UAV SE shall (T) be capable of
operating in
CBP UAV environments specified herein.
3.5 CHARACTERISTICS OF SYSTEM ELEMENTS
3.5.1 Aircraft
The aircraft shall (T) have a design life that minimizes the Aircraft
Total Ownership
Costs (TOC) over 15,000 flight hours and 10 years.
3.5.1.1 Design Life
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Characteristics of the aircraft are contained below and based on
International Standard
Atmosphere (ISA) standard day conditions with aircraft weight
complement of payloads
and the amount of fuel needed to accomplish the specific mission.
3.5.1.2.1 The aircraft shall (T) have an operating radius under LOS
command and
control (C2) of at least 100 nautical miles (nm) and be capable of
loitering
at that radius for at least 12 hours (T) or 20 hours (O) utilizing
internal fuel
only with the payload operating. It shall (T) then return to its
original
launch point without refueling and have a 20 minute fuel reserve
calculated for loiter at a 10,000 ft mean sea level (MSL) altitude,
maximum
endurance flight profile, under ISA day conditions.
3.5.1.2.2 KPP 3: The aircraft shall (T) be capable of taking off and
landing with
a 100% fuel load and the specified payloads from a 5,000-ft (T) 3,500-
ft (O) runway at a density altitude of 10,000 ft.
3.5.1.3.1 KPP 4: The aircraft shall be capable of operating in level
flight at or
above the altitude determined by the Signatures specification and at
or below the altitude determined by the sensor specification for the
specified endurance (sea level to 15,000 ft (T), 20,000 ft (O)).
3.5.1.3.2 The aircraft shall (T) be capable of reaching this operating
altitude during
the transit phase of flight, i.e., before reaching the patrol area.
3.5.1.3.3 The aircraft should (O) be capable of operating in level
flight at the altitude
allowing maximum line of sight reception by the Communication Relay
and
Signals Interception Payload specifications.
3.5.1.3.4 The aircraft shall have a service ceiling on an ISA standard
day of at least
15,000 ft MSL (T), 20,000 ft MSL (O).
KPP 5: The aircraft shall (T) be inaudible to the unaided human ear on
the ground
directly below it at its normal operating altitude. The aircraft
should (O) not be
detectable as a UAV at night to the unaided human eye on the ground
directly
below it at its operating altitude.
3.5.1.2 Aircraft Performance
3.5.1.3 Operating Altitude
3.5.1.4 Signatures
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
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3.5.1.5.1 Shall (T) provide sufficient electrical power to operate all
aircraft
subsystem functions (including any draw by deicing equipment) plus all
sensor subsystems simultaneously with a 20 percent reserve after
losses.
3.5.1.5.2 Shall (T) provide a voice relay capability to enable
beyond-line-of-sight
(BLOS) communication between aircraft operators and air traffic
controllers.
3.5.1.5.3 Should (O) provide a see-and-avoid (S&A) sensor, separate
and
independent of the specified Electro-optical Payload subsystem,
capable
of detecting non-cooperative airborne traffic that conforms to ASTM
2411.
3.5.1.5.4 Shall (T) provide a sufficiently low electromagnetic
interference (EMI)
environment to preclude being a hazard to ground personnel or
degradation of the specified Communication Relay and Interception
Payloads subsystem.
3.5.1.5.5 Shall (T) have lost link and mission abort procedures
permanently stored
in the onboard mission management computer.
3.5.1.5.6 Airspeed – The aircraft shall (T) have an operational
airspeed range which
will maximize the CBP UAV System’s capability of meeting it mission
objectives as defined herein, and a dash speed of 120 knot, airspeed
(KTAS) or more (O) under International Standard Atmosphere (ISA)
standard day conditions.
3.5.1.5.7 Weight
a. A mission ready aircraft shall (T) be capable of being emplaced by
no more
than four (T) two (O) people to support and perform the movement of
the
aircraft from its mover/storage site to the launch/recovery site and
then back to
the mover/storage site. The aircraft weight should (O) have a positive
margin
between mission weight and gross vehicle weight.
b. Weight Variations: Weight changes to components and subsystems
should
(O) not adversely affect required flying qualities and performance.
3.5.1.5.8 Aircraft Position Accuracy – The aircraft shall (T) possess
a spatial
location accuracy of at least 25m (82ft) (T) 10m (33ft) (O) CEP during
the
in-flight phase of the mission for use in CBP UAV System calculations.
3.5.1.5.9 Handling Qualities – The Flight Control System shall (T)
limit maximum
allowable roll and pitch angles, automatically provide coordinated
flight in
cruise phases of flight, and provide stall protection in order to
prevent
departure from controlled flight scenarios.
3.5.1.5 Other
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a. Aircraft Launch and Recovery. The aircraft shall (T) be capable of
safely
launching and recovering in at least 20 (T) 35 (O) knots of headwind
and a 15-
knot steady-state crosswind.
b. Autonomous Emergency Recovery. The aircraft shall (T) have the
capability
to automatically deviate to a pre-determined alternate recovery site
in
contingency situations so that the aircraft can be successfully
recovered by
either automatic or manual control.
c. Flight Outside the Flight Envelope. The CBP UAV shall (T) possess
sufficient
control power and response rate to safely return to the Aircraft
operating flight
envelope through the automatic flight control system.
d. Transfer of Flight Control Modes. Engagement, disengagement or
changes to
the aircraft flight control mode shall (T) be achievable and not
result in
dangerous stability or control characteristics.
3.5.1.5.10 Aircraft Environmental Conditions – In addition to the CBP
UAV System
environmental conditions specified in Section 3.2, the aircraft shall
be able
to operate and withstand the conditions specified below.
a. Temperature Extremes. The aircraft shall (T) safely operate in and
meet the
CBP UAV System’s mission objectives when exposed to temperatures
between -40° F / -40° C to 122° F / +50° C (T) -40° F/-40° C to
150°F/+65°C
(O) for daily cycle .
b. Rain. The aircraft shall (T) be capable of operating in and meeting
the CBP
UAV System’s mission objectives when exposed to precipitation
measuring
12.5 (T) 25 (O) millimeter (mm) per hour for one hour with a 2.25mm
mean
droplet size, with a Standard Deviation of 0.77mm.
c. Icing. The aircraft shall have an icing detection capability (T) or
icing rate
detection capability (O). The aircraft shall report actual icing
conditions to the
operator (T). The aircraft shall be capable of transiting (30 minutes
duration)
through light rime icing conditions (T) or moderate rime icing
conditions (O).
The aircraft may have anti-ice and/or de-ice equipment (O).
d. Vibration. The aircraft shall (T) not suffer physical or functional
damage and
meet the CBP UAV System’s mission objectives when subjected to
vibration
present throughout the aircraft operating environment.
3.5.1.5.11 Aircraft Modes of Operation – The aircraft shall (T) be
capable of flying
pre-programmed mission profiles independent of navigational assistance
from the GCS, and be capable of being controlled via the Air Vehicle
Operator’s Console with manual flight control functions. With loss of
the
data link, the CBP UAV System shall (T) attempt to reestablish data
link
while continuing on the pre-programmed flight path and mission
profile.
When data link is not re-established within a predetermined time
period,
the aircraft shall (T) be capable of fully autonomous flight to a
predesignated
point and perform an autonomous emergency recovery. The
aircraft mission phase main modes of operation are:
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
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a. Pre-launch. In this mode, all aircraft pre-launch activities are
accomplished.
The aircraft will accomplish pre-launch activities using the data link
or ground
cable connected between the GCS and the aircraft.
b. Launch. In this mode, manual or automatic aircraft launch is
accomplished.
c. Flight. In this mode, flight activities are accomplished.
d. Recovery. In this mode, aircraft recovery is accomplished.
3.5.1.5.12 In-Flight Operations – The aircraft shall (T) have the
following in-flight
capabilities:
a. Autonomous navigation and flight between multiple, selected
waypoints.
b. Automatic loiter and track on command.
c. Automatic execution of lost-link procedures to reacquire the data
link in the
event of data link loss of contact.
d. Automatic return to a pre-planned recovery area when a lost data
link
connection is not reacquired within a predetermined period of time.
Automatic
refers to a series of pre-programmed steps that allow the mission
planners to
set waypoints, altitudes, speeds, execution time (the period of time
after lost
link), holding, climbing, descending, and landing instructions.
e. Autonomous execution of emergency procedures due to electrical
generator
failure or other critical aircraft subsystem failure.
3.5.1.5.13 The aircraft should (O) have the onboard, in-flight,
self-contained ability to
detect traffic that may present a conflict, evaluate flight paths,
determine
traffic right-of-way, and maneuver well clear (or as required); this
is known
as “sense and avoid” capability.
The aircraft shall contain the necessary equipment to maintain control
of the aircraft
subsystems, communicate with the GCS, provide communication relay, and
perform its
missions.
3.5.1.6.1 Air Vehicle Data Link – The aircraft shall contain the
Airborne SATCOM
Terminal (AST) as defined in Section 3.5.9.
3.5.1.6.2 Embedded Voice Communications Relay – The aircraft shall
have an
airborne (T) Multi-band (AM/FM) tactical radio system that provides an
airborne command and control (C2) capability for the UAV when in
flight.
Utilizing multiple radios, the onboard interfacing shall (T) provide
the ability
to route audio from one radio system to the other to perform in-band
relays, cross-band relays, simulcast on multiple radios, relay and
simulcast at the same time, operate full duplex or half duplex
(selectable),
and function as a repeater. It shall (T) enable UAV controllers to
talk on
all law enforcement, military, medical, marine, SAR and public service
3.5.1.6 Aircraft Functional Requirements
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
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frequencies from 30 MHz to 960 MHz (VHF/UHF) with APCO Project 25
compliant digital communications capable of tuning in 1.25 kHz steps,
able
to operate on 12.5 kHz and 25 kHz FM channels over several different
frequency bands. The radio system shall (T) have embedded Type 3
Encryption (Voice Private) with an Over-the-Air Re-Key (OTAR)
capability.
In addition to the Main receiver, the system shall (T) have a second
receiver (an imbedded Motorola XTS-5000 module) having DF interfaces
and CTCSS and DCS tones. An additional radio with a minimum of 4
simultaneously operable channels shall be provided for communications
relay. It shall (T) have a Communications Management Controller with
the
ability to: (1) tune and monitor multiple radio systems; (2) provide
two
microphone and headset ports to allow two radios to operate
independently; (3) preset channels, manual frequency selection on each
system, front panel programming, PC database data port on the front of
the unit, 5V and 28V bus, data entry via cursor/value knobs or
keyboard;
and (4) control the radio system when the UAV is on the ground and
while
in flight.
3.5.1.6.3 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) – The aircraft shall have
an IFF Mode
IIIC and IV identification system capability, (T) shall be capable of
automatic or manual in-flight programming (T), and should have Mode S
and a Precision Locator Information (PLI) transponder capability (O).
It
should also conform with FAA regulations for altitude encoding
transponders specified via 14 CFR section 91.215.
3.5.1.6.4 Locator Beacon – The aircraft shall (T) possess the
capability to emit a
locator signal compatible with existing USCG and FAA-capable search
and rescue systems.
3.5.1.6.5 Navigation Lights – The aircraft shall (T) have a
navigation, position, and
anti-collision (strobe) lighting system which is compliant with
Federal
Aviation Administration regulations regarding flight in the national
aerospace and be capable of being activated or deactivated from the
GCS
and takeoff and landing system. The CBP UAV System should (O)
contain anti-collision lighting having an operator-selectable
capability for
Night Vision Device (NVD) or for visible light range.
3.5.1.6.6 Navigation – The aircraft shall (T) have the following modes
of navigation,
be capable of switching between all modes as necessary to meet mission
requirements, and meet all requirements for CBP operations. Loss of
GPS or INS source/functionality should (O) not result in a loss of
navigation solution or flight safety.
a. Global Positioning System (GPS) Navigation - Aircraft navigation
solution is
calculated using only GPS data.
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 36
b. Inertial Navigation System (INS) Navigation - Aircraft navigation
solution is
calculated using an internal INS sensor.
c. Aided Navigation – Aircraft navigation solution is calculated using
a weighted
combination of multiple navigation sensors.
d. Present Position Navigation – Aircraft navigation solution is
updated using the
current aircraft present position as determined from external
references such
as mark on top or derived from internal system or sensor updates.
3.5.1.6.7 Sense and Avoid System Requirements – Sense-and-avoid is the
onboard, self-contained ability to detect traffic that may present a
conflict,
evaluate flight paths, determine traffic right-of-way, and maneuver
well
clear (or as required) in accordance with (IAW) FAA regulatory
guidance.
Sense-and-avoid systems should (O) provide a minimum traffic detection
capability as described in ASTM-2411.
3.5.1.6.8 Payload Provisions – The aircraft shall (T) incorporate a
payload capability
that provides the following functions or provisions:
a. Support operation of two or more sensors simultaneously in straight
and level
flight conditions.
b. Provide a total payload weight capacity of at least 300 (T) 500 (O)
lbs.
c. Provide a total internal payload volume of at least five cubic
feet.
d. Provide an interface, via the payload ICD, to support operation of
1 or more
payloads.
e. Provide aircraft position, attitude, and other flight information
to the payloads.
f. The aircraft shall (T) have a meteorological sensor with the
capability to
calculate and report winds aloft, measure temperature (±1° C),
relative
humidity (±2% between 0% and 80% relative humidity and ±3% between 80%
and 100% relative humidity), and barometric pressure (±0.1 inches
(3.37
millibars) of mercury.
3.5.1.6.9 Aircraft Servicing – The aircraft shall (T) incorporate the
following
functions or provisions.
a. Possess an embedded gravity (T) pressure (O) fuel and de-fuel
capability
b. Withstand and remain operational after a fresh water wash of the
airframe and
engine
c. Possess lift and hoisting (hard) point capable of supporting a
mission ready
aircraft
d. Use reasonably available commercial fuel such as AVGAS, JP-5 and
JP-8 (T)
and diesel (O) fuels
e. Possess a single point grounding plug
f. Ground Operation Provisions. All aircraft components should (O) be
capable
of being operated to accomplish system maintenance, training, and / or
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 37
system preparation by either an external auxiliary power unit for at
least 30
minutes under worse case thermal and environmental conditions without
external cooling.
3.5.2 Payload
KPP 6: The aircraft shall (T) be capable of simultaneously operating
combinations
of two or more of the following payloads, without degrading payload or
aircraft
performance, while in flight: EO/IR/laser illuminator, Synthetic
Aperture Radar
(SAR)/Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI), signals interception, and
communications relay.
The payloads shall (T) operate within the flight envelope and under
the same climatic,
altitude, and operating conditions as the CBP UAV System.
3.5.2.3.1 Automatic Tracking – Applicable payloads shall (T) be
capable of
automatically tracking a human-sized, single moving object and keep a
stationary object in the center of that sensor’s Field of View (FOV).
Tracking accuracy should (O) be sufficient to allow target designation
at
the specified ranges.
3.5.2.3.2 Geographic Pointing – Applicable payloads shall (T) be able
to
automatically point at a specified geographic location within the
payload’s
field of regard (FOR). In conjunction with the air vehicle’s automatic
loiter
capability, the payload should (O) be able to maintain constant
surveillance and track on a designated geographic point.
3.5.2.3.3 Fixed Pointing – Applicable payloads shall (T) be able to
continuously
point at a fixed azimuth and depression.
3.5.2.3.4 Target Marking – Applicable payloads shall be able to mark 4
(T) 8 (O)
targets and then be able to automatically return to the marked target
after
panning away from the target.
3.5.2.1 Types of Initial Payloads
3.5.2.2 Flight Operation
3.5.2.3 Payload Tracking and Pointing
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The payloads shall (T) be capable of being controlled manually by an
operator in the
GCS, or an SCT, or automatically controlled via the mission plan.
Payload command
and controls shall (T) be accomplished independent of aircraft command
and controls.
Applicable payloads shall (T) supply the coordinates for payload
center FOV to the CBP
UAV System for display in the GCS, SCT, and RVT, and imagery and
payload status
indications for display to the operator.
If applicable, the payload detector cooling system shall (T) be a
closed-loop, selfcontained
system, and not require charging prior to flight.
Applicable sensors shall (T) be capable of providing sensor specific
metadata for
imagery embedding. Typical sensor metadata elements include: FOV,
focal length,
azimuth angle, depression angle, sensor type, time stamp, sensor
settings, and sensor
motion information (roll, pitch, and yaw).
The contractor shall provide non-proprietary payload interface
specifications for
integrating specified payloads into the UAV system. Installation /
loading of payload
elements into the CBP UAV System shall (T) not require modification of
aircraft, GCS,
or RVT core operating software.
3.5.3 Electro-optical/Infra-red/Laser Illuminator
The Electro-optical/Infra-red (EO/IR) sensor provides real time
(video) imagery support
under all environmental conditions in which the CBP UAV System
operates. The EO/IR
payload capability shall (T) include a day/night passive imagery
sensor, and laser
illuminator (class 3B or less).
3.5.3.1.1 Shall (T) have a day and a night digital video imaging
capability with a
National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale (NIIRS) level 7 (T) 8
(O)
capability at 8 nm slant range, with all functions remotely selectable
while
in flight.
3.5.2.4 Payload Control
3.5.2.5 Data Display
3.5.2.6 Payload Cooling System
3.5.2.7 Sensor Metadata
3.5.2.8 Payload Interfaces
3.5.3.1 EO/IR/Laser Illuminator Airborne Suite
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3.5.3.1.2 Shall (T) have a 360-degree continuous (no stop) field of
regard (FOR) in
azimuth and a +10 to -90 degree FOR in elevation (0 degrees elevation
being nadir for the sensor).
3.5.3.1.3 Shall (T) be capable of autotrack, autofocus, and autoscan
functions.
3.5.3.1.4 Shall (T) be capable of focusing on the exterior of the
aircraft during flight.
3.5.3.1.5 Shall (T) be capable of detecting a standing human being at
night,
non-cued (independent search), at a slant range of three times the
specified Operating Altitude in wide field of view (WFOV).
3.5.3.1.6 Shall (T) be capable of recognizing a standing human being
at night as a
human being at a slant range of two times the specified Operating
Altitude.
3.5.3.1.7 Shall (T) be capable of identifying a standing human being
at night as
likely armed or not (based on position of arms) at a slant range of
one and
a half times the specified Operating Altitude.
3.5.3.1.8 Shall (T) have selectable video rates up to 30 frames/sec.
3.5.3.1.9 Shall (T) provide National Television Standards Committee
(NTSC)-
formatted video transmission.
3.5.3.1.10 Shall (T) be capable of recognizing a back pack or bundle
carried by a
human being at a slant range of two times the specified operational
altitude.
3.5.3.1.11 Shall (T) be capable of marking a target into a retrievable
database.
3.5.3.1.12 Shall (T) have a stability value of 70 microradians root
mean square
(RMS).
3.5.3.1.13 Shall (T) be capable of a slew rate of at least 60
degrees/sec.
3.5.4 Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)
Moving-target-indicator (MTI) radar modes have the ability to detect
targets in the
presence of radar confounding land terrain and can be superimposed on
radar images
of the terrain to better indicate the environmental context of
detected objects.
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3.5.4.1.1 The SAR shall (T) be capable of providing wide area
surveillance
(mapping) of a 5 nm wide swath at National Radar Imagery
Interpretation
Scale (NRIIS) level 4 with Spot imagery available at NRIIS level 6.
3.5.4.1.2 Shall (T) have a ground mapping mode and a ground moving
target
indicator (GMTI) mode.
3.5.4.1.3 Shall (T) have a default means to preclude creating a
radiating hazard to
ground personnel.
3.5.4.1.4 The ground mapping mode shall (T) provide both strip and
spot
submodes, a minimum field of regard of 180 degrees, a minimum range of
10 nm, and an impulse resolution (IPR) of 1 ft in spot submode.
3.5.4.1.5 The GMTI mode shall (T) have a minimum detectable velocity
(MDV) of 3
kt and a revisit rate of no more than 60 sec per 90 degrees of sector
scan.
3.5.4.1.6 The GMTI mode shall (T) have a minimum range of range of 20
km with a
field of regard of 180 degrees at that range.
3.5.5 Signals Interception
3.5.5.1.1 Shall (T) provide 360-degree coverage in azimuth of the
spectrum from 30
MHz to 3 GHz unblocked.
3.5.5.1.2 The payload shall provide 2 degree (T) 1 degree (O) root
mean square
(RMS) direction finding (DF) accuracy from 30 MHz to 150 MHz and
provide 1 degree (T) 1/2 degree (O) root mean square (RMS) direction
finding (DF) accuracy from 150 MHz to 3000 MHz.
3.5.5.1.3 The system shall (T) provide automatic and manual DF of
multiple signals
simultaneously. Automatic DF should (O) be able to separate out
individual communication links.
3.5.5.1.4 The payload shall (T) provide a minimum standoff distance
for DF of 50
miles for listening/collection mode.
3.5.5.1.5 UAV shall (T) be able to output formatted data reports to
ground units.
3.5.5.1.6 The signals intercept airborne suite shall (T) be suitable
for integration and
operation on a UAV with respect to size, weight, and power.
3.5.4.1 SAR Airborne Suite
3.5.5.1 Signals Interception Airborne Suite
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3.5.5.1.7 System shall (T) support bandwidth from 3 kHz through 200
kHz.
3.5.6 Communication Relay
3.5.6.1.1 Shall provide 20 (T) 36 (O), secure, voice channels with
Data Encryption
Standard (DES) and Advanced Encryption standard (AES) encryption
(selectable) (T) in addition to the channel reserved for air traffic
control
communication. The installed system shall be compatible with current
inplace
ground communications systems as specified in section 3.5.1.6.2.
3.5.6.1.2 This multi-channel radio relay suite shall provide frequency
selection from
the GCS, embedded secure communications, and broadcast capability (T)
and incorporate payload data broadcast capability (O).
3.5.7 Hyper-spectral Imaging Sensor (HIS) System
The sensor payload should include the option for a hyper-spectral
imaging (HSI) sensor
(imaging spectrometer) system (O). The sensor and its associated data
transmission,
analysis, and display subsystems should (O) be capable of producing
images with
numerous spectral bands for each pixel, and correcting the spectral
radiance of each
pixel for source illumination, source geometry, atmospheric effects,
and sensor effects.
Further, the sensor/analysis system should (O) be capable of spectral
matching or
unmixing in order to display images clearly highlighting selected
materials or conditions
on the ground. The sensor/analysis system should (O), after a period
of configuration
and training, be capable of producing such displays in near real time,
to enable rapid
response by ground personnel, to the detected conditions. The sensor
package should
(O) be mechanically, thermally and electrically compatible with the
payload capabilities
of the aircraft, and should be suitably rugged for extended flight
operations. This
payload should only be required to be carried concurrent with the
EO/IR, laser
illuminator, satellite tracker and communication relay payloads (O).
3.5.8 Ground Control Station (GCS)
The GCS is the command and control center for the CBP UAV System. Each
GCS
controls and monitors aircraft via the Link Segment. The Link Segment
receives
telemetry and imagery data from the aircraft and transmits command and
control data to
the aircraft from the GCS. Operationally, the GCS shall support:
multiple aircraft
command and control; Link Segment command and control; embedded
communication
relay; mission payload command and control; imagery annotation and
imagery
processing functions; and tactical communications with the users. The
CBP UAV
System should (O) be incorporated and integrated into each border
patrol sector
internal command and control system. The operational flight control
programs (OFP)
shall be isolated, via hardware and/or software, from the mission
planning, mission
support, payload interface, and data handling software segments. The
OFP shall have
DO-178B Level B certification. The isolated sub-components (non-flight
critical) shall
3.5.6.1 Communications Relay Airborne Suite
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have DO-178B Level C certification and be isolated such that any
change or
replacement of a sub-component does not require re-certification of
the OFP.
The GCS workstations shall (T) be capable of hosting all functionality
associated with
NATO STANAG 4586 Level 1 through 5 control of the aircraft and
payload.
3.5.8.1.1 Environmental Conditions
a. Rain Operating Conditions. The ground components of the CBP UAV
System
should (O) continue to operate and be capable of meeting the CBP UAV
System’s mission objectives in a rain shower of 2 inches per hour for
one hour
in winds up to 35 knots steady-state.
b. Wind. The CBP UAV GCS should (O) not sustain any physical damage
and
be capable of meeting the CBP UAV System’s mission objectives during
steady winds of up to 35 knots with gusts to 45 knots.
c. Icing. The CBP UAV GCS should (O) remain operational and be capable
of
meeting the CBP UAV System’s mission objectives when subject to icing
conditions as defined in Section 3.2.5.3.5.
3.5.8.1.2 GCS Communications – The GCS shall (T) allow for external
and internal
voice tactical communications among the flight crew members (Mission
Commanders, Pilots, Payload Operator), the Tactical Supervisors, and
maintenance support personnel as required.
The GCS system ground communications shall (T) conform to the
following standards,
provisions, or capabilities:
3.5.8.2.1 Use DHS standard tactical communications equipment and
procedures for
ground CBP UAV components.
3.5.8.2.2 Contain a minimum of two (T) four (O) AN/ARC-210/RT-1851.
The
AN/ARC-210/RT-1851 Warrior Multimode Integrated Communications
System provides 2-way multimode voice and data communications over
the 30-400 MHz frequency range in either normal, secure or
jam-resistant
modes via line-of-sight (LOS) or satellite communications (SATCOM)
links. The Rockwell Collins RT-1851(C) is a programmable Digital
Communication System and is a fully digital transceiver that provides
transfer of data, voice and imagery. It supports Bandwidth Efficient
Advanced Modulation (BEAM) technology providing superior bandwidth
efficiency. BEAM technology provides data transfer rates up to 100
kb/s
LOS and 80 kb/s SATCOM in a 25 kHz channel. The UHF/VHF CBP UAV
System communications capability shall (T) be digital data capable and
3.5.8.1 GCS Architecture
3.5.8.2 Ground System Communications
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interface with standard DHS systems, architectures, and protocols. The
radios should (O) be integrated into the internal voice communication
suite
of the GCS. Other key features shall (T) be:
a. Software re-programmable in the field via MLVS
b. Compatible with existing 1553 controllers for ARC-210
c. Control via 1553, C-12561A remote control, or RCU-8150 remote
control
d. Interoperable with a variety of high power amplifiers, low noise
amplifiers,
tunable filters and interference cancellation systems
e. Fully compliant with ICAO ED-23B
f. 8.33 kHz operation
g. Hardware shall support software-only upgrades for: BEAM, CSEL
COSPASSARSAT
Receive (406 MHz), SATURN, VDL modes 2 and 3 (data), DAMA B,
and VDL mode 3 voice
3.5.8.2.3 All radio and telephone communications are to be
interoperable with
National Security Agency (NSA) approved encryption systems.
3.5.8.2.4 Communication equipment should (O) have an additional tap
for use of
payload data by external imagery systems.
3.5.8.2.5 If any commercial or non-developmental items (NDI)
subsystems are used
in the GCS, all applicable DHS, National, and International spectrum
management policies and regulations are to be satisfied.
3.5.8.2.6 The GCS shall (T) be able to import National
Geospacial-Intelligence
Agency (NGA) Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED), Digital Feature
Analysis Data (DFAD), Compressed Arc Digitized Raster Graphics
(CADRG) and scanned hard-copy maps.
The GCS shall (T) have provisions for the following:
a. Recording aircraft up-link and down-link command and control data,
payload
data, and internal and external voice communications, and video in
standard
US (NTSC and MPEG 2) format, as well as
b. Provide links for further dissemination of payload data.
c. Support the ability to have 3rd party application display real-time
and recorded
Aircraft positional (X, Y, Z, Heading, Pitch, Roll), payload
positional information
(Heading, Pitch, Roll), and video information.
d. Interface through HTTP(s) server or direct connection to ground
station
equipment provided by the vendor.
e. Positional and payload information shall adhere to the DIS standard
or other
agreed in advance open published protocol data unit (PDU) based
standard.
3.5.8.3 GCS Data Recording
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f. Video, payload and positional information shall be published in
groups to allow
for real-time to near real-time integration of the UAV information
into larger
fused 2-D and 3-D visualization environments.
g. Unclassified test data streams in the above formats shall be
provided as
development samples, along with supporting integration and
implementation
documentation to provide third party application designers.
The GCS shall (T) be capable of providing the following automated
mission planning
functions:
a. Import of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), Digital
Terrain
Elevation Data (DTED), Digital Feature Analysis Data (DFAD), and
Compressed Arc Digitized Raster Graphics (CADRG).
b. Point and click route planning to include terrain avoidance
warning, fuel
calculations, and payload search area information.
c. Aircraft pre-programming and system checks to include Built-in-Test
(BIT).
d. Weight and balance calculations for takeoff, climb, cruise,
descent, and
landing performance based on weight, drag index and environmental
conditions.
e. Provide a minimum of two common and redundant operator consoles.
f. Provide the capability to connect Directorate communication
networks via the
GCS and data terminals.
g. All situational awareness displays and data terminals shall provide
sufficient
information for the pilot or analyst to maintain adequate orientation
of vehicle
position and state.
h. Upload mission planning data to the aircraft while on the ground.
During the mission, the GCS shall (T) be capable of:
a. Controlling one airborne aircraft and its payloads while performing
mission
planning/power-on preflight simultaneously on a second aircraft.
b. Controlling at least one aircraft and payload without the use of
external
communication/data relay stations at a distance of 150 nm,
line-of-sight (LOS)
permitting.
c. Controlling at least one aircraft and payload throughout the
desired
operational area and with the use of no more than two
communication/data
relay stations (or satellites).
d. Providing the capability to override automated/pre-programmed
inputs to the
aircraft and payload.
e. Be able to turn on and off aircraft equipment.
3.5.8.4 Mission Planning
3.5.8.5 Mission Control
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f. Providing the means to pass control of the payloads to an SCT.
g. Changing the mission plan and uploading the new mission plan to the
aircraft
using the command and control data link.
3.5.8.6.1 Environmental Control – Heating and cooling vents shall (T)
be provided
for all occupied spaces in the CBP UAV GCS. At outside ambient
temperatures of -40° F, the heating system maintains an effective
temperature of at least 64° F within the personnel space; at outside
ambient temperatures of 122° F, the cooling system maintains an
effective
temperature of no greater than 84° F within the personnel space.
Personnel shall (T) be provided an acoustical environment which should
not cause personnel injury, interfere with voice or any other
communications, cause fatigue, or in any other way degrade system
effectiveness.
3.5.8.6.2 Electrical Power – The CBP UAV System ground equipment shall
(T) use
standard U.S. electrical power sources, available with standard mobile
electrical power sources, integrated to supply the appropriate
electrical
power on a continuous operation. The CBP UAV System ground
equipment shall (T) be capable of restoring and/or maintaining
electrical
back-up power in sufficient time to avoid critical mission data loss,
computer memory loss, or loss of aircraft control. The CBP UAV
System’s
mission objectives should (O) continue to be achievable after
restoration
of electrical power. The CBP UAV System should (O) have
electrical/electronic equipment protection devices to prevent power
surge/power failure damage.
3.5.8.6.3 Lightning Protection – The GCS system shall (T) meet the
lightning
requirements as defined in MIL-STD-464, paragraph 5.4. Indirect
lightning
effects for CBP UAV System ground equipment should (O) be considered
and mitigated.
3.5.9 Link Segment
3.5.9.1.1 The Link Segment shall (T) include consists of redundant
control links and
non-redundant sensor data links.
3.5.9.1.2 The aircraft shall (T) also be able to use either command
and control link
for air vehicle command, control, and aircraft feedback, however, the
primary data link shall be the main link for payload data
transmission.
3.5.8.6 General Physical Characteristics for the GCS and Takeoff and
Landing
System
3.5.9.1 General Description
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3.5.9.1.3 If the CBP UAV System determines the primary command and
control link
to be unusable, it shall (T) switch automatically to the secondary
data link
in such a manner to continue successful and safe aircraft flight and
mission operations. The CBP UAV System should (O) allow operator
selection of data links. The Link Segment should (O) provide the
capability for encrypting the primary and secondary command and data
links.
3.5.9.1.4 A “zeroize” capability to clear encryption codes and keys
automatically
(initiated with imminent loss of flight) or manually shall (T) be
required.
3.5.9.1.5 The Link Segment should (O) provide redundancy for aircraft
C2, be
electronically steerable, support multiple frequencies and multiple
fullduplex
channels simultaneously, be anti-jam with low probability of
intercept, be capable of supporting both unidirectional and
omnidirectional
communications simultaneously, and support simultaneous
communication with two airborne aircraft at the same time.
3.5.9.1.6 The Link Segment should (O) provide data distribution
(imagery and
system data) from the aircraft to the GCS, SCT, and RVT, via discrete
and
selectable frequencies and also provide imagery to "on the move" CBP
agents in vehicles or on foot.
3.5.9.2.1 Primary Command and Control Link – The primary command and
control/data link transmits aircraft command/control, payload
command/control, and tactical voice communications to the air vehicle.
The primary data link receives air vehicle health/status, payload
data, and
tactical voice communications from the air vehicle. The effective
range of
the primary command and control/data link shall (T) be 150 nm (LOS
permitting) without relay from other airborne or surface relay
systems.
3.5.9.2.2 Secondary Command and Control Link – A secondary Command and
Control link shall (T) be provided predominantly as a redundant
command
and control data link and have an operational range of 150 nm to
achieve
the mission radius. Handoff from the GCS to another should (O) occur
within the design radius. The secondary command and control link
transmits aircraft command/control and tactical voice communications
to
the aircraft. The secondary command and control link receives aircraft
and payload health/status and tactical voice communications from the
air
vehicle.
3.5.9.2.3 Ground SATCOM Terminal (GST) Performance – The GST shall (T)
contain the necessary equipment of the primary and secondary LOS and
BLOS command and control links and perform the following functions:
3.5.9.2 Command Link Suite Performance
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a. Provide capability to separate radio frequency (RF) energy from the
GCS to
enhance system / crew survivability.
b. Not create interference with other electronic systems to the level
they are not
usable.
c. Be capable of simultaneous transmission of command up-link and
reception of
sensors/aircraft telemetry down-link using discrete, selectable
frequencies.
d. Provide data distribution (system data) from the aircraft to the
GCS and RVT,
via discrete and selectable frequencies.
e. SATCOM Terminal Power Requirements. The GST shall (T) operate from
standard Alternating Current (AC) or Direct Current (DC) electrical
power
sources. The GST can be powered from a GCS shelter or from a vehicle
when
remote from other power sources. The GST shall (T) be capable of
restoring
and/or maintaining electrical back-up power in sufficient time to
avoid critical
mission data loss or loss of aircraft control. The CBP UAV System’s
mission
objectives should (O) continue to be achievable after restoration of
electrical
power. The GST should (O) have electrical / electronic equipment
protection
devices to prevent power surge / power failure damage.
3.5.9.2.4 Airborne SATCOM Terminal (AST) Performance – The function of
the
AST shall (T) be to receive up-link commands and transmit down-link
air
vehicle health/status and command, control, and other mission data.
The
AST shall (T) be compatible with the avionics suite and meet the
requirements specified in paragraph 3.5.1.6.2 through 3.5.1.6.6.
3.5.9.2.5 Shall provide secure, dual redundant, duplex, digital,
narrowband
channels for uplinking commands to the aircraft and downlinking
aircraft
health and status (telemetry) reports to the control station (T).
3.5.9.2.6 Shall inform the onboard mission management computer within
2 sec if
link is lost or regained (T).
3.5.9.2.7 Shall have a backup battery capable of sustaining 30 minutes
of flight
control without payload use immediately on line if the primary power
source (engine/generator) fails on the aircraft (T).
3.5.9.3.1 Shall provide a secure, simplex, digital, wideband channel
for downlinking
airborne sensor data to the control station (T).
3.5.9.3.2 It should (O) allow for future growth to a wideband SATCOM
data link.
3.5.10 Sensor Control Terminal (SCT)
3.5.9.3 Data Link Suite Performance
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The SCT shall (T) provide the user with control of imagining payloads
and access to
payload imagery and data, independent of the GCS, from an aircraft at
a minimum
distance of 20 (T) 30 (O) nm. Payload imagery and aircraft related
information, to
include: aircraft position, heading, and MSL altitude, date/time
group, target location,
previously “marked” targets stored in a retrievable database, and
north seeking arrow,
shall (T) be displayed to the users via the SCT.
3.5.10.1.1 Shall provide at least one SCT capable of receiving video
from the EO/IR
sensor or imagery from the SAR/MTI sensor when 20 nm (T) 30 nm (O)
from the aircraft.
3.5.10.1.2 Each SCT shall (T) be capable of steering the EO/IR sensor
in azimuth
and elevation, selecting WFOV and narrow field of view (NFOV) (or
variable zoom if sensor is capable), and engaging autofocus,
autotrack,
autoscan, and mark targets into a retrievable database when 20 nm (T)
30
nm (O) from the aircraft.
3.5.10.1.3 Shall provide display screen resolution equal to that of
the EO/IR video
(T).
The SCT shall (T) use computer hardware capable of providing NATO
STANAG 4586
Level 3 functionality and possess provisions for recording imagery and
data.
Each SCT shall (T) be ruggedized to withstand off-road travel and be
able to operate in
the same conditions as the GCS, as defined in section 3.5.8.1.1.
The SCT shall (T) be capable of performing BIT and providing the users
with health and
maintenance data.
All external interfaces shall (T) use standard interface ports.
The SCT shall (T) operate from standard AC or DC electrical power
sources. The SCT
can be powered from a GCS shelter or from vehicle, or battery when
remote from other
power sources.
3.5.10.1 Mission
3.5.10.2 SCT Configuration
3.5.10.3 Environment
3.5.10.4 SCT BIT
3.5.10.5 Information Interface
3.5.10.6 Electrical Power Interface
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3.5.10.7.1 Each SCT shall (T) be portable by a single person, and be
capable of
being setup and placed into operation by one person within 10 minutes.
3.5.10.7.2 Each SCT shall (T) be capable of being powered from a
patrol vehicle's
electrical system.
3.5.11 Remote Video Terminal (RVT)
The RVT shall provide the user with access to payload imagery and
data, independent
of the GCS, from an aircraft at a minimum of 10 (T) 20 (O) nm. Payload
imagery and
aircraft related information, to include: aircraft position, heading,
and MSL altitude,
date/time group, target location, previously “marked” targets stored
in a retrievable
database, and north seeking arrow shall (T) be displayed to the users
via the RVT. The
RVT antenna shall (T) be connected to the RVT via a cable.
3.5.11.1.1 Shall provide at least one RVT capable of receiving video
from the
specified payloads when 10 nm (T) 20 nm (O) from the aircraft.
3.5.11.1.2 Shall (T) provide screen resolution and refresh rate to
provide Situational
Awareness and equal to that of the EO/IR video displayed in the GCS.
The RVT shall (T) use computer hardware capable providing NATO STANAG
4586
Level 2 functionality.
Each RVT shall (T) be ruggedized to withstand off-road travel and be
able to operate in
the same conditions as the GCS, as defined in section 3.5.8.6.1.
The RVT shall (T) be capable of performing BIT and providing the users
with health and
maintenance data.
All external interfaces shall (T) use standard interface ports.
3.5.10.7 Physical Characteristics
3.5.11.1 Mission
3.5.11.2 RVT Configuration
3.5.11.3 Environment
3.5.11.4 RVT BIT
3.5.11.5 Information Interface
3.5.11.6 Electrical Power Interface
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 50
The RVT shall (T) operate from standard AC or Direct Current (DC)
electrical power
sources, to include being powered from a GCS shelter or from vehicle,
or battery when
remote from other power sources.
3.5.11.7.1 Each RVT shall be portable by a single person (T) or as a
handheld
device (O) and be capable of being setup and placed into operation by
one person within 10 minutes.
3.5.11.7.2 Each RVT shall (T) be capable of being powered from a
patrol vehicle's
electrical system.
4.0 VERIFICATION
This section defines the verifications envisioned by the Government to
determine
whether the CBP UAV System conforms to all requirements delineated in
Section 3 of
this specification. The actual test verification program and plan
shall be developed by
the CBP UAV team IAW the CBP UAV contract. Single and/or multiple
verification
subparagraphs and methods may be required to verify a specific
requirement.
The government shall determine who will be responsible for conducting,
all verifications
required herein. Test plans, procedures, verifications, and reports
will be subject to
review and concurrence of the government. Table 4-5, Requirement /
Verification
Cross-Reference Matrix, illustrates the requirement and verification
methods necessary
to ensure CBP UAV System compliance.
4.1 METHODS OF VERIFICATION
The methods utilized to accomplish verification include:
4.1.1 (N/A) Not Applicable
Verification is not warranted.
4.1.2 (1) Analysis
Verification will be accomplished by technical evaluation or
mathematical models and
simulations, algorithms, charts, graphs, circuit diagrams, or
scientific principles and
procedures to provide evidence that stated requirements were met.
4.1.3 (2) Demonstration
Verification will be accomplished by actual operation, adjustment, or
re-configuration of
items to provide evidence that the designed functions were
accomplished under specific
scenarios. The test article may be instrumented and quantitative
limits of performance
monitored/measured.
3.5.11.7 Physical Characteristics
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
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4.1.4 (3) Examination
Verification will be accomplished by inspection, without the use of
special laboratory
equipment or procedures, to determine conformance to the specified
requirements
which can be determined by the investigators. Examination will be
non-destructive and
can include: sight, hearing, smell, touch, and physical manipulation,
mechanical and
electrical gauging and measurement, and other forms of investigation.
4.1.5 (4) Test
Verification will be accomplished by systematic exercising of the
applicable item under
appropriate conditions with instrumentation to measure required
parameters.
Collection, analysis, and evaluation of quantitative data will
determine that the
measured parameters equal or exceed specified requirements. Vendor
must comply
with all FAA STC requirements whether by "one-only" STC
(aircraft/engine/propeller) or
"multiple" STC (aircraft/engine/propeller) and TSO / TSO update
requirements. All
presented documentation must be able to be verified through FAA, ACO
or Flight
Inspection Safety District Office.
4.2 CLASSIFICATION OF VERIFICATION
Verification classification levels are defined below and include:
4.2.1 (A) Design
The CBP UAV System design includes the GCS, RVT, SCT, aircraft,
payload, and Link
Segment. As such, design verifications will be conducted on the total
system design to
verify the requirements specified in Section 3, and the
interoperability of each element.
Individual CBP UAV System elements will be verified independently
prior to being
verified as part of the total CBP UAV System.
4.2.2 (B) First Article Inspection
Reserved.
4.2.3 (C) Acceptance Inspection
Reserved.
4.2.4 (D) Special Inspection
Reserved.
4.3 INSPECTION FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT
The government designate, in accordance with the Government’s
management /
approval principles, will establish and maintain test and measuring
equipment and
inspection facilities of sufficient accuracy, quality, and quantity to
permit performance of
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Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 52
required verifications. Equipment can include appropriate commercial,
military, or
specially designed inspection equipment.
4.4 TEST PLANS, METHODS, AND PROCEDURES
Verification analyses, demonstrations, examinations, and tests will be
conducted in
accordance with the DHS-approved detailed test methods and procedures.
These test
procedures will include tests, test sequence, test criteria, and
number of tests required.
Testing will be accomplished in accordance with the program Integrated
Master
Schedule and the Master Test Plan. If an item or element has been
previously tested
and has met the requirements of this specification, additional testing
is not required if
substantiating data/reports so indicate.
4.5 DETAILED VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
4.5.1 Environmental Verification
The CBP UAV System when in its field configurations should (O) be
verified to meet the
requirements of Section 3.3.3 of this specification. Verification
methods and
requirements are to be measured in accordance with the methods defined
and shall
meet the performance requirements defined in MIL-STD-461. A National
Voluntary
Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) facility will be used to
verify qualification
limits.
4.5.1.1.1 E3 Facilities – If required, Government E3 testing and
evaluation facilities
can be utilized to accomplish E3 verifications. DHS shall determine
the
most cost effective facility to perform the subject tests and will
incorporate
such data into the program Integrated Master Schedule and the Master
Test Plan.
4.5.1.1.2 COTS and NDI – Compliance of NDI and
commercial-off-the-shelf items
(COTS) to MIL-STD 461E limits are to be verified by test, analysis, or
a
combination thereof.
4.5.1.1 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Requirements
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Table 4-5: Requirement/Verification Matrix
REQUIREMENT/VERIFICATION CROSS-REFERENCE MATRIX
Method of Verification Classes of Verification
N/A – Not Applicable A – Design
1 – Analysis B – 1st Article
2 – Demonstration C – Acceptance
3 – Examination D – Special
4 – Test
Section 3 Verification
Method
Verification
Class
Section 4
Requirement Description 1 2 3 4 N/A A B C D Verification
( ) = Shall Number
3.2.1.2 Payloads X 4.4
3.2.1.3 (1) Ground Control
Station (GCS)
X 4.4
3.2.1.3 (2) Ground Control
Station (GCS)
X 4.4
3.2.1.4 Link Segment X 4.4
3.2.2.1 Baseline
Configuration
X 4.4
3.2.3 External Interfaces X 4.4
3.2.4 Internal Interfaces X 4.4
3.2.5.1.1 Mission Capability
Requirements
X 4.4
3.2.5.1.2 System
Computations
X 4.4
3.2.5.1.3 Target Location
Accuracy
X 4.4
3.2.5.1.4.a Pre-Flight
Programming
X 4.4
3.2.5.1.4.b In-Flight
Programming
X 4.4
3.2.5.1.5.a
(1)
Launch and
Recovery
X X 4.4
3.2.5.1.5.a
(2)
Launch and
Recovery
X X 4.4
3.2.5.1.5.a
(3)
Launch and
Recovery
X X 4.4
3.2.5.1.5.b Command and
Control Hand-off
X X 4.4
3.2.5.1.5.c Simultaneous
Operations
X X 4.4
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REQUIREMENT/VERIFICATION CROSS-REFERENCE MATRIX
Method of Verification Classes of Verification
N/A – Not Applicable A – Design
1 – Analysis B – 1st Article
2 – Demonstration C – Acceptance
3 – Examination D – Special
4 – Test
Section 3 Verification
Method
Verification
Class
Section 4
Requirement Description 1 2 3 4 N/A A B C D Verification
( ) = Shall Number
3.2.5.1.6 (1) CBP UAV System
Communications
X 4.4
3.2.5.1.6 (2) Frequency change X 4.4
3.2.5.2.2 FAA Conformance X X 4.4
3.2.5.2.3 FCC/IRAC
Conformance
X X 4.4
3.2.5.2.4 EPA Conformance X X 4.4
3.2.5.2.5.a Set-up times X 4.4
3.2.5.2.5.b Fueling X X 4.4
3.2.5.2.5.c Preparation for
Transportation
times
X 4.4
3.2.5.2.5.d
(1)
Launch and
Recovery Time
X 4.4
3.2.5.2.5.d
(2)
Launch and
Recovery Time
X 4.4
3.2.5.2.5.e Automatic Launch
and Recovery
X 4.4
3.2.5.2.6 Aircraft to Aircraft
System
Interoperability
X 4.4
3.2.5.2.8.a Electrical Power X X 4.4
3.2.5.2.8.b
(1)
Emergency Power X X 4.4
3.2.5.2.8.b
(2)
Emergency Power X X 4.4
3.2.5.2.9 Human Engineering X 4.4
3.2.5.3.1.a Operational
Temperature
Extremes
X X 4.4
3.2.5.3.1.c Operational
Temperature Shock
X 4.4
3.2.5.3.2 Humidity X 4.4
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 55
REQUIREMENT/VERIFICATION CROSS-REFERENCE MATRIX
Method of Verification Classes of Verification
N/A – Not Applicable A – Design
1 – Analysis B – 1st Article
2 – Demonstration C – Acceptance
3 – Examination D – Special
4 – Test
Section 3 Verification
Method
Verification
Class
Section 4
Requirement Description 1 2 3 4 N/A A B C D Verification
( ) = Shall Number
3.2.5.3.3 Rain Non-
Operating, Storage,
and Transit
X 4.4
3.2.5.3.4.a Snow Non-
Operating, Storage,
and Transit
X 4.4
3.2.5.3.4.b Snow Operating X 4.4
3.2.5.3.5.a Icing Non-
Operating, Storage,
and Transit
X 4.4
3.2.5.3.5.b Icing Operating X 4.4
3.2.5.3.6 Wind X 4.4
3.2.5.3.7 Fungus X 4.4
3.2.5.3.8 Salt Fog X 4.4
3.2.5.3.9 Blowing Sand and
Dust
X X 4.4
3.2.5.3.10.a Altitudes, Non-
Operating, Storage,
and Transit
X X 4.4
3.2.5.3.10.b Altitudes, Operating X 4.4
3.2.5.3.12 Induced
Environment
X 4.4
3.2.5.3.13 Vibration X X 4.4
3.2.5.3.14 Mechanical Shock X X 4.4
3.2.5.3.15 Acceleration X 4.4
3.2.5.4.1.a MTBMA X X 4.4
3.2.5.4.1.b MTBSA X X 4.4
3.2.5.4.2.a Mission Availability X X 4.4
3.2.5.4.2.b Operational
Availability
X X 4.4
3.2.5.4.2.c Inherent Capability X X 4.4
3.2.5.4.3.a Mean Time
Between Failure
X X 4.4
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 56
REQUIREMENT/VERIFICATION CROSS-REFERENCE MATRIX
Method of Verification Classes of Verification
N/A – Not Applicable A – Design
1 – Analysis B – 1st Article
2 – Demonstration C – Acceptance
3 – Examination D – Special
4 – Test
Section 3 Verification
Method
Verification
Class
Section 4
Requirement Description 1 2 3 4 N/A A B C D Verification
( ) = Shall Number
3.2.5.4.3.b Mean-Time-To-
Repair
X X 4.4
3.2.5.4.3.c Independence of
Failures
X 4.4
3.2.5.4.4.a System Diagnostics X X 4.4
3.2.5.4.4.b
(1)
Health Status and
Warnings
X X 4.4
3.2.5.4.4.b
(2)
Health Status and
Warnings
X X 4.4
3.2.5.4.5 System Diagnostics
and Support
X X 4.4
3.2.5.5.1 Transportability X 4.4
3.2.5.5.2 Ground
Transportability
X 4.4
3.2.5.5.3 Rail Transportability X 4.4
3.2.5.5.4 Air Transportability X X 4.4
3.2.5.5.5 Marine
Transportability
X X 4.4
3.3.1 Materials X X 4.4
3.3.1.1 (1)
Hazardous, Toxic
and Ozone
Depleting
Chemicals
Prevention
X X 4.4
3.3.1.1 (2) Hazardous, Toxic
and Ozone
Depleting
Chemicals
Prevention
X X 4.4
3.3.2.1 Computer Hardware
Requirements
X 4.4
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 57
REQUIREMENT/VERIFICATION CROSS-REFERENCE MATRIX
Method of Verification Classes of Verification
N/A – Not Applicable A – Design
1 – Analysis B – 1st Article
2 – Demonstration C – Acceptance
3 – Examination D – Special
4 – Test
Section 3 Verification
Method
Verification
Class
Section 4
Requirement Description 1 2 3 4 N/A A B C D Verification
( ) = Shall Number
3.3.2.1.1 Data Storage and
Main Memory
Reserve Capacity
X 4.4
3.3.2.1.2 Processing
Speed/Throughput
Reserve Capacity
X 4.4
3.3.2.1.3 Input / Output (I/O)
Channel
Requirements
X 4.4
3.3.2.1.4 Processor and
Firmware
Enhancements
X 4.4
3.3.2.2 Computer Software X X 4.4
3.3.2.2.2 Programming
Languages
X 4.4
3.3.2.2.3 Commenting
Standards
X 4.4
3.3.2.2.4 (1) Error and
Diagnostic
Messages
X 4.4
3.3.2.2.4 (2) Error and
Diagnostic
Messages
X 4.4
3.3.2.2.5 Character Set
Standards
X 4.4
3.3.2.2.6 Software Security X X 4.4
3.3.2.2.7 Fault Tolerance X 4.4
3.3.2.2.8 Computer Program
Regeneration
X 4.4
3.3.3 (1) Electromagnetic
Environmental
Effects (E3)
X 4.5.1.1
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 58
REQUIREMENT/VERIFICATION CROSS-REFERENCE MATRIX
Method of Verification Classes of Verification
N/A – Not Applicable A – Design
1 – Analysis B – 1st Article
2 – Demonstration C – Acceptance
3 – Examination D – Special
4 – Test
Section 3 Verification
Method
Verification
Class
Section 4
Requirement Description 1 2 3 4 N/A A B C D Verification
( ) = Shall Number
3.3.3 (2) Electromagnetic
Environmental
Effects (E3)
X 4.5.1.1
3.3.3.1 Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMC)
X 4.5.1.1
3.3.3.2 (1) Electromagnetic
Vulnerability (EMV)
X 4.5.1.1
3.3.3.2 (2) Electromagnetic
Vulnerability (EMV)
X 4.5.1.1
3.3.3.3 Electromagnetic
Interference (EMI)
X 4.5.1.1
3.3.3.4 Electromagnetic
Radiation Hazards
(HERP, HERF,
HERO)
X 4.5.1.1
3.3.3.5 Electrostatic
Discharge (ESD)
X 4.5.1.1
3.3.4.1 System Safety X X 4.4
3.3.4.2 (1) Safety Provisions X X X 4.4
3.3.4.2 (2) Safety Provisions X X X 4.4
3.3.5 (1) Security X X X
3.3.5 (2) Security X X X
3.4 Logistics X 4.4
3.4.1 Support Equipment X 4.4
3.5.1.1 Design Life X 4.4
3.5.1.2.1 (1) Flight Profile X 4.4
3.5.1.2.1 (2) Flight Profile X 4.4
3.5.1.2.1 (3) Flight Profile X 4.4
3.5.1.2.2 (1) Flight Takeoff and
Landing
X 4.4
3.5.1.2.2 (2) Flight Takeoff and
Landing
X 4.4
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 59
REQUIREMENT/VERIFICATION CROSS-REFERENCE MATRIX
Method of Verification Classes of Verification
N/A – Not Applicable A – Design
1 – Analysis B – 1st Article
2 – Demonstration C – Acceptance
3 – Examination D – Special
4 – Test
Section 3 Verification
Method
Verification
Class
Section 4
Requirement Description 1 2 3 4 N/A A B C D Verification
( ) = Shall Number
3.5.1.3.1 Operating in Level
flight
X X 4.4
3.5.1.3.2 Operating Altitude X X 4.4
3.5.1.3.4 Service Ceiling X X 4.4
3.5.1.4 Signatures X X 4.4
3.5.1.5.1 Electrical Power X 4.4
3.5.1.5.2 Voice Relay
Capability
X X 4.4
3.5.1.5.4 EMI X X 4.4
3.5.1.5.5 Lost Link and
Mission Abort
X X 4.4
3.5.1.5.6 Airspeed X X 4.4
3.5.1.5.7.a Weight X 4.4
3.5.1.5.8 Aircraft Position
Accuracy
X 4.4
3.5.1.5.9 Handling Qualities X X 4.4
3.5.1.5.9.a Aircraft Launch and
Recovery
X X 4.4
3.5.1.5.9.b Autonomous
Emergency
Recovery
X X 4.4
3.5.1.5.9.c Flight Outside the
Flight Envelope
X 4.4
3.5.1.5.9.d Transfer of Flight
Control Modes
X X 4.4
3.5.1.5.10.a Temperature
Extremes
X 4.4
3.5.1.5.10.b Rain X 4.4
3.5.1.5.10.c
(1)
Icing Detection
Capability
X 4.4
3.5.1.5.10.c
(2)
Report Icing X X 4.4
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 60
REQUIREMENT/VERIFICATION CROSS-REFERENCE MATRIX
Method of Verification Classes of Verification
N/A – Not Applicable A – Design
1 – Analysis B – 1st Article
2 – Demonstration C – Acceptance
3 – Examination D – Special
4 – Test
Section 3 Verification
Method
Verification
Class
Section 4
Requirement Description 1 2 3 4 N/A A B C D Verification
( ) = Shall Number
3.5.1.5.10.c
(3)
Transiting X X 4.4
3.5.1.5.10.d Vibration X X 4.4
3.5.1.5.11 (1) Aircraft Modes of
Operation
X X 4.4
3.5.1.5.11 (2) Aircraft Modes of
Operation
X 4.4
3.5.1.5.11 (3) Aircraft Modes of
Operation
X X 4.4
3.5.1.5.12 In-Flight Operations X 4.4
3.5.1.6.2 (1) Embedded Voice
Communications
Relay
X X 4.4
3.5.1.6.2 (2) Embedded Voice
Communications
Relay
X X 4.4
3.5.1.6.2 (3) Embedded Voice
Communications
Relay
X X 4.4
3.5.1.6.2 (4) Embedded Voice
Communications
Relay
X X 4.4
3.5.1.6.2 (5) Embedded Voice
Communications
Relay
X X 4.4
3.5.1.6.2 (6) Embedded Voice
Communications
Relay
X X
3.5.1.6.3 (1) Identification Friend
or Foe (IFF)
X 4.4
3.5.1.6.3 (2) Identification Friend
or Foe (IFF)
X 4.4
3.5.1.6.4 Locator Beacon X 4.4
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 61
REQUIREMENT/VERIFICATION CROSS-REFERENCE MATRIX
Method of Verification Classes of Verification
N/A – Not Applicable A – Design
1 – Analysis B – 1st Article
2 – Demonstration C – Acceptance
3 – Examination D – Special
4 – Test
Section 3 Verification
Method
Verification
Class
Section 4
Requirement Description 1 2 3 4 N/A A B C D Verification
( ) = Shall Number
3.5.1.6.5 Navigation Lights X 4.4
3.5.1.6.6 Navigation X 4.4
3.5.1.6.8 Payload Provisions X X X 4.4
3.5.1.6.8.b Payload Provisions X X 4.4
3.5.1.6.8.f Payload Provisions X 4.4
3.5.1.6.9 Aircraft Servicing X X 4.4
3.5.1.6.9.a Aircraft Servicing X 4.4
3.5.1.6.9.d Aircraft Servicing X 4.4
3.5.2.1 Payload X X X 4.4
3.5.2.2 Flight Operation X X X 4.4
3.5.2.3.1 Automatic Tracking X X 4.4
3.5.2.3.2 Geographic
Pointing
X X 4.4
3.5.2.3.3 Fixed Pointing X X 4.4
3.5.2.3.4 Target Marking X X 4.4
3.5.2.4 (1) Payload Control X 4.4
3.5.2.4 (2) Payload Control X 4.4
3.5.2.5 Data Display X 4.4
3.5.2.6 Payload Cooling
System
X 4.4
3.5.2.7 Sensor Metadata X 4.4
3.5.2.8 Payload Interfaces X 4.4
3.5.3 EO/IR/LI X 4.4
3.5.3.1.1 (1) Digital Video
Imaging Capability
X 4.4
3.5.3.1.1 (2) Digital Video
Imaging Capability
X 4.4
3.5.3.1.2 Field of Regard X 4.4
3.5.3.1.3 Autotrack,
Autofocus,
autoscan functions
X 4.4
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 62
REQUIREMENT/VERIFICATION CROSS-REFERENCE MATRIX
Method of Verification Classes of Verification
N/A – Not Applicable A – Design
1 – Analysis B – 1st Article
2 – Demonstration C – Acceptance
3 – Examination D – Special
4 – Test
Section 3 Verification
Method
Verification
Class
Section 4
Requirement Description 1 2 3 4 N/A A B C D Verification
( ) = Shall Number
3.5.3.1.4 Focusing on the
exterior
X 4.4
3.5.3.1.5 Detecting a
standing human
X 4.4
3.5.3.1.6 Recognizing a
standing Human
X 4.4
3.5.3.1.7 Identifying a
standing Human
X X 4.4
3.5.3.1.8 Selectable video
rates
X 4.4
3.5.3.1.9 NTSC formatted
video
X 4.4
3.5.3.1.10 Recognizing a back
pack
X 4.4
3.5.3.1.11 Retrievable
database
X 4.4
3.5.2.1.12 Stability Value X 4.4
3.5.3.1.13 Slew Rate X 4.4
3.5.4.1.1 Wide Area
Surveillance
X 4.4
3.5.4.1.2 Ground Mapping
Mode
X 4.4
3.5.4.1.3 Radiating Hazard to
personnel
X 4.4
3.5.4.1.4 Search and Spot
submodes
X 4.4
3.5.4.1.5 GMTI mode X 4.4
3.5.4.1.6 GMTI Range X 4.4
3.5.5.1.1 360 degree
coverage
X 4.4
3.5.5.1.2 (1) Direction Finding X 4.4
3.5.5.1.2 (2) Direction Finding X 4.4
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 63
REQUIREMENT/VERIFICATION CROSS-REFERENCE MATRIX
Method of Verification Classes of Verification
N/A – Not Applicable A – Design
1 – Analysis B – 1st Article
2 – Demonstration C – Acceptance
3 – Examination D – Special
4 – Test
Section 3 Verification
Method
Verification
Class
Section 4
Requirement Description 1 2 3 4 N/A A B C D Verification
( ) = Shall Number
3.5.5.1.3 Automatic and
manual DF
X 4.4
3.5.5.1.4 Minimum standoff
distance
X 4.4
3.5.5.1.5 Formatted Data
Reports
X 4.4
3.5.5.1.6 Integration and
Operation
X 4.4
3.5.5.1.7 Bandwidth X 4.4
3.5.6.1.1 (1) Voice Channels X 4.4
3.5.6.1.1 (2) Encryption X 4.4
3.5.6.1.2 Broadcast
Capability
X 4.4
3.5.8.1 GCS Architecture X X 4.4
3.5.8.1.2 GCS
Communications
X X 4.4
3.5.8.2 Ground System
Communications
X 4.4
3.5.8.2.2 (1) Ground System
Communications
X X X 4.4
3.5.8.2.2 (2) Ground System
Communications
X X 4.4
3.5.8.2.2 (3) Key Features X X 4.4
3.5.8.2.6 Ground System
Communications
X X 4.4
3.5.8.3 GCS Data
Recording
X 4.4
3.5.8.4 Mission Planning X 4.4
3.5.8.5 Mission Control X 4.4
3.5.8.6.1 (1) Environmental
Control
X X X 4.4
3.5.8.6.1 (2) Environmental
Control
X 4.4
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 64
REQUIREMENT/VERIFICATION CROSS-REFERENCE MATRIX
Method of Verification Classes of Verification
N/A – Not Applicable A – Design
1 – Analysis B – 1st Article
2 – Demonstration C – Acceptance
3 – Examination D – Special
4 – Test
Section 3 Verification
Method
Verification
Class
Section 4
Requirement Description 1 2 3 4 N/A A B C D Verification
( ) = Shall Number
3.5.8.6.2 (1) Electrical Power X X 4.4
3.5.8.6.2 (2) Electrical Power X X 4.4
3.5.8.6.3 Lightning Protection X 4.4
3.5.9.1.1 Link Segment X 4.4
3.5.9.1.2 Command and
Control link
X 4.4
3.5.9.1.3 Command and
Control link
X 4.4
3.5.9.1.4 Zeroize capability X 4.4
3.5.9.2.1 Primary Command
and Control Link
X 4.4
3.5.9.2.2 Secondary
Command and
Control Link
X 4.4
3.5.9.2.3 Ground SATCOM
Terminal
X 4.4
3.5.9.2.3.e
(1)
SATCOM Terminal
Power
Requirements
X X 4.4
3.5.9.2.3.e
(2)
SATCOM Terminal
Power
Requirements
X X 4.4
3.5.9.2.4 (1) Airborne SATCOM
Performance
X 4.4
3.5.9.2.4 (2) Airborne SATCOM
Performance
X 4.4
3.5.9.2.5 Narrowband
Channels
X 4.4
3.5.9.2.6 Lost Link X 4.4
3.5.9.2.7 Backup Battery X 4.4
3.5.9.3.1 Data Link Suite X 4.4
3.5.10.1 (1) SCT Mission X X 4.4
3.5.10.1 (2) SCT Mission X X 4.4
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 65
REQUIREMENT/VERIFICATION CROSS-REFERENCE MATRIX
Method of Verification Classes of Verification
N/A – Not Applicable A – Design
1 – Analysis B – 1st Article
2 – Demonstration C – Acceptance
3 – Examination D – Special
4 – Test
Section 3 Verification
Method
Verification
Class
Section 4
Requirement Description 1 2 3 4 N/A A B C D Verification
( ) = Shall Number
3.5.10.1 (3) SCT Mission X X 4.4
3.5.10.1.1 Receiving Video X X 4.4
3.5.10.1.2 (1) Steering X X 4.4
3.5.10.1.2 (2) Steering X X 4.4
3.5.10.1.3 Display Screen
resolution
X X 4.4
3.5.10.2 SCT Configuration X X 4.4
3.5.10.3 SCT Environment X 4.4
3.5.10.4 SCT BIT X 4.4
3.5.10.5 Information
Interface
X 4.4
3.5.10.6 Electrical Power
Interface
X 4.4
3.5.10.7.1 Physical
Characteristics
X 4.4
3.5.10.7.2 Physical
Characteristics
X 4.4
3.5.11.1 (1) RVT Mission X X 4.4
3.5.11.1 (2) RVT Mission X X 4.4
3.5.11.1 (3) RVT Mission X X 4.4
3.5.11.1.1 Receiving Video X X 4.4
3.5.11.1.2 Screen Resolution X X 4.4
3.5.11.2 RVT Configuration X X 4.4
3.5.11.3 RVT Environment X 4.4
3.5.11.4 RVT BIT X 4.4
3.5.11.5 Information
Interface
X 4.4
3.5.11.6 Electrical Power
Interface
X 4.4
3.5.11.7.1 Physical
Characteristics
X 4.4
3.5.11.7.2 Physical
Characteristics
X 4.4
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 66
5.0 PACKAGING
The CBP UAV System packaging requirements shall be IAW the Customs and
Border
Protection Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (CBP UAV) contract. Use of existing
packaging
techniques and equipment will be used to maintain the best value
philosophy.
6.0 NOTES
6.1 INTENDED USE
Refer to section 1.2.
6.2 OBJECTIVES
As defined in section 3.0, the following performance parameters or
equipment
characteristics are the CBP UAV System objective goals. The objective
goal is related
to a threshold requirement delineated in section 3 and is
cross-referenced in the table
below.
Table 6-2: Objective Requirement
OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENT Spec
Paragraph
The CBP UAV System design should (O) be of a modular nature that will
facilitate reconfigurations to include or remove subsystem components,
depending on the resources available to the parent unit and the
operating
environment.
3.1.1.3
The system should (O) have the option to carry a hyperspectral
(imaging
spectrometer) sensor.
3.2.1.2
The GCS should have the ultimate (O) objective of controlling multiple
UAVs at one time beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) ranges.
3.2.1.3
The system shall initially include (T) one transportable GCS with a
potential addition (O) of additional transportable GCSs in the future.
3.2.1.3
The baseline functions and equipment configurations of CBP UAV
System elements should (O) be modular and can be interchanged and
intermixed to meet specific missions.
3.2.2
The CBP UAV System should (O) implement an open systems
architecture.
3.2.3
The CBP UAV System should provide 20 (O) continuous hours of Time
On Station (TOS) within a 24-hour period at a 100-nm operational
radius.
3.2.5.1.1
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 67
OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENT Spec
Paragraph
The CBP UAV System should be capable of supporting computations for
operations at altitudes ranging from Mean Sea level (MSL) to greater
than
20,000ft MSL (O).
3.2.5.1.2
The CBP UAV System should provide a target location to the users with
a
Target Location Error (TLE) of less than or equal to (=) 10 (O) meters
(m)
Circular Error Probable (CEP) at 3-5 km slant range.
3.2.5.1.3
The CBP UAV System should (O) be capable of simultaneously operating
multiple aircraft, one or more payloads/sensors, and the embedded
communication relay during a single mission sortie.
3.2.5.1.5.c
The operator and maintainer training functions should (O) be embedded
and have add-on interactive training, with self-paced instruction,
duplicating CBP UAV system flight performance characteristics,
capabilities, and limitations.
3.2.5.1.7
The CBP UAV system should meet all Federal Aircraft Administration
requirements for conducting flight in unrestricted U.S. airspace
(excluding
Class B and C terminal airspace) without (O) a Certificate of Waiver
or
Authorization (COA) by providing an equivalent level of safety to that
of
FAA-certified manned aircraft.
3.2.5.2.2
A CBP UAV System should be capable of being off-loaded from its
transport vehicles and achieving, at a minimum, Mission Capable (MC)
status, which is: one GCS, one aircraft, one Link Segment, and one
payload, within 4 (O) hours.
3.2.5.2.5.a
The CBP UAV System should be compatible with (O) pressure fueling
systems.
3.2.5.2.5.b
The CBP UAV System should (O) minimize any adverse impact on the
environment
3.2.5.2.7
The non-operating CBP UAV System and equipment should (O)
withstand temperature extremes of -40° F (-40° C) to 160° F (+71° C).
3.2.5.3.1.b
Provisions should (O) be made to prevent the excessive accumulation of
moisture during ascent and descent in humid climates.
3.2.5.3.2
The CBP UAV System shall withstand a snow load of 20 (O) pounds per
square-foot when in storage or transit status.
3.2.5.3.4.a
The CBP UAV System should (O) be operational within 1.5 hours after
this equipment encounters an ice load of 3 pounds per square foot.
3.2.5.3.5.b
Hold-down or other facilities will (O) be provided to withstand winds
above
45 knots for a period of 5 minutes, with gusts to 85 knots and with 2
inches of radial glazed ice.
3.2.5.3.6
The CBP UAV System should (O) not experience physical damage and
be capable of meeting its mission objectives when exposed to the
diurnal
solar radiation.
3.2.5.3.11
The CBP UAV System equipment should (O) withstand acceleration
induced during rail, air and sea transport.
3.2.5.3.15
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 68
OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENT Spec
Paragraph
Mission Availability KPP 1: The CBP UAV system should support 14-hour
flights to include night for 5 days per week, i.e., 260 days and 3640
flight
hours (O), throughout the year by providing a combination of a high
mission availability rate and ready spare aircraft.
3.2.5.4.2.a
The CBP UAV System shall provide a operational availability (Ao) of 95
percent (O).
3.2.5.4.2.b
The CBP UAV System shall have an Inherent Availability (Ai) of 0.95
(O). 3.2.5.4.2.c
The CBP UAV System shall have a Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)
of 50 hours (O).
3.2.5.4.3.a
The CBP UAV System should be capable of being configured for (or
deconfigured
from) sea, ground, or air transport in 4 (O) hours or less
3.2.5.5.1
The CBP UAV System should (O) be capable of withstanding rail impacts
at speeds of up to 8 mph.
3.2.5.5.3
Materials should (O) resist degradation when exposed to the service
life
environments.
3.3.1
Recycled, recovered, or environmentally preferable materials should
(O)
be used to the maximum extent possible provided that the material
meets
or exceeds the operational and maintenance requirements, and promotes
economically advantageous life cycle costs.
3.3.1.2
The CBP UAV system should (O) contain non-proprietary software and
follow an Open Systems Architecture, including open specifications for
interfaces, services, and formats
3.3.2
Techniques, such as bank switching, used to address memory
requirements should (O) not degrade the computer system performance
during operational missions.
3.3.2.1.2
Firmware should (O) be compatible with existing and planned hardware
configurations and allow for system enhancements.
3.3.2.1.4
Contractor developed / controlled computer programs that are stored in
Read-Only-Memory (ROM), Programmable ROM (PROM), or other
similar memory will (O) be considered firmware.
3.3.2.2.1
The messages should (O) include a textual description of the
condition,
time of occurrence, required operator actions, and data processor and
software execution status when applicable.
3.3.2.2.4
(1)
Errors detected in the processing of a command or function should (O)
result in an alert to the operator and the erroneous command or
function
ignored.
3.3.2.2.4
(2)
The CBP UAV System should (O) have fail-safe features with adequate
redundancy, and be capable of being rendered safe during emergency or
abnormal situations.
3.3.4.2 (1)
The CBP UAV System should (O) minimize the probability and severity of
injury to personnel during all activities including set-up, operation,
maintenance, and tear-down throughout the life cycle of the equipment
3.3.4.1 (2)
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 69
OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENT Spec
Paragraph
The CBP UAV System should (O) use Support Equipment (SE) that is
common to DHS/CBP aviation.
3.4.1
The aircraft should have an operating radius under LOS C2 of at least
100
nautical miles (nm) and be capable of loitering at that radius for at
least
20 hours (O) utilizing internal fuel only with the payload operating.
3.5.1.2.1
The aircraft should (O) be capable of taking off and landing with a
100%
fuel load and the specified payloads from a 3,500 ft runway at a
density
altitude of 10,000 ft.
3.5.1.2.2
The aircraft should be capable of operating in level flight at or
above the
altitude determined by the Signatures specification and at or below
the
altitude determined by the sensor specification for the specified
endurance (sea level to 20,000 ft (O)).
3.5.1.3.1
The aircraft should (O) be capable of operating in level flight at the
altitude allowing maximum line of sight reception by the Communication
Relay and Signals Interception Payload specifications.
3.5.1.3.3
The aircraft should have a service ceiling on an ISA standard day of
at
least 20,000 ft MSL (O).
3.5.1.3.4
The aircraft should (O) not be detectable as a UAV at night to the
unaided
human eye on the ground directly below it at its operating altitude.
3.5.1.4
Should (O) provide a see-and-avoid (S&A) sensor, separate and
independent of the specified Electro-optical Payload subsystem,
capable
of detecting non-cooperative airborne traffic that conforms to ASTM
2411.
3.5.1.5.3
The aircraft should have an operational airspeed range which should
maximize the CBP UAV System’s capability of meeting it mission
objectives as defined herein, and a dash speed of 120 KTAS or more (O)
under ISA standard day conditions.
3.5.1.5.6
A mission ready aircraft should be capable of being emplaced by no
more
than two (O) people to support and perform the movement of the
aircraft
from its mover/storage site to the launch/recovery site and then back
to
the mover/storage site.
3.5.1.5.7.a
(1)
The aircraft weight should (O) have a positive margin between mission
weight and gross vehicle weight.
3.5.1.5.7.a
(2)
Weight changes to components and subsystems should (O) not adversely
affect required flying qualities and performance
3.5.1.5.7.b
The Aircraft should possess a spatial location accuracy of at least
10m
(33ft) (O) CEP during the in-flight phase of the mission for use in
CBP
UAV System calculations.
3.5.1.5.8
The Aircraft should be capable of safely launching and recovering in
at
least 35 (O) knots of wind and a 15-knot steady-state crosswind.
3.5.1.5.9.a
The aircraft should safely operate in and meet the CBP UAV System’s
mission objectives when exposed to temperatures between -40° F/-40° C
to 150°F/+65°C (O) for daily cycle .
3.5.1.5.10.
a
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 70
OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENT Spec
Paragraph
The aircraft should be capable of operating in and meeting the CBP UAV
System’s mission objectives when exposed to precipitation measuring 25
(O) millimeter (mm) per hour for one hour with a 2.25mm mean droplet
size, with a Standard Deviation of 0.77mm.
3.5.1.5.10.
b
The aircraft should have icing rate detection capability (O).
3.5.1.5.10.
c (1)
The aircraft should be capable of transiting (30 minutes duration)
through
moderate rime icing conditions (O).
3.5.1.5.10.
c (2)
The aircraft should have anti-ice and/or de-ice equipment (O).
3.5.1.5.10.
c (3)
The aircraft should (O) have the onboard, in-flight, self contained
ability to
detect traffic that may be a conflict, evaluate flight paths,
determine traffic
right-of-way, and maneuver well clear (or as required); this is known
as
“sense and avoid” capability
3.5.1.5.13
The aircraft should have an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Mode I,
II,
III, IIIC, and IV identification system capability, and should have
Mode S
and a Precision Locator Information (PLI) transponder capability (O).
3.5.1.6.3
(1)
IFF should also conform with FAA regulations for altitude encoding
transponders specified via 14 CFR section 91.215.
3.5.1.6.3
(2)
The CBP UAV System should (O) contain anti-collision lighting having
an
operator-selectable capability for Night Vision Device (NVD) or for
visible
light range.
3.5.1.6.5
Loss of GPS or INS source/functionality should (O) not result in a
loss of
navigation solution or flight safety.
3.5.1.6.6
Sense-and-avoid systems should (O) provide a minimum traffic detection
capability as described in ASTM-2411.
3.5.1.6.7
Provide a total payload weight capacity of at least 500 (O) lbs
3.5.1.6.8.b
Possess an embedded pressure (O) fuel and de-fuel capability
3.5.1.6.9.a
Use reasonably available commercial fuel such as diesel (O) fuels
3.5.1.6.9.d
All aircraft components should (O) be capable of being operated to
accomplish system maintenance, training, and / or system preparation
by
either an external Auxiliary Power Unit or from deck-edge power for at
least 30 minutes under worse case thermal and environmental conditions
without external cooling.
3.5.1.6.9.f
Tracking accuracy should (O) be sufficient to allow target designation
at
the specified ranges.
3.5.2.3.1
In conjunction with the air vehicle’s automatic loiter capability, the
payload
should (O) be able to maintain constant surveillance and track on a
designated geographic point.
3.5.2.3.2
Target Marking – Applicable payloads should be able to mark 8 (O)
targets and then be able to automatically return to the marked target
after
panning away from the target
3.5.2.3.4
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 71
OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENT Spec
Paragraph
Should have a day and a night digital video imaging capability with a
National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale (NIIRS) level 8 (O)
capability at 8 nm slant range, with all functions remotely selectable
while
in flight.
3.5.3.1.1
The payload should provide 1 degree (O) root mean square (RMS)
direction finding (DF) accuracy from 30 MHz to 150 MHz.
3.5.5.1.2
(1)
The payload should provide ½ degree (O) root mean square (RMS)
direction finding (DF) accuracy from 150 MHz to 3000 MHz.
3.5.5.1.2
(2)
Automatic DF should (O) be able to separate out individual
communication links.
3.5.5.1.3
Should provide 36 (O), secure, voice channels with Data Encryption
Standard (DES) and Advanced Encryption standard (AES) encryption
(selectable) (T) in addition to the channel reserved for air traffic
control
communication.
3.5.6.1.1
This multi-channel radio relay suite should incorporate payload data
broadcast capability (O).
3.5.6.1.2
The sensor payload should include the option for a hyper-spectral
imaging (HSI) sensor (imaging spectrometer) system (O).
3.5.7 (1)
The sensor and its associated data transmission, analysis, and display
subsystems should (O) be capable of producing images with numerous
spectral bands for each pixel, and correcting the spectral radiance of
each pixel for source illumination, source geometry, atmospheric
effects,
and sensor effects.
3.5.7 (2)
The sensor/analysis system should (O) be capable of spectral matching
or unmixing in order to display images clearly highlighting selected
materials or conditions on the ground.
3.5.7 (3)
The sensor/analysis system should (O) , after a period of
configuration
and training, be capable of producing such displays in near real time,
to
enable rapid response by ground personnel, to the detected conditions.
3.5.7 (4)
The sensor package should (O) be mechanically, thermally and
electrically compatible with the payload capabilities of the aircraft,
and
should be suitably rugged for extended flight operations.
3.5.7 (5)
This payload should only be required to be carried concurrent with the
EO/IR, laser illuminator, satellite tracker and communication relay
payloads (O).
3.5.7 (6)
The CBP UAV System’s command and control functions should (O) be
incorporated and integrated into each border patrol sector internal
command and control system.
3.5.8
The ground components of the CBP UAV System should (O) continue to
operate and be capable of meeting the CBP UAV System’s mission
objectives in a rain shower of 2 inches per hour for one hour in winds
up
to 35 knots steady-state.
3.5.8.1.1.a
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 72
OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENT Spec
Paragraph
The CBP UAV GCS should (O) not sustain any physical damage and be
capable of meeting the CBP UAV System’s mission objectives during
steady winds of up to 35 knots with gusts to 45 knots.
3.5.8.1.1.b
The CBP UAV GCS should (O) remain operational and be capable of
meeting the CBP UAV System’s mission objectives when subject to icing
conditions as defined in Section 3.2.5.3.5.
3.5.8.1.1.c
The GCS system ground communications should contain a minimum of
four (O) UHF/VHF radios.
3.5.8.2.2
(1)
The radios should (O) be integrated into the internal voice
communication
suite of the GCS.
3.5.8.2.2
(2)
Communication equipment should (O) have an additional tap for use of
payload data by external imagery systems.
3.5.8.2.4
The CBP UAV System’s mission objectives should (O) continue to be
achievable after restoration of electrical power.
3.5.8.6.2
(1)
The CBP UAV System should (O) have electrical/electronic equipment
protection devices to prevent power surge/power failure damage.
3.5.8.6.2
(2)
Indirect lightning effects for CBP UAV System ground equipment should
(O) be considered and mitigated.
3.5.8.6.3
The CBP UAV System should (O) allow operator selection of data links.
3.5.9.1.3
(1)
The Link Segment should (O) provide the capability for encrypting the
primary and secondary command and data links.
3.5.9.1.3
(2)
The Link Segment should (O) provide redundancy for aircraft C2, be
electronically steerable, support multiple frequencies and multiple
fullduplex
channels simultaneously, be anti-jam with low probability of
intercept, be capable of supporting both unidirectional and
omnidirectional
communications simultaneously, and support simultaneous
communication with two airborne aircraft at the same time
3.5.9.1.5
The Link Segment should (O) provide data distribution (imagery and
system data) from the aircraft to the GCS, SCT, and RVT, via discrete
and selectable frequencies and also provide imagery to "on the move"
CBP agents in vehicles or on foot.
3.5.9.1.6
Handoff from the GCS to another should (O) occur within the design
radius.
3.5.9.2.2
The CBP UAV System’s mission objectives should (O) continue to be
achievable after restoration of electrical power.
3.5.9.2.3.e
(1)
The GST should (O) have electrical / electronic equipment protection
devices to prevent power surge / power failure damage.
3.5.9.2.3.e
(2)
The Data Link Suite should allow for future growth to a wideband
SATCOM data link.
3.5.9.3.2
The SCT should provide the user with control of imagining payloads and
access to payload imagery and data, independent of the GCS, from an
Aircraft at a minimum distance of 30 (O) nm
3.5.10.1
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 4
Performance Spec for CBP UAV System Version 1.0
May 26, 2005 73
OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENT Spec
Paragraph
Should provide SCTs capable of receiving video from the EO/IR sensor
or
imagery from the SAR/MTI sensor when 30 nm (O) from the aircraft.
3.5.10.1.1
Each SCT should be capable of steering the EO/IR sensor in azimuth and
elevation, selecting WFOV and NFOV, and engaging autofocus,
autotrack, and autoscan and mark targets into a retrievable database
when 30 nm (O) from the aircraft.
3.5.10.1.2
The RVT should provide the user with access to payload imagery and
data, independent of the GCS, from an aircraft at a minimum of 20 (O)
nm.
3.5.11.1
Should provide RVTs capable of receiving video from the specified
payloads when 20 nm (O) from the aircraft.
3.5.11.1.1
Each RVT should be portable by a handheld device (O) and be capable
of being setup and placed into operation by one person within 10
minutes.
3.5.11.7.1
The CBP UAV System when in its field configurations should (O) be
verified to meet the requirements of section 3.3.3 of this
specification.
4.5.1.1
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 5
1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1. CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING
CONTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SPECIFICATION a. FACILITY CLEARANCE
REQUIRED: SECRET
(The requirements of the National Industrial Security Program
Operating Manual
apply to all security aspects of this effort)
b. LEVEL OF SAFEGUARDING REQUIRED: SECRET
2. THIS SPECIFICATION IS FOR: (X and complete as applicable) 3. THIS
SPECIFICATION IS: (X and complete as applicable)
a. PRIME CONTRACT NUMBER a. ORIGINAL (Complete date in all cases) Date
(YYMMDD)
X HSBP1005R0425 X 050620
b. SUBCONTRACT NUMBER b. REVISED (Supersedes all previous specs)
Revision No. Date (YYMMDD)
c. SOLICITATION OR OTHER NUMBER DUE DATE (YYMMDD) c. FINAL (Complete
item 5 in all cases) Date (YYMMDD)
4. IS THIS A FOLLOW-ON CONTRACT? YES NO If yes, complete the
following:
Classified material received or generated under (Preceding Contract
Number) is transferred to this follow-on contract
5. IS THIS A FINAL DD FORM 254? YES NO If yes, complete the following:
In response to the contractors request dated ,retention of the
identified classified material is authorized for a period of:
6. CONTRACTOR (Include Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) Code)
a. NAME, ADDRESS, AND ZIP b. CAGE CODE c. COGNIZANT SECURITY OFFICE
(Name, Address, and Zip Code)
TBD TBD TBD
7. SUBCONTRACTOR
a. NAME, ADDRESS, AND ZIP b. CAGE CODE c. COGNIZANT SECURITY OFFICE
(Name, Address, and Zip Code)
8. ACTUAL PERFORMANCE
a. LOCATION b. CAGE CODE c. COGNIZANT SECURITY OFFICE (Name, Address,
and Zip Code)
TBD
TBD
TBD
9. GENERAL IDENTIFICATION OF THIS PROCUREMENT
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) System. Provides UAV Systems equipment
and overall engineering and logistics support
services for CBP UAV System to include UAV Air Vehicle Operator (AVO)
and Mission Payload Operator (MPO) Support and
maintenance support.
10. THIS CONTRACT WILL REQUIRE ACCESS TO YES NO 11. IN PERFORMING THIS
CONTRACT, THE CONTRACTOR WILL:
YES NO
a.COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC) INFORMATION X a. HAVE ACCESS TO
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ONLY AT ANOTHER CONTRACTORS FACILITY OR
GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY
X
b. RESTRICTED DATA X b. RECEIVE CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS ONLY X
c. CRITICAL NUCLEAR WEAPON DESIGN INFORMATION X c. RECEIVE AND
GENERATE CLASSIFIED MATERIAL X
d. FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA X d. FABRICATE, MODIFY, OR STORE
CLASSIFIED HARDWARE
e. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION e. PERFORM SERVICES ONLY X
(1) Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) X f. HAVE ACCESS TO US
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OUTSIDE THE U.S., PUERTO RICO, U.S. POSSESSIONS
AND TRUST TERRITORIES
X
(2) Non-SCI
X g. BE AUTHORIZED TO USE THE SERVICES OF THE DEFENSE TECHNICAL
INFORMATION CENTER (DTIC)
OR OTHER SECONDARY DISTRIBUTION CENTER X
f. SPECIAL ACCESS INFORMATION X h. REQUIRE A COMSEC ACCOUNT X
g. NATO INFORMATION X i. HAVE TEMPEST REQUIREMENTS X
h. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION X j. HAVE OPERATIONS SECURITY
(OPSEC) REQUIREMENTS X
i. LIMITED DISSEMINATION INFORMATION X k. BE AUTHORIZED TO USE THE
DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE X
j. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INFORMATION X l. OTHER (Specify) X
k. OTHER (Specify)
X See Block 13 Remarks
DD Form 254-E, JAN 95 Previous editions are obsolete Computer
Generated Form
HSBP1005R0425 SECTION J Attachment 5
2
12. PUBLIC RELEASE. Any information (classified or unclassified)
pertaining to this contract shall not be released for public
dissemination except as provided by the
Industrial Security Manual or unless it has been approved for public
release by appropriate U.S. Government authority. Proposed public
releases shall be submitted for approval
prior to release.
DIRECT THROUGH (Specify)
Designated Contracting Officer; U. S. Customs and Border Protection;
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 1310; Washington, DC 20229
to the Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)* for
review.
*In the case of non-DoD User Agencies, requests for disclosure shall
be submitted to that agency.
13. SECURITY GUIDANCE. The security classification guidance needed for
this classified effort is identified below. If any difficulty is
encountered in applying this guidance or if any other contributing
factor indicates a need for changes
in this guidance, the contractor is authorized and encouraged to
provide recommended changes; to challenge the guidance or the
classification assigned to any information or material furnished or
generated under this contract; and to submit any
questions for interpretation of this guidance to the official
identified below. Pending final decision, the information involved
shall be handled and protected at the highest level of classification
assigned or recommended. (Fill in as appropriate for the
classified effort. Attach, or forward under separate correspondence,
any documents/guides/extracts referenced herein. Add additional pages
as needed to provide complete guidance.)
For any classified visits to Customs and Border Protection facilities
in performance of this contract, the Contractor shall
provide written identification, including names, social security
numbers, security clearance held, and birth dates to the
contracting officer of record so that a visit authorization request
may be processed.
Upon completion of contract performance, the Contractor shall contact
the contracting officer of record for classified
Information disposition instructions.
Contractor requests for clarification and guidance relating to the
security requirements of this contract shall be addressed
to the contracting officer of record.
14. ADDITIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. Requirements, in addition to
NISPOM requirements, are established for this contract. YES NO
(If Yes, identify the pertinent contractual clauses in the contract
document itself, or provide an appropriate statement, which identifies
additional requirements.
Provide a copy of the requirements to the cognizant security office.
Use Item 13 if additional space is required.)
Personnel must have, or be able to obtain the appropriate security
clearance. Personnel bid for the labor categories associated with this
contract shall have a Secret clearance at the time of award. In
addition to these categories, Secret clearances shall be required for
other labor categories, depending on actual tasking throughout the
duration of the contract. Proof of U.S. citizenship is required to be
permitted access to government facilities.
15. INSPECTIONS. ELEMENTS OF THIS CONTRACT ARE OUTSIDE THE INSPECTION
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COGNIZANT SECURITY OFFICE. (If yes, explain and
YES NO
identify specific areas or elements carved out and the activity
responsible for inspections. Use Item 13 if more space is needed.)
16. CERTIFICATION AND SIGNATURE. Security requirements stated herein
are complete and adequate for safeguarding the classified
information to be released or generated under this classified effort.
All questions shall be referred to the official named below.
a. TYPED NAME OF CERTIFYING OFFICIAL b. TITLE c. TELEPHONE (Include
Area Code)
d. ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)
e. SIGNATURE
17. REQUIRED DISTRIBUTION
a. CONTRACTOR
b. SUBCONTRACTOR
c. COGNIZANT SECURITY OFFICE FOR PRIME AND SUBCONTRACTOR
d. U.S. ACTIVITY RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERSEAS SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
e. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING OFFICER
f. OTHERS AS NECESSARY: Department of the Treasury, Office of Security
DD Form 254-E, Reverse, JAN 95
HSBP1005R0425 ATTACHMENT 6 – UAV STATEMENT OF WORK
1.0 SCOPE ……………………………………………………………………………………….…….
1.1 Background ………………………………………………………………………………………..
1.2 Purpose …………………………………………………………………………………………….
2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS …………………………………………………….……….…….
2.1 CBP UAV Specifications …………………………………………………….…………………….
2.2 Industrial and Military Standards ………………………………………….…………….………
3.0 REQUIREMENTS ………………………………………………………………………………..
3.1 Operational Services ……………………………………………………………………………..
3.1.1 UAV Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) and
Mission Payload Operator (MPO) Support ……………………………………….….
3.1.2 UAV Air Vehicle, Flight Line and Maintenance Support
…………………………...
3.2 Technical/Engineering Support Services ……………………………………………………….
3.2.1 On-Site Performance …………………………………………………………………….
3.2.2 Repair Services ……………………………………………………………………………
3.2.3 Component Repair ………………………………………………………………………..
3.2.5 Emergency Repair ………………………………………………………………………
3.3 Material ……………………………………………………………………………………………
3.3.1 Component Procurement ……………………………………………………………….
3.3.2 Support Equipment Purchasing ………………………………………………………..
3.3.3 Additional Material ……………………………………………………………………..
3.3.4 Training ………………………………………………………………………………….
3.3.5 Data Development and Documentation Services ………………………………………
4.0 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT ………………………………………………………….
4.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………….
4.2 Configuration Control ……………………………………………………………………………
4.3 Engineering Release ………………………………………………………………………………
4.4 Nomenclature and Identification Plates …………………………………………………………
5.0 INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT …...
6.0 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ………………………………………………………………….
7.0 SAFETY
8.0 DELIVERABLES AND SCHEDULE ………………………………………………………….
8.1 Equipment ……………………………………………………………………………………….
8.2 Engineering Analysis …………………………………………………………………………….
8.3 Documentation ……………………………………………………………………………………
8.4 Logistics Support Plan ……………………………………………………………………………
8.5 Test Plan and Test Reports ……………………………………………………………………….
8.6 Warranties …………………………………………………………………………………………
8.7 Engineering and Technical Services ………………………………………………………………
8.8 Program Management Plan ……………………………………………………………………….
C-1
HSBP1005R0425 ATTACHMENT 6 – UAV STATEMENT OF WORK
8.9 Data Files, and Reports ……………………………………………………………………………
9.0 TEST REQUIREMENTS ……………………………………………………………………
9.1 Test Objectives ………………………………………………………………………………..
9.2 Scope of Tests …………………………………………………………………………………
9.3 UAV System Test Plans and Procedures ……………………………………………………
9.4 Responsibilities ………………………………………………………………………………..
9.4.1 Contractor Test Requirements ……………………………………………………..
9.4.2 Government Test Requirements …………………………………………………….
9.5 Test Criteria ……………………………………………………………………………………
9.6 Test Data Evaluation …………………………………………………………………………..
ATTACHMENTS
Attachment A – Equipment List
Attachment B – Personnel Qualifications
C-2
HSBP1005R0425 ATTACHMENT 6 – UAV STATEMENT OF WORK
STATEMENT OF WORK
for
CBP UAV System
1.0 SCOPE
1.1 Background
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP),
Office of Border Patrol (OBP) has a requirement to conduct UAV
operations for use in
surveillance missions to confirm intrusions reported day and night by
ground sensors, to survey
pre-entry staging areas where groups are known to gather prior to
crossing the border, to monitor
post-entry “lay-up” areas and trails, and to support OBP “sign
cutting” operations where agents
search the area for signs of recent human activity. The UAV shall be
integrated with OBP
ground responders and air operations units for interdiction and
apprehension operations. The
UAV shall also be used to help locate lost and/or injured personnel
and to assist OBP Search,
Trauma, and Rescue teams in recovery operations.
The UAV System shall cover a designated area of responsibility (AOR)
defined as within 25
nautical miles of the U.S. Mexico border from Yuma, Arizona to El
Paso, Texas. The UAV
system shall be available 24 hours per day, 7 days a week, with normal
flight operations of 4
days per week averaging 14 hours per mission. Short deployments
outside the AOR may be
required to support other DHS missions.
1.3 Purpose
At the time of award of this Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity
(IDIQ) contract, it is CBP’s
intent to order one commercial off-the-shelf UAV System as outlined in
contract Section B
Supplies or Services, to include Time and Materials (T&M) operational
and maintenance support
services. Therefore, within thirty days of contract award the
Contractor shall deliver one UAV
System configured and ready to fly operational CBP missions on site at
Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
This Statement of Work (SOW) defines the requirements necessary to
provide the UAV Systems
equipment and overall engineering and logistics support services for
CBP UAV System. This
support shall include operation and maintenance; air vehicle operators
and mission payload
operators, systems airframe and equipment repairs/modifications,
system upgrades or
engineering changes, software support services, air vehicle and
mission equipment systems
integration, training, material and equipment support issues
resolution and technical support
services; maintaining support of ground station facilities; material
and equipment procurement
services; and data development and documentation services.
2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
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2.3 CBP UAV Specifications
The specifications for the performance of CBP UAV System baseline
configuration items are
listed below. Any equipment shall provide, as a minimum, the
performance specified in these
documents, as applicable.
Title
CBP Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Specification, Version 1.0 dated May 26,
2005
2.4 Industrial and Military Standards
The following documents are applicable to equipment installed in the
CBP UAV System. The
Contractor shall comply with these standards.
Environmental Engineering Considerations and Laboratory Tests
MIL-STD-810
Interface Standard, Electromagnetic Environmental Effects MIL-STD-464
Electromagnetic Emission and Susceptibility Requirements
For the Control of Electromagnetic Interference MIL-STD-461
System Safety Program Requirements MIL-STD-882
Standard Interfaces of the Unmanned Control System (UCS)
For NATO UAV Interoperability NATO STANAG 4586
Standard Specification for Design and Performance of an
Airborne Sense-and-Avoid System ASTM F 2411-04
ATC Transponder and altitude reporting equipment and use 14 Code of
Federal
Regulation (CFR) section
91.215
COTS items shall, at a minimum, comply with the version of commercial
industry standard DO-
160, produced by the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics that
was current at the time
an item was initially produced. For newly developed items, the version
current at the time of
contract award shall apply. The requirement to comply with DO-160
requirements is waived for
items qualified in accordance with a comparable MILSPEC or MILSTD.
3.0 REQUIREMENTS
Upon thirty days after contract award the Contractor shall deliver one
UAV System configured
and ready to fly operational CBP missions on site at Fort Huachuca,
Arizona. The Contractor
shall provide additional UAV System components and support as required
throughout the
contract period. The UAV System is comprised of:
1) Air Vehicle - The air vehicle is the airborne element of the CBP
UAV System and carries
the payloads and embedded airborne communication relay capability. The
system may
include multiple air vehicles.
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2) Payload - The payloads are self-contained elements that are
designed to accomplish
specific missions. Payloads shall be operated depending upon specific
mission needs of
the CBP UAV System sortie. The system shall include
electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR)
sensor, laser illuminator, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) with a
ground moving target
indicator mode (GMTI), signals interception receiver, communication
relay transceivers,
and the option for a hyper-spectral (imaging spectrometer) sensor.
3) Ground Control Station (GCS) - The CBP UAV GCS facility contains
the hardware
and software for mission planning, air vehicle and payload command and
control, and
receipt and dissemination of imagery/data. The GCS serves as a command
post for
mission planning, flight coordination and scheduling, and ensuring
flight safety and shall
be configured as per the referenced UAV Specification.
4) Launch and Recovery System (LRS) - The LRS provides an automatic
launch and
recovery capability as well as an override capability for manual
control of the takeoff and
landing phases of flight. The LRS shall function without a GCS at the
airfield.
5) Link Segment - The CBP UAV Link Segment consists of redundant
control links and a
data link suite. The control link suite provides command, control, and
communication
(C3) among system operators (pilots in the GCS and LRS), and the air
vehicle. The data
link suite provides data collected by the payloads to payload
operators in the GCS and
supervisors in the field and CBP agents in the field. The control link
suite shall contain a
primary and a secondary link.
6) Sensor Control Terminals (SCT) - The SCT provides supervisory
agents in the field
with direct control of all functions of the EO/IR sensor and access in
real time to its video
imagery and data independent of the GCS. The system shall include
multiple SCTs.
7) Remote Video Terminal (RVT) - The RVT provides the CBP agents in
the field with
direct access in real time to EO/IR sensor video imagery and data
independent of the
GCS.
For the initial delivery a narrowband satellite communication (SATCOM)
system for control
beyond line of sight (BLOS) is not required, however the UAV air
vehicle shall be
configured to accommodate the integration of SATCOM later.
The various tasks required to provide support are described below.
With the exception of the air
vehicle operators, mission payload operators, and maintenance
technicians, the support shall be
provided on an as-needed basis and submitted in accordance with
Section B. The scope of each
effort shall be well defined and authorized by CBP. The Contractor
shall summarize the scope
of each effort, submitting a plan of action to CBP for review. The
plan of action shall include,
but is not limited to, a description of the effort to be undertaken
plus a breakdown of personnel,
man-hours, and total cost. The description of the effort to be
undertaken shall include any
studies required to determine course(s) of action to resolve the
issue, recommendations as to
which option(s) to employ, any assistance or equipment required from
CBP or outside sources,
any testing required to confirm successful resolution of the issue,
and any anticipated follow-on
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HSBP1005R0425 ATTACHMENT 6 – UAV STATEMENT OF WORK
effort(s) after testing. Written approval from the Contracting Officer
of Record, or duly
appointed designee, shall be obtained before any work is actually
performed. Once each effort is
complete, the Contractor shall submit a final report that summarizes
the actual tasks performed,
total labor hours, by category, used to fulfill the task requirements,
and the total cost incurred.
The Contractor’s initial plan of action and the Contractor’s final
report shall be construed to be
the substantiating documentation required for the preparation of
billing invoices submitted to
CBP. The Contractor shall provide a summary report with the billing.
If no billing is generated
for the month, a summary of the effort expended (labor hours by
category) shall be submitted to
the COTR via the Monthly Status Report. The Monthly Status Report is a
deliverable under the
contract and shall be submitted in accordance with Data Item
Description (DID) UAV001.
3.1 Operational Services
The Contractor shall provide technical support for the operation and
maintenance of the UAV
System. This support requires certified/licensed on-site full-time
employees with specialized and
unique technical and engineering skills. The Contractor shall provide
upon contract award proof
of initial UAV system specific training, certification, and/or
licensing for the positions outlined
in this SOW. This shall include compliance with follow on
qualification, training, evaluation,
and currency requirements as dictated by CBP, regulatory agencies, the
UAV manufacturer and
other Government activities.
Initial flight operations are planned for Fort Huachuca, Arizona, for
at least the first three months
with an anticipated relocation of UAV operations to an OBP specified
site within the AOR.
OBP mission requirements may require periodic deployments to other OBP
AOR locations.
CBP anticipates 2,912 flight hours per year.
The Contractor shall coordinate with CBP UAV Flight Operations Service
Center (FOSC)
personnel and comply with, all applicable flight planning documents,
certifications, licensing,
training, and follow-on qualifications necessary to support safe,
efficient flight operations in the
U.S. National Airspace System.
The Contractor shall provide the necessary relevant, current documents
at the operating site to
support recurring flight operations to meet CBP mission requirements.
These include, but are
not limited to, the following: applicable Flight Information
Publications (FLIP); manufacture’s
weight and balance data; operational, logistical, maintenance, and
management checklists for all
aspects of UAV operations; and a Flight Crew Information File (FCIF)
for centralized
information dissemination at the operating site.
The Contractor shall perform the necessary tasks prior to each flight
to safely operate in the U.S.
National Airspace System and conduct the mission per direction from
the CBP UAV FOSC.
This shall include, but is not limited to, filing a flight plan;
receiving a comprehensive
climatology briefing (with updates as required); calculating normal
and emergency air vehicle
operating capabilities concurrent with existing ambient conditions and
mission requirements;
ensuring Notices to Airman (NOTAM)s are current and in compliance with
the flight plan; and
reviewing published lost link procedures in relation to the mission
profile.
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HSBP1005R0425 ATTACHMENT 6 – UAV STATEMENT OF WORK
The Contractor shall be responsible for site preparation and support
aspects of the UAV System
operation to include, but not limited to, the following: at both the
hangar and the operating site,
the contractor shall be responsible for extending the power from the
entrance panel to the point
of need. All required wiring shall meet standard electrical codes for
type of wire, size of
conductors, appropriate circuit breakers and disconnects. The
Government shall provide fuel on
site for the UAV system and the generators however; the Contractor
shall perform all
fueling/defueling operations. The Contractor shall also provide oil,
any other lubricants, UAVspecific
additives required for operation to include a suitable container for
explosive storage as
required.
3.1.1 UAV Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) and Mission Payload Operator
(MPO) Support
The Contractor shall provide trained, qualified, and current AVO and
MPO personnel to support
all UAV flight missions. All AVO and MPO personnel shall be U.S.
citizens and maintain a
security clearance per the National Industrial Security Program as
determined by CBP.
The Contractor shall be required to ensure that AVOs and MPOs follow
the direction of local
CBP personnel and their contractors operating the FOSC. AVOs and/or
MPOs shall maintain
frequent and reliable communication with the CBP Air and Marine
Operations Center (AMOC)
before, during, and at the conclusion of each flight, in addition to
normal Air Traffic Control and
OBP Agent coordination.
Air Vehicle Operator/Pilot
Minimum/General Experience: Five (5) or more years of experience in a
relevant functional
area.
Responsibility: Performs UAV technical and/or flight operations.
Responsible for UAV pre and
post flight system checks, and navigates the UAV to accomplish mission
requirements. Must be
thoroughly familiar with remote piloting systems, aerodynamic, and UAV
flight performance
operation parameters.
Minimum Education: Associates degree or equivalent military training
and a commercial pilot’s
certificate with instrument rating (or Airline Transport Pilot) and
meets the qualifications for
exercising these privileges.
Mission Payload Operator
Minimum/General Experience: Six (6) or more years of general
experience including at least
three (3) years of specialized experience in the required area of
expertise.
Responsibility: Performs advanced engineering and/or analysis tasks
required for operation of
UAV onboard sensor(s) while in flight. Performs sensor calibration and
baseline instrumentation
set-up. Performs data collection requirements to meet customer needs
and insures data quality
control. Records and interprets sensor data. Optimizes sensor
performance for given tasks.
Applies advanced engineering and/or analysis practices, concepts, and
data collection
procedures. Gathers information, analyzes problem areas, adjusts
instrumentation and performs
system modifications as necessary to enhance data acquisition.
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HSBP1005R0425 ATTACHMENT 6 – UAV STATEMENT OF WORK
Minimum Education: Associates degree or equivalent military training.
3.1.2 UAV Air Vehicle, Flight Line and Maintenance Support
The Contractor shall provide trained, qualified, and current Flight
Line and Maintenance support
personnel to enable the UAV System to operate for 2,912-flight hours
per year. This support
includes flight line activities in direct support of UAV launch,
recoveries and maintenance
support of the UAV before and after flight. All activities shall be
performed under the direction
of the CBP UAV FOSC.
Flight line Activities: The Contractor shall support UAV flight
missions using Contractorprovided
flight line support personnel who are trained, qualified, and current
in UAV operations.
These personnel may include, but are not limited to, the following
positions and responsibilities:
flight line crew chiefs, tow-qualified personnel, launch and recovery
element, and associated
safety and quality assurance personnel.
The Contractor shall prepare the UAV for scheduled missions in
accordance with the flight
schedule and direction from CBP UAV FOSC in regard to payload, planned
hours of flight, and
planned area of operations. Preparation for flight includes all
preflight, mission data loading and
safety procedures. When the UAV is mission ready, the Contractor shall
position the UAV to a
predetermined preflight area where all final checks shall be
performed. Flight line support
includes UAV launch and recovery, performing all required post-flight
checks and scheduled or
unscheduled maintenance, and returning the UAV to its hangar.
Maintenance Support: The Contractor shall perform all required UAV
maintenance to
accomplish the availability requirements stated in the performance
specification using Contractor
personnel who are trained, qualified, and current in UAV maintenance
procedures. Maintenance
personnel may include, but are not limited to, the following positions
and responsibilities: UAV
airframe, power plant, payload equipment mechanics and technicians;
GCS, ground data
terminal, SCT and RVT technicians; weight and balance technicians; and
associated safety and
quality assurance personnel.
The Contractor shall provide maintenance support in order to meet the
readiness and
maintainability requirements in the referenced performance
specification. The Contractor shall
provide all parts and materials used in the maintenance program and
document all maintenance
actions using best commercial practices. The Contractor shall provide
the number of maintainers
required per airframe, GCS and ground support equipment and for
logistics support (fueling,
vehicle maintenance, supply support). The skill qualifications for the
identified personnel shall
be documented and provided to the Government upon contract award.
For all flight line and maintenance support personnel, the Contractor
shall document and provide
on request proof of initial UAV system-specific training,
certification, and/or licensing, as well
as compliance with follow-on qualification, training, evaluation, and
currency requirements as
dictated by the CBP UAV FOSC, CBP, regulatory agencies, the
manufacturer, other Government
activities, and/or the Contractor. All flight line and maintenance
support personnel shall be U.S.
citizens and maintain a security clearance per the National Industrial
Security Program as
determined by CBP.
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Air Vehicle Maintenance Technician
Minimum/General Experience: Three (3) or more years of experience in a
relevant functional
area or training sufficient to enable the successful accomplishment of
assigned air vehicle
maintenance tasking.
Responsibility: Performs UAV maintenance and/or technical activities
such as preventative and
corrective maintenance to insure successful completion of air mission
operations. Prepares the
UAV system for flight and acts as a ground safety observer during
flight operations.
Minimum Education: Equivalent training and a current Airframe and
Powerplant (A&P)
certificate.
3.2 Technical/Engineering Support Services
The Contractor shall provide technical/engineering support services
for systems integration,
integrated system enhancements and/or conducting engineering studies
on CBP UAV System.
The Contractor shall also provide any required technical and
engineering support in performing
diagnostics and troubleshooting to resolve equipment problems that may
be beyond the scope of
assigned UAV System Contractor maintenance personnel. Such support in
assisting on-site
maintenance personnel in identifying, analyzing, and resolving
problems shall be provided by
technical and engineering personnel knowledgeable on those specific
CBP UAV System.
3.2.1 On-Site Performance
Contractor personnel may, be required to travel to the CBP UAV System
AOR in order to
accomplish tasks stipulated in this SOW. Personnel shall be qualified
to perform relevant system
engineering and be familiar with all hardware and software aspects of
the CBP UAV System
components. Tasks may include system troubleshooting and analysis,
formulation of alternate
system integration schemes to resolve system problems, and system
operation and test to validate
proper system operation following any system modifications. Personnel
shall be subject to
approval by the CBP Contracting Officer of Record or designated
representative and the COTR
must authorize all reimbursable travel.
3.2.2 Repair Services
The Contractor shall provide repair services, as required, for the UAV
System baseline and
integrated components and equipment. Requirements for repair services
shall be coordinated
with the local OBP Sector Chief. Prior to commencement of repair, the
Contractor shall provide
the OBP Sector Chief with a repair plan and estimate of cost. The
repair plan shall address
Contractor requirements such as local maintenance and ground support,
time to repair, and
access to the air vehicle and its components. Approval to proceed with
the repair must be
granted by CBP Contracting Officer of Record or designated
representative.
3.2.3 Component Repair
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HSBP1005R0425 ATTACHMENT 6 – UAV STATEMENT OF WORK
The Contractor shall provide services, as required, for the repair of
CBP UAV System
components or structures that are unique or not readily repairable
through commercial sources.
Provide a full 12-month warranty on new parts and equipment, including
items designed and
manufactured by the Contractor, newly supplied by the Contractor, and
components acquired and
used by the Contractor to upgrade the UAV System. The 12-month
warranty period for each
system shall commence no earlier than Government acceptance.
3.2.4 Emergency Repair
The Contractor shall provide for emergency repair of CBP UAV System
equipment and related
airframe components. CBP may agree to position systems equipment for
emergency repairs at
the home base or Contractor facility, as agreed between CBP and the
Contractor depending upon
the information contained in the Critical Spares List. However, the
Contractor shall be prepared
to respond quickly (no more than 72 hours) to emergency repair
requirements that may be
required at remote locations within CBP UAV System operating areas.
3.3 Material
3.3.1 Component Procurement
The Contractor shall provide an agreement for purchasing unique CBP
UAV System components
and structures that are not available through commercial sources. In
addition, components and
sub-components may be procured to provide supplemental spare parts
support. Purchases shall
be subject to CBP approval by the Contracting Officer of Record or
designated representative.
3.3.2 Support Equipment Purchasing
The Contractor shall provide a purchasing agreement for special or
unique test equipment, tools,
and other support equipment that has been developed for the CBP UAV
System. In addition,
items may be procured to provide supplemental maintenance or logistics
support. Purchases
shall be subject to CBP approval by the Contracting Officer of Record
or designated
representative.
3.3.3 Additional Material
The Contractor shall assist CBP, as directed by the COTR, in acquiring
any additional material
required for the support of the CBP UAV System.
3.3.4 Training
The Contractor shall provide training, as required, for the
maintenance, operation or logistical
support of the CBP UAV System. The training may include, but is not
limited to, structured
classroom presentations at CBP or Contractor facilities, simulator
training at CBP or Contractor
facilities, training software for use on personal computers, or
on-the-job training. Training
alternatives provided by outside sources may be identified if they are
not available directly from
the Contractor.
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3.3.5 Data Development and Documentation Services
The Contractor shall develop data related to the CBP UAV System
documentation packages as
required to appropriately reflect any changes made to the equipment
baseline. Documents may
include source code listings, specifications, equipment lists,
operator manuals, maintenance
publications, drawing packages, and integrated support plans. The
Contractor shall update
existing documents and/or develop new documents as directed by the
COTR. Further guidance
is provided in Section 8.0 of this SOW. Once a requirement is
identified for performance under
this contract, appropriate DIDs shall be provided for the specific
effort.
4.0 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
4.1 Introduction
The Contractor shall establish, within his organization, the
responsibilities and procedures for
implementing the configuration management requirements stipulated
below. The planning and
implementation shall be subject to review and audit by CBP. The
Contractor shall submit a
Configuration Management Plan thirty days after contract award for
review and shall address
procedures for implementation and shall be subject to review by the
Government.
Responsibilities and procedures that have been developed for use by
similar programs may be
considered for use upon review and if approved applied to this
contract. Configuration
management shall be maintained current throughout the course of this
contract and shall address
both hardware and software configuration items.
4.2 Configuration Control
CBP UAV System documentation shall be monitored and updated by the
Contractor to reflect
any changes resulting from tasks defined in this SOW. Changes shall be
incorporated as
necessary into documents after they have been revised and approved by
CBP. All such
specifications applicable to hardware and software items shall be
maintained in accordance with
the Contractor’s configuration management policies as approved by CBP.
The Contractor shall
maintain interface control throughout the course of this contract. In
addition, the Contractor
shall provide information delineating the status of changes from the
CBP UAV System baseline,
including proposed effectivity and implementation status of approved
changes under this
contract. The status of the CBP UAV System baseline changes shall be
included in the
Contractor’s Monthly Status Report.
4.3 Engineering Release
The Contractor shall ensure that all engineering design releases are
processed through the
Contractor’s configuration management authority. The configuration,
control, and status of
engineering release records shall be provided to the CBP Program
Manager or designee upon
request.
4.4 Nomenclature and Identification Plates
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The Contractor shall recommend the assignment of nomenclature for
newly designed
configuration items resulting from this contract. Nomenclature
recommendations shall be
submitted to the CBP Contracting Officer of Record by letter. CBP
approved nomenclatures
shall be applied to the configuration item nameplate and to the
specification, drawings, and other
applicable data items pertaining to the item.
5.0 Inventory Management and Government Furnished Property
Government Furnished Property (GFP) shall be supplied as specified in
Contract Section J,
Attachment 1. Every effort shall be made by the Government to procure
and provide to the
Contractor all related components required as stipulated. However, any
required components or
items not specifically listed shall be the Contractor’s responsibility
to procure and provide in
order to complete successful UAV system operation.
If equipment fails or is inoperative subsequent to or during UAV
operations the Contractor shall
notify CBP in writing of the nature of the problem. CBP shall
coordinate to have the equipment
repaired and/or replaced. The Contractor shall be responsible for
troubleshooting the interface
and / or operation to determine the cause of the failure and making
any repairs necessary to the
UAV system to prevent further malfunctions or failures. CBP shall be
notified in writing of the
procedures employed by the contractor to determine the cause of the
malfunction or failure.
Repair or replacement costs for GFP damaged due to Contractor error,
abuse or misuse shall be
the Contractor’s responsibility.
The Contractor shall utilize, when applicable, the Government
inventory procedures as identified
in the Contract Government Property Clause of Section I.
6.0 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
The Contractor shall exercise all technical direction and control of
the integration, engineering,
and support effort required in accomplishing the tasks associated with
this SOW. This includes
the necessary Project/Program Management and the support and technical
efforts directly
associated with CBP UAV System configuration control, data
development, systems
engineering, test, and logistical planning requirements.
7.0 SAFETY
The Contractor shall implement a system safety and environmental
protection program for the
UAV System and shall ensure that safety and environmental protection
considerations are
integral parts of the systems engineering efforts. The safety program
shall address personnel and
equipment concerns relative to the integration, testing, use,
maintenance and life cycle support of
the system. Within this program the Contractor shall properly apply
these requirements to
ensure the identification and understanding of all known hazards and
their associated risks; and
mishap risk eliminated or reduced to acceptable levels. A Preliminary
Hazard Analysis (PHA)
shall be conducted and Category I or II hazards with a potential
greater than 10 x 10-4 shall be
controlled. The contractor shall publish a list of such hazards with
corrective actions required to
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reduce the probability of occurrence of unsafe events that can cause
either loss of life or damage
equal to or more than the replacement cost of the item. A System
Safety Assessment Report
shall be delivered in accordance with DID UAV002 and shall include the
PHA as an attachment.
8.0 DELIVERABLES AND SCHEDULE
8.1 Equipment
The Contractor shall deliver thirty days after contract award
equipment outlined in Attachment
(A). The equipment shall be packaged and forward shipped to the
destination specified upon
contract award.
8.2 Engineering Analysis
The Contractor shall provide an engineering analysis report and
related documentation to support
airworthiness design and potential FAA flight worthiness
certification.
The data provided shall include conditions and assumptions used for
engineering design and
analysis for static and dynamic loads in ground and airborne
environments. If obtained a
certified copy of the FAA approved flight worthiness certificate shall
be provided along with
proposal submission. Additionally the supporting engineering analysis
report shall include
identification of specific standards to which the UAV System was built
and shall be delivered no
later than sixty days after contract award.
8.3 Documentation
As referenced in section 3.3.5 above the Contractor shall provide
copies of the documents listed
below. One copy of the data shall be delivered in paper and one copy
in electronic format. The
electronic format shall be in Adobe Acrobat. Documents shall include
engineering mechanical
drawings, electrical drawings, and other documentation as required.
Interface documents shall
define configuration thermal protection, electrical power connections,
circuit protection, system
interface requirements, and associated rationale. Interface documents
shall define the necessary
data exchanges and interfaces between the UAV System and other
avionics systems. The
documents are deliverables under the contract and shall be delivered
no later than thirty days
after contract award. Updates shall be included as part of the tasking
for updated documentation
described below:
Equipment Specification
Interface Control Document
System Functional Description
Built in Test Functional Description
Air Vehicle Troubleshooting Procedures
Emergency Procedures
Operation and Maintenance Manuals
Checklists
Special Tools and Test Equipment Requirements
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Critical Spares List
8.4 Logistics Support Plan
The Contractor shall provide a Logistics Support Plan for the UAV
System in accordance with
DID UAV003 thirty days after contract award and shall include the
following:
A. Supply Support – The Contractor shall provide supply support to
include all spares (e.g.,
repairable units, assemblies, modules), repair parts (i.e.,
non-repairable components),
consumables (e.g., liquids except UAV fuels, lubricants, disposable
items), special supplies,
and related inventories needed to maintain the prime mission-related
equipment, computers
and software, test and support equipment, transportation and handling
equipment, training
equipment, and facilities. The Contractor shall identify long lead
items and critical spare
quantities in the form of a recommended spares list for consideration
by CBP, plus
provisioning and procurement activities, and documentation associated
with material
acquisition, handling, distribution, recycling, and disposal.
Specifically identify all EPA
listed hazardous materials used in the primary systems or for
maintenance.
B. Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation – The Contractor
shall identify all
materials, equipment, special provisions, containers (i.e., reusable
and disposable), and
supplies necessary to support the packaging, preservation, storage,
handling, and/or
transportation of the prime mission-related elements of the system,
personnel, spares and
repair parts, test and support equipment, technical data, software,
and mobile facilities. This
includes the initial and sustaining transportation requirements in
support of the distribution of
materials and personnel.
C. Facilities – The Contractor shall provide information related to
the physical and structural
dimension requirements required to support the mission operational,
maintenance, support,
and housing functions; capital equipment and primary utilities (e.g.,
heat, power, energy
requirements, environmental controls and communications) to include
any unique
requirement that is outside of US NEC or other building code standard.
Additionally the
Contractor shall identify airfield runway requirements and note if a
FAA airfield safety
waiver is required.
D. Technical Documentation – The Contractor shall provide system
installation and
checkout procedures, operating and maintenance instructions,
inspection and calibration
procedures, overhaul instructions, facilities data, modification
instructions, engineering
design data (e.g., specifications, drawings, materials and parts
lists, digital data), supplier
data, logistics provisioning, and procurement data that are necessary
in the performance of
system development, production, operation, maintenance, and retirement
functions. Data
should cover the prime mission-oriented system and other support
infrastructure as well (i.e.,
test and support, transportation and handling, and training equipment
and facilities).
Technical data includes information system capabilities and associated
databases, archives,
and e-file solutions.
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E. System IT (Computer) Hardware and Software – The Contractor shall
identify all
computers, associated software, interfaces, and the networks necessary
to support scheduled
and unscheduled prime mission and other support activities. This may
include conditionmonitoring
programs, diagnostic tapes, and associated requirements for the
implementation
of computer aided design, maintenance and logistic support capability.
F. Personnel – The Contractor shall identify personnel (i.e., organic,
reimbursable, and
Contractor) required for the installation, checkout, and sustaining
maintenance and support of
the system, its prime mission-related elements, and the other elements
of support (e.g., test
equipment, transportation and handling, facilities, mobile teams,
operators at test facilities
and calibration laboratories).
G. Training – The Contractor shall include all personnel, equipment,
facilities,
data/documentation, and associated resources necessary for the
training of system operational
and maintenance personnel to include both initial and refresher
training. Training equipment
may include (e.g., simulators, mockups, special devices, and
computers), data, and software
developed and utilized as necessary to support both the informal
day-to-day training and that
of a more formal nature.
H. Configuration Management – The Contractor shall provide a
configuration management
plan that identifies the management of the systems and associated
support systems
configuration as they are deployed and for their life cycle. Establish
the methodology to
establish configuration identification, manage engineering changes,
maintain status
accounting, and perform audits/assessments and reviews.
I. Maintenance and Support Planning – The Contractor shall include all
planning and
analysis associated with the establishment of requirements for the
overall support of a system
throughout its life cycle. Identify reliability parameters through
supportability and
maintainability analyses; identify maintenance requirements from user
to original equipment
manufacture (OEM) or other, from initial testing to the retirement
stage. Maintenance and
support planning should result in the integration of the various
facets of support with each
other (i.e., calibration, Intra/Inter-servicing and mobilization
support), with the prime mission
related elements of the system, and should lead to the definition and
development of a
complete life-cycle support operation.
J. Support Equipment – The Contractor shall identify all tools,
condition monitoring
equipment, diagnostic and checkout equipment, special test equipment,
metrology and
calibration equipment, maintenance fixtures and stands, and special
handling equipment
required to support all scheduled and unscheduled maintenance actions
associated with the
system. Test and support equipment requirements at each level of
maintenance must be
addressed as well as the overall requirements for test traceability to
a secondary standard and
ultimately to a primary standard of some type.
K. Cost Plan (Life Cycle Cost) – Historically logistic life-cycle
costs account for 90% or
more of a prime mission system price. The Contractor shall provide
cost estimates for all of
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HSBP1005R0425 ATTACHMENT 6 – UAV STATEMENT OF WORK
the support and estimated annual operation budget amounts that shall
be required to support
the system.
8.5 Test Plan and Test Reports
The Contractor shall provide a test plan for performance determination
for any upgraded
equipment. The test plan shall include minimum parameters that are
guaranteed by the
Contractor in order to meet CBP performance requirements as stipulated
in the referenced
performance specification. The test plan shall be supplied no later
than thirty days prior to the
scheduled test. Test reports shall be submitted in accordance with the
CBP approved test plan
and shall be submitted no later than 30 days following completion of
acceptance testing. The
plan shall be delivered in accordance with DID UAV004.
8.6 Warranties
Provide warranties as stipulated in Section I of the contract.
8.7 Engineering and Technical Services
Provide services as stipulated in 3.2 above. The services are to be
provided throughout the
contract period.
8.8 Program Management Plan
The Contractor shall provide, as part of the proposal, a Program
Management Plan (PMP) that
defines Contractor organizational structure, their program management
systems and procedures,
and responsibilities and authority of senior management staff assigned
to this effort. The
Contractor shall also maintain data files containing all information
developed for and associated
with the design, development, integration, manufacturing,
installation, and testing of the UAV
System delivered to CBP. Management reports summarizing program
status, program changes,
and program issues shall be submitted monthly in accordance with DID
UAV001.
8.9 Data Files, and Reports
The Contractor shall provide reports including, but not limited to,
the following: scheduled
flights, aborted or flown, to include takeoff and landing times
(local), duration of flight in hours
and tenths of hours, system status upon recovery of aircraft Code 1 -
Immediately ready for
flight, Code 2 - Non-mission essential equipment inoperative, Code 3 -
Mission essential
equipment inoperable) and description, nomenclature, part numbers of
any old/new equipment
changed between flights, air vehicle and mission support equipment
availability and status (e.g.,
UAV, GCS, SCTs, RVTs); UAV sensor availability and status (e.g., any
failure of the reported
systems, time awaiting parts, time to repair these systems); a daily
summary of maintenance and
repair actions by major system; and other logistics support data as
specified by the Logistics
Support Plan.
Following each flight, the Contractor shall review and analyze
operations and mission data;
sensor and other recorded data; and debrief with the CBP UAV FOSC and
OBP personnel, to
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HSBP1005R0425 ATTACHMENT 6 – UAV STATEMENT OF WORK
document lessons learned and to suggest program, process, and/or
product improvements. The
Contractor shall also support and offer input to CBP’s post-flight
discussion of tactics and
sensors employed, mission effectiveness, suggested improvements to
tactics, and any items
affecting future operations. Again, if the UAV Systems are collocated,
these briefings may be
combined.
9.0 TEST REQUIREMENTS
9.1 Test Objectives
The purpose of the testing is to evaluate the UAV System against both
specification and
contractual requirements that address system operation and
functionality. The UAV System
shall be tested in accordance with applicable commercial
procedures/practice as normally
performed in preparation for, and in the execution of, a
functional/operational check flight. The
ground tests and functional/operational check flight shall include all
test procedures required to
ensure safety of flight and demonstrate that the system conforms to
specifications.
9.2 Scope of Tests
The testing shall include ground acceptance tests, flight acceptance
tests, performance
evaluations, and inspections by both the contractor and the
Government. Testing shall be
performed on all UAV System deliveries to include systems integration
and upgrades. The
contractor shall perform sufficient testing to demonstrate proper
installation and operation of all
air vehicle systems to include external systems and their interfaces.
Contractor
functional/operational flight/systems testing shall be conducted prior
to Government final
acceptance at the contractor's facility or upon delivery as so
designated. Contractor tests shall
exercise and verify the functionality and operation of individual
systems, as well as the total
integrated UAV System. Contractor testing shall ensure that individual
components properly
interface with each other to perform the UAV mission as defined in the
referenced Government
specification.
9.3 UAV System Test Plans and Procedures
The Contractor shall prepare and submit for approval the UAV System
test plan and procedures
in accordance with DID UAV004 in Contract Section J, Attachment 3. The
test plan procedures
shall describe comprehensive test procedures for components,
subsystems and all systems
required by this SOW and associated specification. The procedures
shall be delivered to CBP for
review upon contract award. Component and subsystem testing procedures
and subcontractor
test procedures may be approved at that time. The Contractor shall not
proceed with system
testing until receiving CBP approval of the system test procedures.
9.4 Responsibilities
The purpose of this section is to delineate the responsibilities of
the contractor and the
Government during the acceptance testing of the UAV System.
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HSBP1005R0425 ATTACHMENT 6 – UAV STATEMENT OF WORK
9.4.1 Contractor Test Requirements
The Contractor shall perform and complete the tests in sufficient time
to meet the contractual
delivery date of the air vehicle to the Government. If an item or
element has been previously
tested and has met the requirements of this specification, additional
testing is not required if
substantiating data/reports so indicate. Changes to the test plan or
schedule for systems
integration and upgrades shall be provided to the Government at least
30 days prior to the
initiation of these tests. In some instances, concurrent Government
sign off of contractor factory
tests shall be used in lieu of a separate Government final acceptance
test. CBP reserves the right
to witness all Contractor testing and shall make the sole
determination when concurrent sign off
is acceptable.
The Contractor shall perform testing in accordance with engineering
test procedures and
Maintenance Instruction Manuals (MIMS) at a place of its choosing,
using personnel, facilities,
equipment, and services as necessary to ensure thoroughness and
completeness of the testing.
The Contractor shall provide flight crew personnel to conduct
flight-testing.
The Contractor shall be responsible for preparing the UAV System for
ground and flight tests to
be conducted at the contractor's facility or at another site specified
by the government. The
Contractor shall also be responsible for providing the necessary
support equipment, to include
special test sets, for conducting ground and flight tests.
The Contractor shall be responsible for identifying any technical
testing support required from
external suppliers. Technical support may include assistance with the
testing and/or include
troubleshooting assistance in the event of a discrepancy discovered
during testing. Any required
technical support from CFE suppliers shall be the responsibility of
the Contractor.
Prior to the commencement of Government final acceptance tests, the
contractor shall perform
the types of testing listed below to ensure adherence to applicable
specifications and compliance
with contractual requirements.
1. Test to satisfy suitability of the UAV System for flight to include
day and night operations.
2. Maintenance functional/operational flight/systems tests.
3. Communication tests including data transfer functions, both
external and internal.
4. Navigation systems tests.
5. Flight management system tests.
6. Autopilot and flight control system tests.
7. EO/IR and radar functional tests.
8. Data handling and display system tests.
As part of the contractor test requirements, the contractor shall
provide analyzed data on these
tests to the Government for evaluation, to include completed
flight/operational acceptance test
checklists to document their performance of the specific tests listed
above. In addition, the
contractor shall provide copies of all completed test procedures
applicable to this effort to CBP
15 calendar days after completion of contractor flight/operational
test of each UAV System in
accordance with DID UAV005.
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HSBP1005R0425 ATTACHMENT 6 – UAV STATEMENT OF WORK
9.4.2 Government Test Requirements
The Government shall prepare and provide to the contractor a
Government Acceptance Test Plan
(ATP) at initial contract signing and 30 days prior to the
commencement of Government testing
for follow-on purchases or systems upgrades. Government sign off of
contractor factory tests
may be used in lieu of a separate Government final acceptance test.
CBP shall make the sole
determination when concurrent sign off is acceptable.
Government final acceptance shall be performed at the contractor's
facility or other location
specified by the government following completion of Contractor
testing. Government testing
shall be concurrent with Contractor testing prior to the scheduled
delivery date of the air vehicle
as specified in Section F of the contract. CBP shall perform the
following inspections and tests
as the basis for air vehicle acceptance:
Inspection and Acceptance
1. Review contractor testing to determine contractual compliance.
2. Evaluate results of Contractor UAV System tests; identify any
deficiencies and their impact,
i.e., waive additional testing, etc.
3. Review contractor QA inspection documentation and sign off.
4. Conduct UAV System physical inventory.
5. Conduct inventory of documentation delivered.
6. Inspect UAV System logbooks (as applicable).
9.5 Test Criteria
Hardware and software shall be tested to the functional and
performance criteria contained in the
documents listed in section 2.1 of this SOW and revised as needed to
incorporate the
requirements of this SOW.
9.6 Test Data Evaluation
The Government shall have sole responsibility for final evaluation of
all test data. The
contractor shall provide clarification assistance relating to test
data as requested.
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HSBP1005R0425 ATTACHMENT 6 – UAV STATEMENT OF WORK
ATTACHMENT A
CBP UAV System
The following deliverables are due within thirty days of contract
award.
CLIN Nomenclature Part Number Qty Delivery Date ___
0001.1 Air Vehicle 01 Within thirty days of contract award
0001.2 Electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor w/ Laser illuminator 01
Within thirty days of contract award
0001.3 Transportable Ground Control Station (GCS) 01 Within thirty
days of contract award
0001.4 Sensor Control Terminal (SCT) 01 Within thirty days of contract
award
0001.5 Remote Video Terminal (RVT) 02 Within thirty days of contract
award
0001.6 Launch and Recovery System (as required) 01 Within thirty days
of contract award
0001.7 Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) w/
Ground moving target indicator mode (GMTI) 01 Within thirty days of
contract award
0001.8 Signals interception receiver 00
0001.9 Communication relay transceivers 01 Within thirty days of
contract award
0001.10 Hyper-spectral sensor (optional) 00
0001.11 Ground Data Terminal (GDT) 00
0005 Data Deliverables
Equipment Specification 1 Within thirty days of contract award.
Interface Control Document 1
System Functional Description 1
Built in Test Functional Description 1
Air Vehicle Troubleshooting Procedures 1
Emergency Procedures 1
Operation and Maintenance Manuals 1
Special Tools and Test Equipment Rqmts. 1
Equipment Level Specifications 1
Critical Spares List 1
Logistics Support Plan 1 Within thirty days of contract award.
Shipping Address: To be provided upon contract award.
All Equipment:
Data Deliverables: COTR (to be determined at award)
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 1575
Washington, DC 20229
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HSBP1005R0425 ATTACHMENT 6 – UAV STATEMENT OF WORK
ATTACHMENT B
PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS
1. The Contractor shall be responsible for employing personnel having
the following levels of
education, professional, and technical experience. These
qualifications are only a baseline; contractors
should strive for technical excellence in personnel by demonstrating
experience and qualifications beyond
these qualifications.
2. The specialized experience included as part of the required
qualifications shall have been
obtained in the field of endeavor indicated by the applicable labor
categories listed below. The
experience indicated in the following labor categories must have been
performed during the past five
years. In cases requiring experience of more than five years, at least
five years of the total experience
must be within the past five year period. Key personnel are those who
will be performing in Key Labor
Categories listed below. The number of resumes required per key labor
category are shown in brackets.
3. Personnel must have, or be able to obtain the appropriate security
clearance as stated on the DD
Form 254 (Section J, Attachment 5). Personnel bid for the labor
categories annotated with an (*) below
shall have a Secret clearance at the time of award. In addition to
these categories, Secret clearances shall
be required for other labor categories, depending on actual tasking
throughout the duration of the contract.
Proof of U.S. citizenship is required to be permitted access to
government facilities.
Note: All required experience for all labor categories may have been
obtained concurrently. All degrees
shall be obtained from an accredited college or university.
DEFINITIONS
As used in the minimum personnel qualification descriptions for this
contract, the terms indicated shall be
defined or their meaning qualified as follows:
academic year - a full or complete year of study at a junior college,
college, university, or other academic
institution toward which at least 30 semester hours or 45 quarter
hours of undergraduate study, or 18
semester hours or 27 quarter hours of postgraduate study, were
completed.
accredited educational institution - a post-secondary educational
institution (junior college, college,
university, technical trade, or professional school) which was
approved by an accrediting agency listed as
nationally recognized by the U.S. Department of Education.
accredited program - an educational program or course of study offered
by a post-secondary educational
institution which was approved by an accrediting agency listed as
nationally recognized by the U.S.
Department of Education.
degree - an academic title conferred by an educational institution
upon completion of a unified course of
study; if not otherwise qualified, the term shall mean a degree at the
bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral
levels only.
engineering or engineering discipline - when used in relation to
educational or work experience
requirements, “engineering” shall mean any of the following specific
subjects, disciplines, or areas of
work experience only: aerospace, ceramic, chemical, civil, computer,
electrical, electronics, industrial,
materials, mechanical, nuclear, or safety engineering, and engineering
science.
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HSBP1005R0425 ATTACHMENT 6 – UAV STATEMENT OF WORK
experience and years of experience –
a) When used in relation to requirements for past participation in
professional work or employment
activities, “experience” shall mean full-time (on the basis of a
standard forty hour workweek)
participation, at least one-half of which time was spent performing
qualifying functions as practitioner or
employee.
b) When used in relation to requirements for a particular term or
period of participation, “years of
experience” shall mean full, productive years of participation.
Productive years are work years of fiftytwo
weeks reduced by reasonable amounts of time for holiday, annual, and
sick leave. If participation
was part-time, or if less than one-half of the standard work week was
spent performing qualifying
functions, the actual time spent performing qualifying functions may
be cumulated to arrive at full years
(or years and months) of experience. For example, only the actual
number of full days (or full-day
equivalents) of duty or drills completed during a year of military
reserve participation, or in other
qualifying part-time employment or practice may be cumulated toward
years of experience. Qualifying
part-time experience performed in addition to other full-time
qualifying employment during the same
period of time may be cumulated on a full-time equivalent basis and
added to the full-time experience to
satisfy a total experience requirement.
c) When both an educational/training qualification and an experience
qualification are indicated as
minimum requirements, only the experience attained after attainment of
the related educational
qualification will be considered as qualifying experience. Stated
otherwise, only post-degree or posttraining
activities shall be considered as satisfying total “experience”
requirements.
postgraduate degree - a master’s, Ph.D., or other professional degree
for which completion of an
undergraduate curriculum for receipt of a bachelor’s degree was a
prerequisite.
related field - Field of study with a similar curriculum of study but
referenced by a different name.
KEY LABOR CATEGORIES
*Program Manager (1)
*Senior Engineer (1)
*Air Vehicle Operator/Pilot (2)
*Mission Payload Operator (2)
NON-KEY LABOR CATEGORIES
Engineer
Air Vehicle Maintenance Technician
Senior Logistics Analyst
QUALIFICATIONS
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HSBP1005R0425 ATTACHMENT 6 – UAV STATEMENT OF WORK
Program Manager
(Key) This labor category shall serve as the overall lead or director
on the contract and as the liaison between
the contractor and the Government. Minimum qualifications are:
Minimum/General Experience: Ten (10) or more years of experience in
aviation and systems engineering or
program management and supervision of multiple projects in aviation
and systems engineering or the design
of or field service of aviation communication-electronic systems.
Minimum Education: Bachelor's degree from an accredited school in the
areas of Engineering, Systems
Management, Science or Business Administration.
Senior Engineer
(Key) This labor category shall serve as a project manager or team
leader for the support of tasking involving
system concept formulation, system and subsystem design analysis,
interface design analysis, field service
analysis and evaluation of communication-electronic systems. Minimum
qualifications are:
Minimum/General Experience: Five (5) years of practical aviation and
engineering experience in electronic
systems engineering/analyses or integrated communication-electronic
systems.
Minimum Education: Bachelor's degree in Engineering or Physics from an
accredited school.
Engineer
Responsibility: Provide engineering direction and guidance for system
design, installation, integration and
testing.
Minimum/General Experience: Three (3) years of general aviation and
engineering experience in systems
engineering/analyses or integrated communications-electronics systems.
Minimum Education: Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering or
related engineering discipline.
Air Vehicle Operator/Pilot
Responsibility: Performs Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) technical and/or
flight operations. Responsible
for UAV pre and post flight system checks, and navigates the UAV to
accomplish mission requirements.
Must be thoroughly familiar with remote piloting systems, aerodynamic,
and UAV flight performance
operation parameters.
Minimum/General Experience: Five (5) or more years of experience in a
relevant functional area.
Minimum Education: Associates degree or equivalent, or directly
applicable military training
Mission Payload Operator
Responsibility: Performs advanced engineering and/or analysis tasks
required for operation of Unmanned
Air Vehicle (UAV) onboard sensor(s) while in flight. Performs sensor
calibration and baseline
instrumentation set-up. Performs data collection to meet customer
needs and insures data quality control.
Records and interprets sensor data. Optimizes sensor performance for
given tasks. Applies advanced
engineering and/or analysis practices, concepts, and data collection
procedures. Gathers information,
analyzes problem areas, adjust instrumentation and performs system
modifications as necessary to
enhancements data acquisition.
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HSBP1005R0425 ATTACHMENT 6 – UAV STATEMENT OF WORK
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Minimum/General Experience: Six (6) or more years of general
experience including at least three (3)
years of specialized experience in the required area of expertise.
Minimum Education: Associates degree or equivalent, or directly
applicable military training
Air Vehicle Maintenance Technician
Responsibility: Performs UAV maintenance and/or technical activities
such as preventative and
corrective maintenance to insure successful completion of air mission
operations. Prepares the UAV
systems for flight and acts as a ground safety observer during flight
operations.
Minimum/General Experience: Three (3) or more years of experience in a
relevant functional area or
training sufficient to enable the successful accomplishment of
assigned air vehicle maintenance tasking.
Minimum Education: Associate’s degree or equivalent directly
applicable military training.
Senior Logistics Analyst
Responsibility: Provide logistic technology that ensures effective
support of integration, installation, and
test and evaluation. Minimum qualifications are:
Minimum/General Experience: Four years of experience in the field of
aircraft integrated logistics
support.
Minimum Education: Associate’s degree in a technical discipline from
an accredited school or a High
school diploma plus six (6) years of experience in the field of
integrated logistics support.